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m THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
1 BtiUner/Appellee, 
IIHH psHndent/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060353-CA 
.ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT BRIEF 
:>eai rromFilial Orders Entered in the Third Judicial District Court 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley Presiding 
•IMIFIVIAN (1/626) 
•pLENDENlN, P.C. 
Bite Street, 12th Floor 
By , Utah 84111 
§1801) 531-8900 
•801)531-1716 
Todd Stone, pro se 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 277-9955 
Facsimile: (801) 
IIIIH!llfn»s I I Petitioner/Appellee Respondent/Appellant 
Tabl 
ADDENDUM "26" 
Brent R. Chipman #626 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5125 
Facsimile: (801)359-9443 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo— 
JOANNE L. STONE, 
Petitioner, 
TODD L. STONE, 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 0149034S£DA 
judge T^j rem e £-• Me/te 
Comm. T> Vdfcr\<k CzS-ej 
ooOoo 
Petitioner, for cause of action against the Respondent, states and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Petitioner is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah and has been for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married on June 12, 1987 ir> 
Oakland, Alameda County, California. 
3. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen 
between the parties making it impossible for Petitioner to continue in the marital 
relationship. 
4. There have been three children born as issue of the marriage, namely: 
Brittney, born February 3, 1990; Brooklynn, born November 22, 1993; and Brylee, born 
March 19, 1996. 
5. Petitioner should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor 
children subject to Respondent's rights of visitation as agreed by the parties. If the parties 
cannot agree, Respondent's visitation should be supervised. 
6. During the course of the marriage the parties have acquired a home and real 
property located at 2783 Melony Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. Petitioner should be 
awarded the temporary and permanent use and possession of said home subject to the 
mortgage obligations thereon, provided that Respondent pay adequate amounts of child 
support and alimony. 
7. Respondent should have a lien for one-half the net equity in the home and 
real property, or such other amount as may be consistent with the final property settlement 
between the parties, with said lien to be paid upon the sale of the home. Petitioner's 
remarriage or cohabitation, or upon the youngest child becoming emancipated. 
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Respondent should execute a Quit-Claim Deed to the Petitioner subject to the equitable 
lien. 
8. Petitioner should be awarded one half of Respondent's retirement, pensions 
or profit sharing acquired during the marriage. 
9. Respondent should be awarded one half of Petitioner's retirement, pensions 
or profit sharing acquired during the marriage. 
10. Petitioner should be awarded the temporary and permanent use and 
possession of the 1989 GMC Suburban, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent. 
Respondent should sign over the title of said vehicle to Petitioner. 
11. Respondent should be awarded the temporary and permanent use of the 1984 
GMC truck, the Chevrolet Caprice, and the motorcycle free and clear of any claim by the 
Petitioner. 
12. Respondent is employed, and has average gross monthly income of 
approximately $ 3,150 .00. 
13. Petitioner is employed, and has average gross monthly income of 
approximately $2,415.00. A copy of her pay check is attached as Exhibit "A". 
14. Respondent should pay Petitioner the base sum of $ 775.00 per month as 
and for child suppon beginning in June, 2001 based upon the Uniform Child Support 
Schedules. 
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15. Respondent should pay Petitioner $ 1,150.00 per month as alimony, 
beginning in June, 2001 and continuing for a time equal to the duration of the marriage 
unless Petitioner remarries or cohabits. During the time when the parties divide the excess 
rental income from the South Promenade property, Respondent's alimony obligation should 
be $950.00 per month. 
16. Income withholding should be authorized to collect Respondent's support 
obligation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing. Respondent should pay all 
applicable administrative costs for such income withholding. 
17. Respondent should maintain health and medical insurance on the Petitioner 
and the minor children during the pendency of this action and on the minor children 
following entry of the Decree of Divorce as available through his employment. The parties 
should equally divide all medical, dental, orthodontic, optical or counseling expenses not 
covered by insurance which are incurred on behalf of the minor children. The parties 
should also equally divide the pro rata cost of insurance on the minor children. At the 
present time, Respondent's insurance coverage is provided free of charge. 
18. Petitioner should be afforded a COBRA conversion on Respondent's health 
insurance, at her cost, following entry of the Decree. 
19. Respondent should pay one-half of all work related, or education related 
child care costs incurred by Petitioner for the minor children. 
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20. Respondent should maintain life insurance on his life with the minor 
children and the Petitioner as beneficiaries for so long as he has an obligation to pay child 
support or alimony. 
21. Each party should be awarded their clothing, personal effects and the 
household furnishings and furniture in their possession, except as specifically set forth 
otherwise herein. 
22. The court should make an equitable distribution of other items of household 
furniture and personal property acquired by the parties during the marriage. 
23. Respondent should assume, pay and hold Petitioner harmless from the 
following debts and obligations: the America First Credit Union Visa; one-half the 
obligation to Barnes Bank Visa; his student loans; the Sears account; that portion of 
Questar bill ($ 36.75 per month on a total due of $1,492.00 as of June, 2001) used for an 
air conditioner in the condominium given to the parties by Respondent's father; and his 
separate debts and obligation incurred subsequent to June 1, 2001. 
24. Petitioner should assume and pay the following debts and obligations: one-
half the Barnes Bank Visa and her separate debts and obligations incurred subsequent to 
the separation of the parties except as specifically set forth otherwise herein. 
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25. Petitioner has the following approximate monthly expenses to support 
herself and the minor children: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
i. 
J-
k. 
1. 
m. 
1. 
m. 
n. 
0. 
Mortgage 
Home equity loan 
Maintenance 
Food & Household Supplies 
Clothing 
Telephone 
Medical Expenses (Petitioner's one- half) 
Dental Expenses (Petitioner's one-half) 
Utah Power & Light 
Questar 
School Expenses and lunch 
Child care (one-half) 
Entertainment & Recreation 
Gifts and Donations 
Auto maintenance, repairs 
and gasoline 
Water and Sewer 
Barnes Bank Visa 
TOTAL 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
L 
$ 
1,151.91 
476.00 
125.00 
350.00 
160.00 
45.00 
20.00 
20.00 
38.00 
145.00 
52.00 
300.00 
75.00 
245.00 
335.00 
55.33 
37.00 
3,630.24 
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26. Petitioner has gross monthly income of $2,415.00 and net monthly income 
of $1,806.00. 
27. Petitioner is in need of temporary child support in the sum of $ 775.00 per 
month according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines beginning in June, 2001 when 
the parties separated. Respondent has not paid any money to the Petitioner since their 
separation, and he has not paid the mortgage obligations on the residence occupied by the 
Petitioner. 
28. Petitioner is in need of temporary alimony in the sum of at least $ 1,150.00 
per month beginning in June, 2001. 
29. The parties are purchasing other real property located at 6931 South 
Promenade, Salt Lake City, Utah which is rented at the present time. The monthly rental 
income exceeds the mortgage obligation by approximately $400.00 per month. Petitioner 
should be awarded one-half of the excess monthly rent, beyond the mortgage obligation, 
beginning in July, 2001. During the time the parties divide the excess rental income, 
Petitioner's need for temporary alimony would be reduced to $950.00 per month. 
30. The rental property on South Promenade should be sold immediately and 
the proceeds equally divided by the parties. 
31. The parties have an interest in a condominium located in Salt Lake City 
which was previously owned by Respondent's father. 
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32. Said condominium should be sold immediately and the proceeds divided by 
the parties. 
33. The Respondent has also inherited a home in San Francisco from his father, 
but Respondent's mother has a life estate in said property. 
34. The Respondent receives approximately $1,800.00 per month from the sale 
of a business owned by his father. 
35. Respondent should be awarded the real property and other assets inherited 
from his father free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner. 
36. The parties should be mutually restrained from harassing, annoying or 
bothering the other during the pendency of this action and subsequent to entry of a decree 
herein. 
37. Petitioner is apprehensive that without an order requiring Respondent to pay 
temporary child support and alimony that Respondent will not support the Petitioner and 
the minor children. 
38. Petitioner is apprehensive that without a Temporary Order, Respondent may 
try to exercise custodial rights over the minor children as a weapon against the Petitioner. 
39. Petitioner has been the primary care giver for the minor children. 
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40. Respondent has not provided much care for the minor children during the 
marriage. Respondent does not cope well with the children and yells and physically 
disciplines the children. 
41. The children are upset and confused with Respondent's behavior. 
42. The court should schedule an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
Respondent to be and appear before a Domestic Relations Commissioner of the above-
entitled court at a date and time certain then and there to show cause why Petitioner should 
not be awarded the temporary custody of the minor children subject to Respondent's 
reasonable visitation; why Respondent should not pay temporary child support and alimony 
as set forth herein; why the parties should not be mutually restrained from harassing, 
annoying, or bothering one another during the pendency of this action; why Petitioner 
should not be awarded the temporary use and possession of the 1989 GMC Suburban; why 
Respondent should not be awarded the temporary use and possession of the 1984 truck, the 
Chevrolet Caprice, and motorcycle; why Petitioner should not be awarded the temporary 
use of the marital home subject to the mortgage obligations thereon; why the court should 
not enter appropriate orders regarding the temporary payment of debts and obligations: 
why Petitioner should not be awarded the temporary use and possession of the household 
furniture and furnishings; and why the court should not enter such additional temporary 
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relief as may be appropriate, including the sale of the rental property on 6931 South 
Promenade and the condominium gifted to the parties by Respondent's father. 
43. Notice is hereby given that the parties are required to attend a divorce 
education parents course within forty-five days of the filing of this Complaint. Notice 
concerning the scheduling of the course and its contents is attached hereto as Exhibit "BM. 
44. The parties are required to view a videotape on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR). Information regarding the ADR program is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C". Petitioner has viewed the videotape. 
45. Respondent should pay one-half of Petitioner's reasonable attorneys' fees 
and court costs incurred in this proceeding if it is uncontested, or such greater amount as 
the court deems appropriate, under the circumstances, if this matter is contested. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the following relief: 
1. For entry of a Decree of Divorce to become final and absolute upon signing 
and entry in the register of actions. 
2. Awarding Petitioner the care, custody and control of the minor children 
subject to Respondent's rights of reasonable visitation as agreed by the parties. If the 
parties cannot agree. Respondent's visitation should be supervised. 
3. Ordering Respondent to pay the sum of $775.00 per month as child support 
beginning in June. 2001. 
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4. Ordering Respondent to pay the sum of $1,150.00 per month as alimony 
beginning in June, 2001. 
5. Awarding Petitioner the use and possession of the marital residence subject 
to the mortgage indebtedness thereon, and subject to an equitable lien in favor of the 
Respondent for one-half the equity therein, as may be adjusted in the fmal property 
settlement. 
6. Ordering that the real property located at 6931 South Promenade be sold and 
the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. Further ordering the equal division 
of the excess rental proceeds received from said property. 
7. Ordering that the real property (condominium) given to the parties by 
Respondent's father be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
Further ordering the equal division of excess rental proceeds received from said property. 
8. Awarding all property and assets inherited from his father to the Respondent, 
free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner. 
9. Equitably dividing the household furnishings and furniture acquired by the 
parties during the marriage. 
10. Equitably dividing the other assets acquired by the parties during the 
marriage. 
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11. Awarding Petitioner the 1989 GMC Suburban free and clear of any claim 
by the Respondent. 
12. Awarding Respondent the 1984 GMC truck, the Chevrolet Caprice, and the 
motorcycle free and clear of any claim by the Petitioner. 
13. Distributing the debts and obligations of the parties as set forth in the 
complaint. 
14. For entry of an Order to Show Cause requiring Respondent to be and appear 
before a Domestic Relations Commissioner to show cause why Petitioner should not be 
granted the temporary relief set forth in her Motion and Verified Complaint. 
15. For an order that Respondent pay one-half of Petitioner's reasonable 
attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in this proceeding if the same is uncontested, or 
such greater sum as may be appropriate if the matter is contested. 
16. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper. 
St 
DATED this ~2 ( day of June, 2001. 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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DATED this p i / day of June, 2001. 
VStsHJp_ 
Joariiie L. Stone 
Petiuoner 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
c ) 
On the ^ / g day of June, 2001, personally appeared before me Joanne L. Stone, 
who duly acknowledged that she is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter, that she has 
and correct according to her own knowledge, information and belief. 
Notary Public I 
DEANNEM.EGGETT , 
455 East 500 South. Suite 300 I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
" " ^ t l S o ^ " J Notary Public 
State of Utah \ 
Wottr I>IIK1IV / ' / 
(SE/ 
Petitioner's Address: 
2783 Melony Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
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Tab 2 
ADhh'INIMUM "27" 
Glen M. Rahman, ((TSB #2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (USB #1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
1 
JOANNE L. STONE 
1 Petitioner, 
1 ^ # 
TODD L. STONE, 
Respondent. 
COUNTER PETITION 
Case No. 014903655 DA I 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley | 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
STATE OF UTAH 
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
) ss. 
) 
Todd Stone, Respondent, being first duly sworn petitions the Court and makes the following 
representations and requests as follows: 
1. Respondent is a bona fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has been for 
more than three (3) months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Respondent and Petitioner are husband and wife, having been married in Oakland, 
Alameda County, California on the 12th day of June 1987. 
3. There are three (3) minor children bom as issue of the marriage of the parties, namely: 
Brittney Stone, bom February 3, 1990, age 11; Brooklynn Stone, bom November 22, 1993, age 7 1/2; 
and Brylee Stone, bom March 19, 1996, age 5. 
4. In the event a divorce is granted. it is i easonable tl lat joint legal and physical ci istody of 
the minor children be awarded to the parties, and that a visitation and custody plan be worked out with 
the assistance of an. ev all latoi in tl i.e e\ ent the pai ties cannot agree, 
5. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties making the continuation of the marriage intolerable to the Respondent. 
6. During the course of the marriage, the parties have acquired the following property: 
REAL PROPERTY SCHEDULE 
Income Producing 
No 
a. 
Property 
Descr. & 
Ownership 
Interest 
House - Marital 
Residence 
House -
Promenade Dr. 
Condo - Pintail 
Court 
hi 
Lien Holder 
Information 
Wells Fargo 
America First 
CU 
Washington 
Mortgage 
Country Wide 
Home Loan 
Present FMV 
$220,000.00 
$98,000.00 
$95,000.00 
Debt Balance 
$139,000.00 
$ 38,000.00 
$64,000.00 
$67,000.00 
Title Details 
Joint Tenants 
Joint Tenants 
Joint Tenants 
f. 
Purchase 
Info. 
Bought in '94 
Bought in'89 
Refinanced in 
1986 
Not after July, 
2001 
$800.00/mo 
Loan/Fees 
$518.00/mo + 
Condo Fee of 
$195/mo. + Special 
Assessment 
2 
PERSONAL PROPERTY SCHEDULE 
a. I 
roperty Descr. & 
>vnership Interest 
mp Trailer 
lity Trailer 
rtorcycle Trailer 
no 
md Father Clock 
rling Silver 
anox China 
ldware 
isher 
/. Panasonic 
/. f 
3rts Equipment 
mping Equipment 
yvn Mower, Edger, 
mmer, 
3wblower 
inkier System 
frigerator/Freezer 
Couches 
}olf Clubs 
m Ball Machines 
b. 1 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 1 
any 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
1 None 
J None 
| Yes 
c. 1 
Present 
FMV 
None 
None 
None 
$200.00 
$400.00 
$1600.00 
$800.00 
$300.00 
$150.00 
1 $1,000.00 
d. | 
Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Nonce 
None 
$750.00 
1 None 
None 
1 None 
J None 
1 $1,000.00 
— 1 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
M 
M 
C 
SG 
CG 
M 
M 
CG 
M 
CG 
C, M, SG 
C,M 
CG,M 
M 
M 
M 
M, SG, C 
1 M 
- 1 Purchase Info. 
Respondent's money 
Respondent's money 
Student Loan 
Gift to Respondent 
Respondent's money 
Respondent's money 
Money from 
Wedding 
; Respondent's money 
Respondent's money, 
gift from 
Respondents mother 
1 for rental properties 
1 Respondent's money 
Paid off with Father's 
1 money 
fc
 1 Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Rental $$ 
No 
No 
3 
a. 
Property Descr. & 
Dwnership Interest 
itchenware 
- Bar-b-ques 
jtchen Table 
•ooks 
Light Fixtures 
lirrors 
uburban 
is Log 
icture & Bowl 
iir Hockey Table 
- Ping Pong Tables 
:e Chests 
ocking Chair 
Children's Furniture 
rard Tools 
'hnstmas China 
bedding Presents 
iold Jewelry 
$ from Candy 
Machines 
.amps 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
America 
First CU 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
1 None 
None 
c. 
Present 
FMV 
None 
$5,000.00 
$7,000.00 
S125.00 
d. 
Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
J None 
1 None 
— 1 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
C,M 
M,CG 
M 
C, M, CG 
M, CG ! 
C 
M 
M 
C 
M 
M 
C,M 
CG 
M,CG 
C,M 
C, M, SG 
M 
C, M, SG 
M 
C 
f. 
Purchase Info. 
Respondent's money 
Gift from mother 
Gifts from mother 
and Respondent's 
money 
Respondent's money 
gi \ 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes ' 
1 No 
4 
a. 
roperty Descr. & 
ivnership Interest 
ing 
ing Set 
leos 
by Furniture 
fice Equipment 
^er 
hi 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
c. 
Present 
FMV 
$1,500.00 
$500.00 
$300.00 
$15,000.00 
$250.00 
Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
e. 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SOGift to Spouse 
CG 
M 
C,M 
M 
C,CG 
CG 
f. 
Purchase Info, 
Birthday gift from 
mother 
Loan from family 
Inherited from father 
Gift from mother 
Si 1 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
The Respondent and Petitioner have premarital property or inheritance as follows: 
PRE-MARITAUINHERITED PROPERTY SCHEDULE 
Item 
Doll Cabinet 
T.V., Coffee Table, 
Hutch, End Tables 
Bicycle 
Gray China 
Red Luggage 
Christmas items 
[ Letterman Jacket 
1 Caprice 
1 Motorcycle 
a 
Who has possession 
Who it belongs to 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
Petitioner/Petitioner's 
4£es££«tknt/Respondent' s 
Respondent's 
b 
Acquired 
Prior to 
Marriage 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
c 
Received 
as a 
Loan 
-Received as 
an 
Inheritance 
yes 
e 
Liquidation 
Value 
f 
Replaceme 
nt Value 
5 
Item 
Bedroom Furniture 
T.V./Living Room 
Furniture 
Dining Room 
Furniture 
Tools/Tool Box 
$$ from Bus. Sale 
Big Clock 
Deceased Father's 
Furniture 
White Pillow 
1 1 - Table Saw 
1 Condo - Pintail Ct 
a 
Who has possession 
Who it belongs to 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent's 
Respondent/Respondent's 
b 
Acquired 
Prior to 
Marriage 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
c 
Received 
as a 
Loan 
yes 
d, 
Received as 
an 
Inheritance 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
e 
Liquidation 
Value 
f 
Replaceme 
nt Value 
8. The parties have the following retirement accounts that have accumulated during the 
course of their marriage: 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS SCHEDULE 
Custodian/ Account 
Number 
DMBA 
Utah Retirement 
Systems 
Qwest 
1 Qwest 
Date 
Account 
Opened 
1988 
1992 
1999 
2000 
Type of 
Account 
401K 
Savings & 
Investment 
401K 
401K 
Investment 
Account Balance (a) on 
date of marriage; 
fb) on date of answers or 
as indicated 
$12,000.00 
$5,000.00 
6 shares 
Names and Addresses of 
all Account Holders and 
Beneficiaries 
Joanne Stone 
Todd Stone 
Todd Stone 
Todd Stone 
Loan 
Information 
None - unable to 
obtain loan since 
unstable employee 
None / ??? vested 
lOyrs 
Restricted from 
sale for 6 mo. 
6 
Ul - Unsecured School Loan 
U - Unsecured Loan 
S - Secured Loan 
HC - Health Care 
CC- Credit Cards 
INS - Insurance 
AF - Attorney Fees 
T - Taxes 
RP I - Real Property at Promenade Drive 
RP2 - Real Property for Condominium 
RP3 - Real Property for California House 
RP4 - Real Property at Melony Drive 
9. During the marriage, the parties have incurred the following debts and obligations: 
DEBTS SCHEDULE 
Type 
(See above 
for 
definition) | 
Ul 
Ul 
Ul 
Ul 
U 
u 
u 
u 
u 
T 
T 
T 
T 
S 
Creditor/Account No. 
UniPac - Student Loan | 
School - Computer 
Classes 
Classes - Parent 10 
Classes - Fact 24 
Ann Stone 
Wasatch Lawn 
Mower Specialists (for 
mower, edger, trimmer, 
etc.) 
Mountain America CU 
credit line 
Ann Stone 
Utah State Tax 
Commission 
IRS and USTC for year 
2000 income tax 
Federal Social Security 
1 California property tax 
Paxton Garage 
Date Incurred 
1988-89 
April 2001 
June 2001 
Oct 2000 
Reimburse-
ment of 
Expenses 
1996-1999 
May 2001 
Collateral 
Vehicle 
purchased 
after 
separation 
Mechanic's 
1 lien on Truck 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent | 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Joint 
1 Respondent 
Respondent 
Balance 
Owed 
$3,600.00 
$200.00 
$400.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
$4,500.00 
$850.00 
$6,500.00 
$2,500.00 
$2,100.00 
Unknown 
$5,000.00 
1,000.00 
$250.00 
Payment 
Terms/Mo. 
$92.00/mo. 
$200.00 / mo. 
$75.00/mo. 
$225.00/mo. 
$l,200.00/mo. 
75.00/mo. 
All due 
RP4 
RP4 
RP4 
RP3 
RP2 
RP2 
RP2 
RP2 
RP2 
RP1 
RP1 
INS 
INS 
(JNS 
Wells Fargo Mortgage 
America First CU 
Anne Stone - paid 
house payments on 
Melony Drive while 
Respondent was out of 
work 
1 st National Mortgage 
Natalie Echstien 
Countrywide Mortgage 
Hidden Lakes 
Hidden Lakes Assn. 
SL County Property 
Taxes - Condo 
PNC Mortgage 
(Changed to 
Washington Mutual) 
Carrol Barilla 
MetLife - Condo 
Insurance 
Bear River Insurance 
1 (for all vehicles) 
Allstate Insurance 
Oct 1993 
Dec 1993 
Mar-Oct 1997 
Aug 1999 
April 2000 
April 2001 
Dec 1986 
Jan 2001 
July 1989 
Oct 2000 
May 2001 
May 2001 
Melony 
Drive House 
Melony 
Drive House 
California 
House 
Rental 
Deposit & 
Last Month 
Rent 
Pintail Court 
Rental 
Condo 
Gas/water 
Condo 
Promenade 
House -
rental 
Rental 
Deposit 
Joint 
Joint 
Joint 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Joint 
Joint 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent 
$138,000.00 
$38,000.00 
$2500.00 
$89,000.00 
$1,800.00 
$68,000.00 
$55.00 
approx 
$1,000.00 
$65,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$350.00 
$800.00 
$2,400.00 
$l,200.00/mo. 
$430.00/mo. 
$650.00 / mo. 
$195.00/mo. 
$750.00/mo. 
$200.00/mo. 
HC 
CC 
cc 
cc 
AF 
Doctor and hospital 
bills incurred by 
Respondent during his 
disability 
Sears credit card 
Barnes VISA 
America First CU credit 
card - VISA 
Attorney Fees -
California & Utah 
Joint 
Petitioner 
Petitioner 
Joint 
unknown 
$2,100.00 
$2,800.00 
$450.00 
unknown 
$60.00/mo. 
$75.00/mo. 
$30.00/mo. 
10. The parties have an interest in the following Vehicles and Recreational Equipment: 
VEHICLE, RV, ATV, BOAT, etc. SCHEDULE 
Description of 
vehicle; VIN; Year 
and Model; 
Ownership Interest 
1989 Suburban 
Respondent 
84 Yamaha 
Motorcycle 
1 Respondent 
1984 GMC Truck 
Respondent 
1 1977 Chevy Caprice 
1 Respondent 
1 1977 Layton Trailer 
Respondent 
1986 Chevrolet 
Celebrity 
Respondent 
— Purchase Info, -
Date, Purchase 
price, Down 
Payment 
April 30, 1996 
Prior to marriage 
Gifted from father 
Prior to marriage 
Purchased with $$ 
from refinancing 
Condo 
, $1,200.00 
purchased from 
family 
— 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa 
tion 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
— Monthly 
Payment 
Amount 
None 
None 
$250.00 
owing on 
repairs 
None 
None 
$200.00 
— 1 
Present 
FMV 
None 
f. 
Insurance 
Carrier/Amt. 
Of Coverage 
Bear River Ins. 
Tebbs Ins. 
Bear River Ins. 
None 
None 
& 1 
Name of 
Principal 
Driver 
Respondent | 
Respondent 
Respondent 
None 
Respondent 
1 
9 
11. Each of the parties is able-bodied and employed. Respondent is employed at Quest 
Corporation, earning approximately $3150.00 per month except he is currently on disability pay at 
$2506.92 per month for approximately one more month, and Petitioner is employed at the Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), and earns approximately 
$2416.00 per month, and may have had a raise since April 2001. 
12. As has been alleged above, the parties have a 1989 GMC Suburban vehicle, free of any 
lien or obligations and which is equipped to pull a trailer or boat of the parties. Subsequent to the 
initiation of this action, the Respondent has acquired a 1986 Chevrolet Celebrity for the sum of 
$1200.00 payable at the rate of $200.00 per month which is the only other vehicle that is adequate for 
carrying the 3 minor children as well as the driver. The parties have a Chevrolet Caprice and an older 
pick-up truck which are free of any encumbrance, but are inoperable without repairs. 
13. Each of the parties have hospital and medical insurance available to them through their 
employer for the benefit of the minor children and themselves, and Respondent's has been at no cost to 
him but there will be a cost in the near future. It is reasonable that the parties determine and choose the 
coverage that would be the least expensive for the minor children and that they each pay any uncovered 
expenses, premiums and deductibles on an equal basis. 
14. Each of the parties are employed necessitating child care. It is reasonable that each share 
1/2 of any work-related child care cost actually incurred. It is reasonable that the children to be cared 
for from time to time by Respondent's mother when she is willing and able. 
15. Petitioner has abused the process of a protective order in an effort to acquire the use and 
possession of the parties residence, custody of the minor children and possession of a vehicle and has 
effectively abandoned the marriage. In addition, she has indulged in conduct which makes her ineligible 
i 
for alimony. In addition, she is not in need of alimony, the Respondent is not capable of bearing his 
needed expenses and pay alimony. Petitioner is able to provide for her own needs without alimony, and 
under the criteria of Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) none should be awarded. 
16. Petitioner has expressed disdain and hatred for Respondent's family and it is reasonable 
that Petitioner be restored to her maiden name of Butorovich. 
17. It is reasonable that in the event a divorce is granted, the Court make equitable orders 
dividing the properties acquired during the parties marriage in an equitable manner, including the equity 
in the home at Melony Drive, the equity in thej^wto at Promenade, the value of the automobiles or the 
automobiles themselves, and the value of any 401(k) pension, retirement or profit sharing plans or other 
fringe benefits of the parties acquired during the marriage to the date of entry of the decree. 
18. It is reasonable that the Court make an equitable allocation of the debts and obligations 
incurred by the parties during their marriage under all the circumstances. The Petitioner should 
specifically be responsible for the following debts and obligations and be required to hold the 
Respondent harmless from any liability thereon: 
a. The first and second mortgage payments on the Melony Drive home, all taxes, 
maintenance obligations and expenses connected with said home, including utilities, telephone 
company, Utah Power and Light, and Questar, water and sewer, and any other utility connected 
with said home subsequent to the separation of the parties; 
b. All expense and operating obligations connected with the Suburban automobile 
that she is driving. That she be required to hold the Respondent harmless from any liability 
thereon; 
I 
c. The obligation to Barnes Bank Visa, holding the Respondent harmless from any 
liability thereon; 
d. One-half of the outstanding medical and dental expenses and 1/2 of the medical 
and dental expenses not covered by insurance and including any premiums with respect to 
expenses for the minor children; 
e. One-half of the work-related day care expense for the minor children actually 
incurred and paid; 
f. The school expenses and lunch for the children. 
19. It is reasonable that in the event a divorce is granted that the Respondent be awarded all 
of his inherited property and gifted property from his father, and the matters obtained from his father's 
estate, specifically including the real property located in Hidden Lakes, known as the Pintail condo, 
which said property was placed in the name of the Petitioner and Respondent as joint tenants to oblige 
the Respondent's father for purposes of allowing him to acquire another loan on real property. It has 
been acknowledged by Petitioner at all times that she has no equitable interest in said property and that 
she recognizes ((s)was to be returned to the joint names of Respondent and his father (prior to transfer 
into the joint names, it had been in the joint names of Respondent and his father prior to the parties 
marriage). The delay in transferring title back to Respondent and his father as joint tenants, was 
occasioned by the illness and subsequent death of Respondent's father. 
20. It is reasonable that a child evaluation study be accomplished for custody and a Parenting 
Plan and that each pay 1/2 of the costs. It is further reasonable that the children receive counseling 
immediately because of the stress of this process and the negative acting out as a result thereof. 
l 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
1. For decree of divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties the same to become final upon the date of entry. 
2. For an award of joint legal and physical custody of the minor children to each of the 
parties and that a parenting plan be put into place with the assistance of a child custody and visitation 
evaluator in the event the parties cannot agree. 
3. For child support to be paid in accordance with the guidelines established by statute in 
the State of Utah based upon the combined joint earnings through the parties employment. 
4. For an order requiring each of the parties to pay 1/2 of the hospital, medical and dental 
expenses not covered by insurance and to share equally the premiums and deductibles for insurance 
coverage, for the benefit of the minor children during their minority, so long as the same is provided 
through their employment at a reasonable cost, and that the parties choose the policy that is most 
economical and provides the greatest coverage for the children. 
5. For an order restoring Petitioner to her maiden name of Butorovich. 
6. That the Court enter an order awarding no alimony to either party based upon the criteria 
established in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) in that Petitioner is capable of providing for 
her own needs, she is able-bodied and employed and earns substantial income sufficient for her needs, 
and the Respondent is not capable of servicing the parties obligations and paying anything toward 
Petitioner's needs. In addition, Petitioner's conduct, including abandonment of the marriage, does not 
make her eligible for alimony. 
7. Respondent prays for an order dividing assets as follows: 
a. To Respondent all of his premarital and inherited properties including both 
real and personal and subject to any encumbrance on said properties, if any. 
b. To Respondent the Suburban automobile, motorcycle and truck, free of 
any encumbrance and free of any claim or interest in the Petitioner. 
c. One half of the value of the 401 (k) pension plan, profit sharing or any 
fringe benefit plans accumulated during marriage through the parties employment and subject to 
an appropriate qualified domestic relations order. 
d. The all-right title and interest in equity in and to the Promenade caado 
subject to the encumbrance thereon. 
e. Respondent's items of personal clothing, personal effects and 
miscellaneous items, 1/2 of the items of the items of furniture, household goods and household 
utensils and effects acquired by the parties during their marriage as the parties may agree or as 
determined by a mediator after the parties each make a list of the items which they desire placing 
the values thereon. 
f The following items of personal property: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY SCHEDULE 
a. 
Property Descr. & 
Ownership Interest 
^amp Trailer 
Jtihty Trailer 
b. 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any 
None 
None 
c. 
Present 
FMV 
None 
None 
^ 
Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
e. 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG^Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
M 
M 
L 
Purchase Info. 
Respondent's money 
Respondent's money 
gi 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
1 
— 1 
*roperty Descr. & 
'wnership Interest 
otorcycle Trailer 1 
ano 
and Father Clock 
srling Silver 
:nnox China 
)ldware 
asher 
V. ganasonic 
y. f ) 
iorts Equipment 
imping Equipment 
wn Mower, Edger, 
immer, 
owblower 
rinkler System 
frigerator/Freezer 
Couches 
3olf Clubs 
im Ball Machines 
tchenware 
Bar-b-ques 
tchen Table 
— 1 Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any 
None 
None 
None 1 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Yes 
1 None 
1 None 
1 None 
£• 1 
Present 
FMV 
None 
$200.00 
$400.00 
$1600.00 
$800.00 
$300.00 
$150.00 
$1,000.00 
1 None 
- 1 Debt 
Balance 
None | 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Nonce 
None 
$750.00 
None 
None 
1 None 
1 None 
$1,000.00 
1 None 
1 None 
None 
— f 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
C 
s6 
CG 
M 
M 
CG 
M 
CG 
C, M, SG 
C,M 
CG,M 
M 
M 
M 
M, SG, C 
M 
C,M 
M,CG 
1 M 
f. 1 
Purchase Info. 
Student Loan 
Gift to Respondent 
Respondent's money 
Respondent's money 
Money from 
Wedding 
Respondent's money 
Respondent's money, 
gift from 
Respondents mother 
for rental properties 
Respondent's money 
Paid off with Father's 
money 
& 1 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Rental $$ 
No 
No 
No 
No 
1 No 
1 
__ 
Property Descr. & 
3wnership Interest 
looks 
Light Fixtures 
/lirrors 
luburban 
3as Log 
Mcture & Bowl 
Vir Hockey Table 
- Ping Pong Tables 
ce Chests 
locking Chair 
Ihildren's Furniture 
Yard Tools 
Christmas China 
Wedding Presents 
Gold Jewelry 
$$ from Candy 
Machines 
Lamps 
Swing 
^wing Set 
" b. 1 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any | 
None 
None 
None 
America 
First CU 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
c. 
Present 
FMV 
$5,000.00 
$7,000.00 
$125.00 
$1,500.00 
-Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
— 1 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
C, M, CG 
M,CG 
C 
M 
M 
C 
M 
M 
C,M 
CG 
M,CG 
C,M 
C, M, SG 
M 
! C, M, SG 
M 
C 
CG 
M 
- 1 Purchase Info. 
Respondent's money 
Gift from mother 
Gifts from mother 
and Respondent's 
money 
Respondent's money 
Birthday gift from 
mother 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No I 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
a. 
ropertv Descr. & 
wnership Interest 
deos 
by Furniture 
fice Equipment 
yer 
b. 
Lien 
Holder 
Informa-
tion, if 
any 
None 
None 
None 
None 
c. 
Present 
FMV 
$500.00 
$300.00 
$15,000.00 
$250.00 
d. 
Debt 
Balance 
None 
None 
None 
None 
e. 
C = Client Pre-M 
S = Spouse Pre-M 
M=Acq During M 
CG=Gift to Client 
SG=Gift to Spouse 
C,M 
M 
C,CG 
CG 
f. 
Purchase Info. 
Loan from family 
Inherited from father 
Gift from mother 
& 1 
Income 
Producing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
8. To the Petitioner the following items of property: 
a. The all-right title and interest in and to the Melony Drive home, subject to 
the first and second mortgages thereon, and holding Respondent harmless from any liability 
thereon. 
b. The blue Chevrolet Celebrity, free of any encumbrance. 
c. All of Petitioner's premarital and/or inherited property. 
d. Petitioner items of personal clothing and personal effects and miscellaneous items 
e. One-half of the value of the 401(k) pension plan, profit sharing or any 
fringe benefit plans through the parties employment and subject to a qualified domestic relations 
order. 
9. For an order requiring the Petitioner pay the following debts and obligations and 
requiring her to hold the Respondent harmless from any liability thereon: 
a. The first and second mortgages on the Melony Drive property, including all 
payments starting with July 2001 and the real property taxes or any expenses in connection with 
said property. 
b. The Barnes Bank Visa obligation, and all debts and obligations or expenses that 
she may have incurred subsequent to June 1, 2001, and including her costs and attorney fees for 
the pursuit of this action. 
10. Requiring the Respondent to pay the following debts and obligations and requiring him to 
hold the Petitioner harmless from any liability thereon as follows: 
a. The mortgage obligation on the Promenade home, holding the Petitioner 
harmless from any liability thereon, including all payments from June 1, 2001 and the obligation 
against the Pintail condo representing his premarital property and/or inherited property. 
b. The obligation on the blue Chevrolet Celebrity. 
c. All obligations incurred subsequent to the parties separation, including his 
separate costs and attorney fees. 
d. The following debts: 
DEBTS SCHEDULE 
Type 
Ul 
Ul 
Ul 
Ul 
u 
Creditor/Account No. 
UniPac - Student Loan 
School - Computer 
Classes 
Classes - Parent 10 
Classes - Fact 24 
Ann Stone 
Date Incurred 
1988-89 
April 2001 
June 2001 
Collateral 
Vehicle 
purchased 
after 
separation 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Joint 
Balance 
Owed 
$3,600.00 
$200.00 
$400.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
Payment 
Terms/Mo. 
$92.00/mo. 
$200.00 / mo. 
1 
Type 
U 
U 
u 
u 
T 
T 
T 
T 
S 
IVP4 
NlP4 
RP4 
RP3 
RP2 
Creditor/Account No. 
Wasatch Lawn ] 
Mower Specialists (for 
mower, edger, trimmer, 
etc.) 
Mountain America CU 
credit line 
Ann Stone 
Utah State Tax 
Commission 
IRS and USTC for year 
2000 income tax 
Federal Social Security 
California property tax 
Paxton Garage 
Wells Fargo Mortgage 
America First CU 
Anne Stone - paid 
house payments on 
Melony Drive while 
Respondent was out of 
work 
1st National Mortgage 
Natalie Echstien 
Date Incurred 
Oct 2000 
Reimburse-
ment of 
Expenses 
1996-1999 
May 2001 
Oct 1993 
Dec 1993 
Mar-Oct 1997 
Aug 1999 
April 2000 
Collateral 
Mechanic's 
lien on Truck 
Melony 
Drive House 
Melony 
Drive House 
California 
1 House 
Rental 
Deposit & 
Last Month 
J Rent 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Joint 1 
Respondent | 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent 
Respondent 
Joint 
Joint 
Joint 
Respondent 
Joint 
Balance 
Owed 
$4,500.00 
$850.00 
$6,500.00 
$2,500.00 
$2,100.00 
Unknown 
$5,000.00 
1,000.00 
$250.00 
$138,000.00 
$38,000.00 
$2500.00 
$89,000.00 
$1,800.00 
Payment 
Terms/Mo. 
$75.00/mo. 
$225.00/mo. 
$l,200.00/mo. 
75.00/mo. 
All due 
$l,200.00/mo. 
$430.00/mo. 
$650.00/mo. 
I 
Type 
RP2 
RP2 
RP2 
RP2 
RP1 
1 RP1 
INS 
INS 
INS 
HC 
CC 
cc 
cc 
AF 
Creditor/Account No. 
CountryWide Mortgage 
Hidden Lakes 
Hidden Lakes Assn 
SL County Property 
Taxes - Condo 
PNC Mortgage 
(Changed to 
Washington Moutual) 
Carrol Barilla 
MetLife - Condo 
Insurance 
Bear River Insurance 
(for all vehicles) 
Allstate Insurance 
Doctor and hospital 
bills incurred by 
Respondent during his 
disability 
Sears credit card 
Barnes VISA 
Amenca First CU credit 
card 
Attorney Fees -
California & Utah 
Date Incurred 
April 2001 
Dec 1986 
Jan 2001 
July 1989 
Oct 2000 
May 2001 
May 2001 
Collateral 
Pintail Court 
Rental 
Condo 
Gas/water 
Condo 
Promenade 
House -
rental 
Rental 
Deposit 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Joint 1 
Respondent 
Respondent | 
Respondent | 
Respondent 
Joint 
Joint 
Respondent 
Joint 
Respondent 
Joint 
Joint 
Petitioner 
Joint 
Balance 
Owed 
$68,000 00 
$55 00 
approx 
$1,000 00 
$65,000 00 
$1,000 00 
$350 00 
$800 00 
$2,400 00 
unknown 
$2,100 00 
$2,800 00 
$450 00 
unknown 
Payment 
Terms/Mo. 
$195 00/mo 
$650 00/mo 
$200 00/mo 
$60 00/mo 
$75 00/mo 
$30 00/mo 
2 
11. Respondent prays for a mutual restraining order restraining each of the parties from 
making derogatory comments about the other in the presence of the minor children or to third parties, 
restraining each from harassing, annoying, harming or molesting each other and for a positive order 
requiring cooperation with respect to accomplishing meaningful, peaceful and amicable visitation with 
the minor children so that neither party assumes an attitude or position that the children are owned or 
possessed by one party as opposed to the other and that each be required to encourage a good 
relationship with each parent and flexibility with respect to visitation concerning family events such as 
weddings, accommodating vacation periods of each parent. 
12. Respondent further requests that a child evaluation study be made for the purpose of 
determining a recommendation regarding custody and visitation and a parenting schedule. Respondent 
prays further for counseling for the minor children. 
13. And for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate in the 
premises. 
2 
DATED this J day of August, 2001. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
GLEN M. RICHMAN^ 
BARBARA W. RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DATED this \^ day of August, 2001. 
TODD STONE 
Si 
2001. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, on the /^-day of August, 
rv.^.ry h'ubnc 
GLEN V. ROMA." 
5 0 S J L : I : " : c'5t. »:oo 
Salt La«e C / utan34K_ 
' lv Commission E <prres 
Auoust '0 2CCI 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, UT 
L44MS0iA-
My Commission Expires: 
U l - Unsecured School Loans 
U - Unsecured Loan 
T - Taxes 
CC - Credit Cards RP1 - Real Property at Promenade Drive RP3 - Inherited House in Cahfomis 
INS - Insurance RP2 - Real Property for Condominium RP4 - Real Property at Melony Drive 
A - Attorney FeesS - Secured Loan HC - Health Care 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JULY 25, 2001 
2 COMMISSIONER T. PATRICK CASEY PRESIDING 
3 For the Petitioner: BRENT R. CHIPMAN 
4 For the Respondent: GLEN M. RICHMAN 
5 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 THE COURT: Now has counsel had an opportunity to 
9 confer in the Stone matter? 
10 MR. CHIPMAN: Briefly, Your Honor. I just finished 
11 my juvenile court hearing. 
12 THE COURT: Do you need more time to talk? 
13 MR. CHIPMAN: No, I think we've agreed on a number 
14 of issues that are the same from Mr. Richins response that I 
15 received before the holiday about 4:00 on dividing day care 
16 and medical expenses but the other issues we'll need to 
17 present argument on with regard to [unintelligible] use of 
18 the marital residence. 
19 THE COURT: Right, and then we still have - do we 
20 have counsel here now in the Ace matter? Is that something we 
21 can present a stipulation on? 
22 (Whereupon another matter was handled) 
23 THE COURT: In the Stone matter, is counsel still 
24 having discussions? 
25 MR. CHIPMAN: No, Your Honor, we've been able to 
1 further equally divide work-related child care for the 
2 children. 
3 In addition, they have agreed that neither party 
4 would have the minor children sleep with them in the same bed 
5 and that the minor children will not sleep with any 
6 relatives, grandparents, during periods that the children are 
7 with either party. And my understanding is that the 
8 respondent is agreeing to these matters without admitting any 
9 allegations that yelling or sleeping in the same bed or 
10 disciplining the children have occurred and that the 
11 petitioner would by the same token deny any implicit 
12 allegations that has occurred with her. 
13 The issues, Your Honor, that we cannot agree upon 
14 is temporary custody of the three minor children. Brittney 
15 is 11, Brooklynn will be eight in November, and Brylee is 
16 five, three little girls. I'll remind the Court that there 
17 was a protective order hearing on June 21 in front of the 
18 Commissioner which a protective order was stipulated to which 
19 provided for some limited visitation. That visitation has 
20 occurred and in fact there's been some expansion of the 
21 visitation over the July 24 weekend to allow visitation for 
22 the entire weekend last weekend. The parties have not been 
23 able to agree on exact parameters of visitation in the 
24 future. 
2 5
 There is issue with regard to child support for the 
1 THE COURT: And whatever the expense is, whichever 
2 parent is paying for the insurance can reimburse the other 
3 for half. 
4 MR. RICHMAN: Of the prorata 
5 THE COURT: For the prorata portion. 
6 MR. RICHMAN: And we agree. 
7 MR. CHIPMAN: There may be that it's available to 
8 both of them at a minimal cost, then maybe it makes sense to 
9 double insure. 
10 THE COURT: Well, and in fact, sounds as if you're 
11 going to have a policy that's going to cover everybody 
12 including the other party; is that correct? So you're 
13 effectively reimbursing for half because the party that's 
14 covered is paying for their share as well. You just divide 
15 the premium directly right down the middle. 
16 MR. CHIPMAN: During the pendency of the action 
17 that would be fine. 
18 MR. RICHMAN: We will agree to that. On the child 
19 evaluation study we would agree to front the required 
20 retainer when we agree on an evaluator with the court 
21 deferring how the cost should be allocated in the final 
22 analysis. 
23 I THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHIPMAN: That's certainly acceptable to us. 24 
25 THE COURT: So on the items that are agreed to it's 
7 
1 seven years, starting school at the end of next month where 
2 they have attended school. 
3 We believe that the issue of visitation should be 
4 as agreed upon by the parties until there is some 
5 recommendation by the custody evaluator. There was 
6 restricted visitation at the protective order hearing every 
7 other week from Friday night to Saturday night in part I 
8 believe to allow the children to attend church, but also in 
9 part because of some concerns about extended visitation. My 
10 client did allow Mr. Stone to have the children from Friday 
11 evening through Sunday evening this last weekend and there 
12 may be certain occasions when that will happen in the future 
13 on an ad hoc basis or where we can agree, but at this point 
14 in time we believe that the visitation agreed to at the 
15 protective order hearing should be incorporated into the 
16 court's order today. 
17 THE COURT: It was ordered Friday through Saturday, 
18 but only every other week? 
19 MR. CHIPMAN: It was every week? 
20 MS. STONE: Every other weekend. 
21 MR. CHIPMAN: Every other weekend. 
22 THE COURT: I don't remember the specifics of it. 
23 I don't have that file. 
24 MR. CHIPMAN: And again, he was unrepresented by 
25 counsel, it was a stipulation and so I'm sure counsel can 
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j children are owned by one parent. 
children of both these parents and 
love both parents and they ought t 
These children 
they 
o be 
There's no reason that my client ought 
visitation and ought not to be alt 
not given joint custody of the chi 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. CHIPMAN: I'd like to 
counseling that he says he's gone 
ernat 
ldren 
see 
probably 
with both 
to have re 
e weekends 
the result 
to. That would 
are 
very much 
of them. 
stricted 
if he is 
of the 
speak 
volumes in helping with this problem. 
THE COURT: There is a lot here, a lot of issues 
that the parties can't agree on and unfortunately I, I feel 
as if there's a lot of positioning going on. I don't know 
ultimately what the outcome of this case is going to look 
like but with the parties combined incomes, the first and 
second mortgages in the Melanie Drive property look like more 
than the parties can afford. In the meantime there is at 
least one property that has a real modest mortgage on it and 
I'd like to see the parties - and I don't know about this 
condo - I'd like to see the parties explore quickly, soon, 
the prospect of perhaps getting out from underneath the $2100 
- excuse me, the $1600 in mortgage payments in the Melanie 
Drive property and dealing with the property division issues 
really fairly quickly. If you wait until December you won't 
sell that property probably until next year, and in the 
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1 meantime we'll have a pretty hefty combined mortgage payment 
2 in the interim. 
3 I think it is difficult for me to determine that 
4 Mr. Stone should be expected to reside with his mother for 
5 the foreseeable future and certainly the ultimate result of 
6 this case would not reflect any such assumption and in 
7 particular where, at the same time the petitioner is claiming 
8 that the mother is somehow gotten involved and said 
9 inappropriate things to the children. That would, it seems 
10 to me, have the effect of making the Court chose between 
11 leaving them in a situation where she's complaining about 
12 things the mother is saying or restricting their contact with 
13 their father and I don't think that's appropriate. If there's 
14 not a parenting plan here in place, Dr. Davies may very well 
15 I would hope that he would at least explore with the 
16 parties the possibility of some sort of a joint parenting 
17 order going forward. I'm not satisfied that I can find that 
18 it would be appropriate on a temporary basis to order joint 
19 custody legal or otherwise but - legal or physical, but I do 
20 think that's something that the parties shouldn't deem as 
21 precluded from your discussions, I'm simply, I think at this 
22 point not in a position to make findings that that's really 
23 going to be workable and I don't have, like I say, a 
24 parenting plan. 
25 It doesn't appear to me Mr. Stone has completed the 
45 
1 divorce education class for parents either. If he has the 
2 certificate is not in the file. If he hasn't he should go 
3 ahead and do that right away. It costs $40. It's not 
4 duplicative of the counseling that he's receiving and it's 
5 better to have that done sooner than later and it's get just 
6 one-
7 MR. RICHMAN: I don't think either one of them has 
8 done that. 
9 THE COURT: There is a certificate from the 
10 petitioner. 
11 MR. RICHMAN: There is? 
12 THE COURT: Yes, having completed it. 
13 It sounds as if - and I don't have a good idea of 
14 the layout and so forth, as if the parties had effectively 
15 been able to keep these vehicles, multiple vehicles and so 
16 forth, parked at the marital residence Melanie Drive property 
17 previously and that they're becoming a point of contention 
18 now that they're separating, I'm not persuaded that there is 
19 an alternative that wouldn't entail significant expense 
20 requiring Mr. Stone to move the inoperable vehicle or the 
21 trailers. He should be permitted to as soon as he's able to 
22 and the parties should make arrangements to do that, but the 
23 property appears to be large enough to accommodate them so as 
24 long as this other stuff that was just recently carted in has 
25 been moved and stored, I think that's as much as the Court 
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2 HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: This is case number 014903655. Counsel, 
5 would you identify yourselves for the record please? 
6 MR. CHIPMAN: Brent Chipman representing the 
7 Petitioner Joanne Stone. She's present in court, Your Honor. 
8 MS. CORPORON: Mary Corporon representing the 
9 Respondent Todd Stone, who is also present, Your Honor. 
10 MS. BLOMQUIST: Michelle Blomquist, office of 
11 guardian ad litem. 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon? 
13 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I believe that we have 
14 reached a settlement in this case. 
15 THE COURT: I'd invite you to read that into the 
16 record. 
17 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, the settlement of these 
18 parties is that they would be awarded the joint legal custody 
19 of the two youngest minor children of the parties. The 
20 oldest child, Brittany, would be in the sole custody of the 
21 petitioner, the child's mother. The petitioner would be the 
22 primary physical custodian of, or the physical custodian of 
23 the two youngest children of the parties, subject to the 
24 respondent's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation with 
25 the two younger children substantially as he's had visitation 
1 
1 with the children during the pendency of this action, with 
2 the understanding, however, that the guardian ad litem's 
3 proposal regarding his contact with the children is that -
4 let me find the exact language of the proposal from the 
5 guardian -
6 MS. BLOMQUIST: [inaudible]. 
7 MS. CORPORON: Which, which paragraph is the -
8 MS. BLOMQUIST: [inaudible]. 
9 MS. CORPORON: Thank you. Sorry, I was looking in 
10 the finding. That it's in the children's best interests -
11 and we're talking about Brooklynn and Brylee to have frequent 
12 meaningful contact with their father and that the father have 
13 liberal parent time. Therefore, that will be the order of 
14 the court. If the parties are unable to make that work into 
15 the future there would be a mediation session, which would be 
16 specifically authorized by this Court regarding the issue of 
17 Mr. Stone's parent time with the two younger children and 
18 this Court could re-visit the issue of his parent time with 
19 the two younger children, including an evidentiary hearing, 
20 if necessary, if the parties are unable to make the 
21 arrangement, for some reason to make the arrangement that 
22 we're discussing here today work. 
23 The, further the advisory guideline at 30-3-33 
24 would be controlling and would be incorporated specifically 
25 into the final orders of this Court. The respondent, the 
1 father, would pay to petitioner child support in a stipulated 
2 sum of $600 per month that would commence effective with the 
3 month of August, 2005. 
4 For the record, that is more support than would be 
5 ordered pursuant to the actual current incomes of the 
6 parties, less support than would be ordered if we took the 
7 actual current income of the, of the petitioner and the 
8 respondent's previous income from his former employment. It 
9 represents a compromised position of the two positions of the 
10 parties regarding whether the respondent is or is not under 
11 employed at this point and is substantially in conformity 
12 with the intent of the child support guidelines. 
13 Neither party would be awarded any alimony from the 
14 other party and each would waive any claim of alimony from 
15 the other. The petitioner would specifically, pursuant to 
16 all the terms and conditions of this settlement consider to 
17 be satisfied and paid in full all judgments she has received 
18 in this and other litigation for attorney's fees against the 
19 respondent here for judgments for items in the nature of 
20 child support, such as judgments for daycare expenses and 
21 would waive any claims for sums not reduced to judgment for 
22 any alleged arrearages of child support or something in the 
23 nature of support and both parties would waive those claims 
24 against the other and they'd start with a clean slate as of 
25 August 1st, 2005. 
1 this should impact her rights or her entitlement in that 
2 other lawsuit and that by doing this we're simply talking 
3 about liquidating a real estate asset to a cash asset, but 
4 not impacting her legal rights in that other lawsuit. 
5 THE COURT: [inaudible] here's the problem I see 
6 with that particular issue. If she wishes to make or place a 
7 representation on the record about the issue of selling these 
8 properties, I'm not going to prevent her from doing that. 
9 But at the same time, I see a big problem, for example, 
10 there's a, there clearly would be an issue of whether or not 
11 that, let's use the word consent, I use it lightly, there 
12 would be a question as to whether or not it would be 
13 enforceable or not. That's the question I can't answer and I 
14 say that because the fact that she is not a party to this 
15 particular lawsuit. She is, all of us know that she is 
16 represented by counsel and counsel is not here today. So 
17 while I'm, have no problem with her placing that statement on 
18 the record if she chooses to do so, I see some obvious 
19 problems with the fact that her lawyer, at least, is not 
20 present. 
21 MR. CHIPMAN: And that's exactly what I wanted. 
22 That's what I was talking about, Your Honor. I understand it 
23 can't be enforceable. But if the Court might inquire and if 
24 she wants to make a statement. Our agreement on this is 
25 contingent upon those properties being listed for sale and I 
13 
1 assume that if they're not listed by the time final documents 
2 are prepared, there may be some, another turn of the screw 
3 that has to take place. 
4 For the information of the Court Mrs. Stone was 
5 most recently represented by Bruce Reading and David Bridge. 
6 They filed a withdrawal about six weeks ago. No other 
7 attorney has filed an entry of appearance. However, Ms. 
8 Corporon was contacted by Kay Burningham recently, who 
9 indicated that she had been retained in the real property 
10 case. I had no contact with her and that certainly means 
11 that she is represented and that's [inaudible] some delicacy 
12 in the discussions regarding the settlement of this case. 
13 THE COURT: Ms. Blomquist? 
14 MS. BLOMQUIST: Thank you, Your Honor. I do agree 
15 with the terms that have been outlined by the parties with 
16 regard to the stipulation. I did want to make some additions 
17 to that. I had requested and the parties had agreed that we 
18 would follow all statutory support orders, including child 
19 support, daycare and medical expenses. Ms. Corporon may have 
20 said that. I did not hear. So I just wanted to confirm that 
21 that was on the record. 
22 I also had made a request at one point that my 
23 client Brittney had some personal property that she wanted to 
24 be returned to her. In speaking with counsel, I've stated to 
25 both of them, that we will seek this outside of the court 
14 
1 MS. CORPORON: No, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Is it, excuse me, sorry, is it still 
3 Ms., Ms. Stone? 
4 MS. STONE: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Stone, you heard all three 
6 counsel place on the record the settlement agreement in this 
7 matter and this is the settlement agreement that you have 
8 accepted? 
9 MS. STONE: (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Stone, you've heard all counsel 
11 place on the record the settlement agreements here? I can't 
12 hear your answer. 
13 MR. STONE: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: And is this the settlement agreement 
15 you've accepted? 
16 MR. STONE: (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Okay, and I think we have a Mrs. 
18 Annabelle Stone present here somewhere, is that correct? Is 
19 she present? 
20 [inaudible] hear [inaudible] would you step forward 
21 to the podium please Mrs. Stone? 
22 Mrs. Stone, have you hired a lawyer to represent 
23 you in the other case? 
24 MRS. STONE: I hired Mr. Bruce Reading. 
25 I THE COURT: He's gone. Did you hire someone after -
19 
1 MRS. STONE: He resigned. 
2 THE COURT: Did you hire Ms. Burningham? 
3 MRS. STONE: I haven't yet. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, and -
5 MRS. STONE: She thinks that she would -
6 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I would advise her not 
7 to discuss what her lawyer just -
8 THE COURT: Okay, just a moment, Ms. Corporon, just 
9 a moment. And let me just say yesterday in preparation for 
10 this case I pulled that case file and while I did not -
11 You're, you can't hear me? 
12 Okay, let me just say I looked at the case file and 
13 while I did not go to the computer printout to see if there 
14 was an appearance of counsel from Ms. Burningham, there was 
15 no such document in the file, and I couldn't tell from my 
16 review of the file yesterday whether or not Ms. Stone was 
17 represented by a lawyer or not. But Ms. Stone, Ms. Corporon 
18 and Mr. Chipman have placed on the record the agreement with 
19 their clients that the three properties at issue are going to 
20 be listed for sale. Did you hear that? 
21 MRS. STONE: I did. 
22 THE COURT: Did they discuss that with you this 
23 morning? 
24 MR. CHIPMAN: I didn't. 
25 THE COURT: Did anyone? 
20 
1 MS. CORPORON: I -
2 THE COURT: No one did? 
3 MS. CORPORON: I didn't discuss it with her, Your 
4 Honor, but she, I made her aware that we were thinking about 
5 selling the property. I guess that's I'm, my concern about 
6 discussing anything with her is that I got a call from Kay 
7 Burningham yesterday saying A'I've been contacted by Ms. Stone 
8 and I now consider her to be my client on this matter." So, 
9 I didn't discuss it with her either. She's represented -
10 THE COURT: Do you understand that these two parties 
11 wish to place the three properties up for sale? 
12 MRS. STONE: That's, I don't think the money should 
13 be distributed until the indebtedness is resolved. 
14 THE COURT: What they talked about and what they 
15 have agreed to do and, and if I mis-state this counsel please 
16 correct me. What they have agreed to do, if I heard them 
17 correctly, is to place the properties up for sale, but take, 
18 I think it came to $40,000. Distribute $40,000 of the sale, 
19 of the total sale price, but then take the balance and hold 
20 it until the other case is decided. 
21 MRS. STONE: What if the sale of the property and 
22 they take their money and there's not enough money to resolve 
23 the indebtedness? I think -
24 THE COURT: That's, that's an excellent question 
25 I which I'm not sure I can answer right now from at least the 
21 
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proposed documents that they, that counsel submitted to me it 
appear to me that there would be money left over, just 
looking at what they maintain the fair market value of the 
properties are. 
MRS. STONE: I would be willing to a sale of the 
property if the funds are held in the court -
THE COURT: They -
MRS. STONE: Till after the other [inaudible] --
THE COURT: Their agreement, and I'm not trying to 
force you, this on you, ma'am. 
We may have a problem here, counsel. At least 
initially, and I want you to keep in mind, ma'am, I'm not 
trying to push you one way or the other. I'm just trying to 
describe for you -
MRS. STONE: 
represent me. 
THE COURT: All right, you can retake your seat them 
ma'am. 
MRS. STONE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Chipman, I need to know what 
your position is in light of the problem we have. 
MR. ?: Our position is, Your Honor, that obviously 
and I mean I'm, I use the word obviously, but let me just 
make it clear in case it's not obvious, I'm m no position, I 
22 
1 have no, as far as I'm concerned I have no legal authority 
2 whatsoever over Mrs. Stone, Mrs. Annabelle Stone [inaudible] 
3 that clear, because she is not a party to this lawsuit. 
4 These two cases have not been consolidated. I have no 
5 authority, quite frankly, over her interest. 
6 MR. CHIPMAN: I agree with you. Interestingly 
7 enough she filed a Motion to join the action, which was 
8 denied and in fact I think Mr. Reading appears as the counsel 
9 in the, in the divorce action, but that's a clerical error. 
10 Our understanding, our agreement with Mr. Stone was premised 
11 on the fact that we would have to have Mrs. Annabelle Stone 
12 agree to list the properties, or to list the property because 
13 she, he transferred his interest to his mother. 
14 THE COURT: I understand. 
15 MR. CHIPMAN: If she doesn't sell the properties, 
16 then I don't think we have a settlement. But I don't know 
17 that that is something that couldn't be addressed between now 
18 and when the paperwork is submitted to the Court. 
19 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, I believe we, we have a 
20 settlement between these two parties. I think we should 
21 reduce that to an Order of the Court. I am fairly confident 
22 that once we can talk to Ms. Stone's, Ms. Annabelle Stone's 
23 counsel and get her in the loop here, that this will go 
24 smoothly. I just think we're, we're in a position where, as 
25 I the Court's indicated, we can't bind Ms. Stone today. So we 
23 
1 have I think the best deal that we can come up with today 
2 and, and -
3 MR. CHIPMAN: The problem is we don't have a deal 
4 if one, the properties aren't listed, and two, the $40,000 is 
5 not divided as agreed upon. Now Mr. Stone wants to say he 
6 doesn't need the $5,000 I don't have a quarrel with that. 
7 But that was negotiated -
8 THE COURT: And I'm just going to cut you off only 
9 to say that I'm going to accept the settlement agreement 
10 entered into by the parties in this particular case. I 
11 recognize we have an issue as to the sale of this property 
12 and Ms. Annabelle Stone's participation in the sale of the 
13 properties, which is totally impossible to resolve today. 
14 That's an issue that's going to have to be resolved as soon 
15 as she either gets counsel on board to represent her in the 
16 other case, or alternatively, she declares that she's not 
17 going to pursue counsel and she has otherwise agreed on her 
18 own to the sale of her properties. 
19 I want to make it clear, irrespective of Mr. 
20 Chipman's statement and I respect his statement on behalf of 
21 his client, that his position is that if this sale doesn't go 
22 through there, there is no deal. I want to make it clear 
23 that I'm not crossing that bridge right now. I'm accepting 
24 the settlement agreement and if it turns out that Ms. 
25 Annabelle Stone will not participate in the sale, then I will 
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have to return at that point in time, if that arises, what 
impact it has on the settlement agreement that the Court has 
accepted here today. I just want to make that clear that I 
am not taking the position that if this 
't n^ iiAta I will take that measure, if I'm required to 
do so, at the appropriate point in time. 
Go ahead, Ms. Blomquist. 
MS. BLOMQUIST: [inaudible] request [inaudible] 
that if this Court does [inaudible] stipulation, I request 
that the counsel [inaudible] stipulate that this will not 
[inaudible] parent time positions with regard to the children 
and that it only be [inaudible] financial issues, at least 
those issues [inaudible] even if there is a dispute with the 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chipman? 
MR. CHIPMAN: I don't have any objection to that. 
I think what the Court was indicating was you're accepting 
the settlement of the parties and it will become an issue of 
enforcement perhaps -
THE COURT: I think Ms. Blomquist - I know what I 
was suggesting. But I think Ms. Blomquist's suggestion is, is 
very appropriate and my question for you is what is your 
response. Is your client willing to so stipulate? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Absolutely. 
25 
1 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon is your client willing to 
2 so stipulate? 
3 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, my client's just 
4 indicated to me that he doesn't feel comfortable with that, 
5 and I'm not certain why. I don't, I haven't had a chance to 
6 discuss it with him. Perhaps we're trying to reach too far 
7 on issues that, I mean we have an agreement, I'm personally 
8 fairly confident it will work on the property sales for 
9 THE COURT: Well 
10 MS. CORPORON: various reasons. But 
11 THE COURT: Let me just, let me just simply state I 
12 obviously can't force a stipulation on the parties. It's not 
13 something that I can do. But as I sit here at this moment, 
14 and I don't want to get into predicting the future because 
15 I'm just no very good at that, but I prepared for this case 
16 for the last two days. I'm sure all of you prepared even 
17 longer than that. I can, and while I can't predict what's 
18 going to happen when you walk out of the door today, 
19 especially in terms of Ms. Annabelle Stone, I'm struggling 
20 with the concept of why these issues consistent with Ms. 
21 Blomquist's request are not separable. They seems to make 
22 all the sense in the world to me that they are separable. 
23 But at the same time I'm not going to cross that bridge if 
24 I'm required to cross it if, in fact, we have a problem with 
25 Ms. Stone's consent as we've described. So I'm going to move 
26 
1 forward. I'm gonna accept the settlement agreement and 
2 [inaudible] the parties and who is, someone's taking the 
3 responsibility to reduce this to written form? 
4 MS. CORPORON: I'm to do it. 
5 THE COURT: And I do want to make this point very 
6 clear, because this is very important. This Court is 
7 accepting the settlement agreement today. This ministerial 
8 act of reducing it to written form is in fact just that. It 
9 is a ministerial act and by that I mean by performing this 
10 ministerial task, it is not an opportunity to, to re-visit 
11 issues, re-negotiate issues. I've had this problem occur in 
12 the past and literally I've, I've, and I don't mean any 
13 disrespect to any counsel, nor any other parties, because I 
14 appreciate the fact that in domestic relations cases because 
15 of the nature of the case, because of the nature of the 
16 underlying relationships, these cases can be very, very 
17 difficult and the issues can be difficult to resolve and 
18 oftentimes it's hard to inject objectivity because of the 
19 nature of the relationships themselves. But I've had it 
20 before where counsel have disagreed to what they've agreed 
21 upon because they've engaged in subsequent negotiations and 
22 couldn't get to a point where they could produce for me the 
23 written document. But I'm requesting| 
24 and in those cases live with what I've done quite frankly in 
25 order for the parties to produce the transcript and I've 
27 
1 literally signed the transcript as the final judgment and 
2 decree in the case and let you take it from there. I'm 
3 hoping that's not going to occur in this case, but just going 
4 through the history of this case and working with you here 
5 today it's important for me to communicate to you that as far 
6 as I'm concerned this matter is settled and resolved. The 
7 only, hesitate to call it a hitch, is the issue related to 
8 ^^S^t^^^^Sto^^ng^ because I don't know if she's going to 
9 represent herself or hire a lawyer to deal with this sale. 
10 So with that stated, I'm going to ask Ms. Corporon, 
11 I'd like to give you a time period to 
12 and I prefer it come to me approved as to form and content by 
13 all counsel. How much time do we need? 
14 MS. CORPORON: If I could submit it by August 17th, 
15 Your Honor. 
16 MR. CHIPMAN: Your Honor, the parties are divorced. 
17 Would you want this in the form of a supplemental 
18 [inaudible]-
19 THE COURT: [inaudible] certainly. Does anyone have 
20 a problem with the [inaudible]? 
21 MR. CHIPMAN: Then I will assume that there will be 
22 a guardian ad litem that will be able to sign off, since I 
23 don't believe anything's going to get done before Friday at 
24 noon? 
25 Ms. Blomquist: [inaudible] I can delegate that to 
28 
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ADDENDUM "30" 
Fabian 
Clendenin 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 l i t 
Telephone: (801)531^900 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 -0210 
Brent R* Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
hchipmanGpfabianlaw.con) 
September 7, 2005 
SENT BY TELEFAX 
AND HAND DELIVERED 
Mary C. Corporon 
Corporon, Williams & Bradford 
405 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax No. 328-9565 
Re: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone 
Dear Mary: 
I enclose my client's Objections to the proposed Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and to the proposed Supplemental Decree. I received a 
second version of the Findings on August 31st with the first version of the Decree. I was 
disappointed that there was no cover letter responding to the concerns and suggestions 
set forth in my letter of August 15th, I was also surprised to see that only one or two of 
the suggested changes had been incorporated into the new version of the Supplemental 
Findings. Your office did not even correct the typographical error that I pointed out. 
Your client is still not emailing Joanne. I am encouraging her to use 
Todd's email to keep him informed about the activities of the girls, but I think she is 
hesitant until she receives an email from Todd so that she can be sure that he is 
checking his email on a regular basis. 
The younger girls have a skate night at school next Thursday, the 15th 
from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. Right now the girls plan on attending with their mother, 
but will probably not get there until about 5:30 p.m. Todd is welcome to attend the 
event and alternate skating with one of the girls while Joanne is with the other. 
351328 I 
Mary C. Corporon 
September 7, 2005 
Page 2 
My client requested an insurance card for Todd on August 25th. She was 
told it would take about two weeks to process the request. She will provide him with the 
card as soon as it is received. Have you received the Releases of Lien from the 
recorder's office? 
Can my client contact Wayne Knudsen to list the properties for sale? I 
provided that name to you four weeks ago on August 9th. If Todd has a problem with 
Mr. Knudsen, please provide me with some names of agents or brokers that are 
acceptable to Mr, Stone. 
Joanne also had a meeting in late August with her employer. She was 
informed of the elimination of two manager positions in her department. The 
department is also changing its approach to accounting that will eliminate much of the 
work she currently performs. She is faced with the elimination of almost all future 
increases to her income unless she obtains a four-year degree. 
She has therefore determined to move with the children to Hayward, 
California, and look for a job with Bank of America or another financial institution. The 
next session of school in California starts the second week of October. 
This is my client's notice under the statute that she intends to move with 
the children on October 1, 2005. This will give her about one week to get settled and 
locate employment before the children start school on October 10th. 
Joanne is committed to following the parent time provisions in the 
Supplemental Decree that address this situation. My client will not interfere with Mr. 
Stone's parent time with the children that will be set forth in the Supplemental Decree, 
with the parent time set forth in the current Orders of the court, or that may be agreed 
on between the parties. 
Please have Mr. Stone email Joanne regarding any extra time he would 
want to spend with the children in September. 
Sincerely, 
Brent R, Chipma 
BRC/aec 
Enclosure 
cc: Joanne Stone 
Guardian ad Litem 
Brent R. Chipman #0626 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JOANNE L. STONE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
TODD L. STONE, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS 
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
TO SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
Civil No 014903655 DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comm, T. Patrick Casey 
-ooOoo-
Petitioner objects to the form of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and to the form of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce prepared by 
Respondent's counsel pursuant to the oral stipulation of the parties entered on the record 
on August 3, 2005 before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. 
Petitioner's counsel notified Respondent's counsel of most of the 
Objections to the proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact by letter dated August 15, 
2005, Petitioner's counsel received another version of the Supplemental Findings and the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce on August 31, 2005 without any cover letter. The 
proposed Supplemental Findings did not incorporate the changes requested by the 
Petitioner and included new provisions that were not agreed to by the parties in the oral 
stipulation. 
Notwithstanding representations by Respondent's counsel that the 
documents would not be submitted to the court* Petitioner files these Objections to 
prevent any misunderstanding and to assist the court in understanding and ruling on any 
disputes in language that cannot be resolved between the parties and the Office of the 
Guardian ad Litem. 
These objections are filed pursuant to Rule 7 (f) (2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and are timely under the Rules. 
Petitioner objects to the following proposed Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and to the associated provisions of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce. The 
numbers reference the paragraphs in the Supplemental Findings. When possible, changes 
in the proposed language is underlined. 
4. The parties did not agree that they were both fit and proper parents to 
be awarded custody of the children. The words, "residential custodian" were not used in 
the oral Stipulation, The first sentence should be deleted. The paragraph should simply 
read, "The parties should be awarded the joint legal custody of the two younger minor 
2 
children, Brooklyn and Brylee. Petitioner should be awarded the $ole physical custody of 
the children, subject to Respondent's exercise of reasonable parent time.... 
6. There needs to be a differentiation between medical records and 
counseling records for Brook and Brylee. The guardian objected to Respondent having 
access to counseling or psychotherapy records for any of the children. The access of 
either party to counseling records should be dependent on the decision of the individual 
counselor. The last clause of paragraph 6 should be deleted dealing with the parents 
being involved in the children's care, 
9, Somewhere in paragraph 9 or elsewhere, there should be a finding 
that Petitioner is the custodial parent and Respondent is the non-custodial parent for 
purposes of the advisory guidelines and for the holiday parent time schedule. 
9 j . Respondent should not have access, direct or otherwise, to the 
psychotherapy records of any of the children. The language of the statute should be 
followed, dealing with medical records. Respondent should also have the reciprocal 
obligation to notify Petitioner of any medical emergencies occurring while the children 
are with him. 
9 m. This subparagraph of the advisory guidelines dealing with 
providing childcare should be deleted based on the issue being addressed specifically in 
paragraph 27. 
3 
10. The statutory language of Sec. 30-3-37 (I) dealing with notice of 
relocation should be included. The paragraph should read, "In the event that either parent 
decide$ to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the residence specified 
in the decree, that parent shall provide if possible 60 days advance written notice ,.. 
Nothing in this paragraph should be interpreted adversely to the provisions 
of paragraph 11 dealing specifically with the possible translocation of the Petitioner and 
the minor children. 
11. The wording of paragraph 11 should be revised to read, 
"Respondent agrees that the Petitioner may move with the children to a location such that 
the foregoing schedule of parent time may not be workable...." 
11. b. and 11 c. The language of these subparagraphs should be revised to 
avoid the current implications that Respondent is entitled to all of the time the children 
might be in Utah after any move from the state, and that Respondent is entitled to have 
the children for the entire time he might choose to spend in another state where the 
children might move. 
13. A clause requiring the parties to verify their income whenever they 
change employment or have a substantial change in income should be added to this 
paragraph. 
A provision regarding income withholding relief consistent with the 
statute should be added as part of, or after, paragraph 15. 
4 
17. The judgments and claims of the Petitioner should be satisfied or 
waived upon the sale of the real property and the distribution of the initial funds pursuant 
to paragraph 24 of the Supplemental Findings. 
19 a. viii. The Christmas china is not Lenox. 
19 a. x . Petitioner does not have a weed eater 
19 a. xi. The language "purchased with funds from Respondent's father's 
estate" should be deleted. 
19 b. This subparagraph should contain a provision that a party could 
pay for copies of any photographs divided to the other party or in their possession. 
21. There is a typographical error in paragraph 21. It should read, 
"During the course of the parties' marriage..." 
23, Paragraph 23 fails to present a workable framework for dividing 
the dependency exemptions for the children. In order to avoid confusion, Petitioner 
proposes that she be awarded Brittney every year; that Respondent be awarded Brylec 
every year and that the parties alternate claiming Brooklyn as dependency exemptions for 
tax purposes. When Brittney is emancipated, Petitioner would get Brooklyn every year 
and Respondent would continue to claim Brylee. When there is only one child, the 
parties would alternate claiming that child with Petitioner being awarded the child the 
first year when there is only one dependency exemption. 
5 
24. Petitioner objects to paragraph 24 as being incomplete and 
inadequate in dealing with the real property. Language should be added as a new sixth 
and seventh sentence in the paragraph stating, "As between the parties, Petitioner should 
be awarded the Melony Drive property pending its sale. As between the parties, 
Respondent should be awarded the Promenade and Pintail properties pending their sale/' 
24, Petitioner further objects to the language in paragraph 24 proposing 
that the three properties be sold as soon as is "commercially feasible at a commercially 
reasonable sales price." All of the real property is residential. The parties agreed to list 
and sell the properties immediately by using an agreed upon real estate agent or broker 
and to follow the recommendations of the agent in determining listing prices for the 
properties. The language of this paragraph should also be clarified to indicate that the 
first $35,000 of equity to be paid Petitioner is in lieu of any award of attorney's fees from 
the Respondent to the Petitioner, and that the remaining sales proceeds, after the payment 
off initial /sums to the parties* attorneys should be equally divided by the parties subject to 
the pending litigation involving Respondent's mother and the Petitioner, The last 
sentence of the paragraph should be clarified so that either party, in purchasing any parcel 
of property under a right of first refusal, would need to pay, or deposit into escrow the 
same amount that would be received from a bona fide buyer, 
6 
24. Petitioner further objects to failure of the proposed paragraph 24 to 
require that Respondent release the three liens he prepared and filed pro se against the 
Melony Drive property in April 2005. 
26. The language of the initial sentence should be changed to, "In the 
event that there are no further problems regarding parent-time.». 
27. To reflect the stipulation of the parties, the language should be 
changed to uThe court finds that the Petitioner has been paying the costs of childcare on 
her own, during gait of the pendency of this action. Each parent should be ordered to pay 
his or her own costs of childcare for so long as the children reside in the Salt Lake area. 
The issue of childcare can be revisited if the Petitioner moves from the Salt Lake area. 
The court specifically addressed the issue of childcare, in the future, if Petitioner moved 
from the area, 
28. The second sentence of this paragraph should be changed as 
follows: 'The Respondent should pay one-half of the pro rata cost of health insurance for 
the minor children as additional child support beginning August L 2005. The third 
sentence should add optical^ and counseling expenses incurred by the minor children. The 
last sentence should read, vtThe entitlement of either party to claim payment from the 
other for non-reimbursed health care expenses maybe subject to the presentation by the 
party .... within 30 days of the parent receiving the billing or the explanation of benefits 
from all related health insurance providers, whichever occurs later. Each party shall 
7 
document bills for medical expenses, the existence of health insurance and all explanation 
of benefits statements to the other parent. This language is consistent with the Utah 
statute. 
Petitioner objects to the following Conclusions of Law; 
2. The proposed paragraph 2 should be changed to state: 'That a 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce should be entered,... 
Petitioner also objects to the paragraphs of the proposed Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce that corresponiUo her objections to the Supplemental Findings of Fact. 
DATED this / day of ^f^{d^i JjlU^j 2005. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
By: lenjuS' 
Brent It Chipman 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
8 
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VIA Facsimile (801) 531-1716 and Regular Mail 
Brent Chipman 
215 South State Street 
12 m Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone - Extra Visitation 
Dear Brent: 
This letter is a follow-up to your recent correspondence which seems to indicate that, 
though Todd Stone is entitled to extra visitation around the time directly prior to when his 
children will be departing the state of Utah, he is not really being given the only extra weekend 
between today and the time the children leave. Please correct me if I have some 
misunderstanding about this. 
Is there a reason why Mr. Stone cannot take the children to their activities over this 
weekend? Please advise. 
Also, in your recent correspondence, you indicate that Mr. Stone is somehow pressuring 
the children about their upcoming move to California. Mr. Stone absolutely denies that he is 
pressuring the children. He does report that the children are extremely upset about the 
announcement of the upcoming move, and that they volunteer to him repeatedly that they do not 
want to move, and they repeatedly volunteer to him that they want to discuss how upset they feel 
about this situation. If the children are upset about this and feel close enough to their father to 
tell him about this, that is not something which is his fault or constitutes his wrong doing. 
I contacted the two younger girls' therapist to ask if Mr. Stone could discuss this situation 
with them and discuss with them how to attempt to help the two girls deal with this situation. 
The therapist absolutely refused to discuss it with me or to set up an appointment to discuss this 
with Mr. Stone, saying that the therapist prefers to deal only with the Guardian Ad Litem and not 
to have any dealings with or give any information to Mr. Stone. It was not conveyed to me by 
the therapist that they felt it would be therapeutically inappropriate to discuss this situation with 
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Mr. Stone - - just that it is the therapist's understanding that they legally are not to do so. This is 
exactly the opposite of what I understood we had agreed to in court; namely, that these two girls 
need to have both their parents involved in their therapy, or the therapy and counseling are not 
going to be successful. Mr. Stone is quite anxious to have some communication with someone 
about this, but has been blocked at every turn. We would certainly like some feed back as to 
whether or not Mr. Stone can discuss his concerns about how to deal with the girls' expressions 
of being upset about moving with their therapist. Again, I look forward to hearing from you 
about this, and I look forward to hearing from the Guardian Ad Litem about this. 
Sincerely, 
MCC/ja 
cc: Todd Stone 
Mandy Rose 
KelL T. William 
y^ttad-^/. yenning 
-Qlljett AJ. T^tCLnno 
Stecey At Snudzt 
•fi Pt&kzttLO-ncd Llotfaotailon 
-£)tt<ytne<fd at JL&ut 
405 <?outk Abln Sfiteet, ^uite #700 
O 
s 
7dltf.Ae (?ittf, Utah 84111 
October 5, 2005 
'TeUpkone (801) 328-f 162 
TzciLmiL (801) 363-8243 
VIA Facsimile (801) 531-1716 and Regular Mail 
Brent R. Chipman 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone 
Dear Brent: 
This letter is to confirm that I am informed by my client he is unable to locate his two 
younger children within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Apparently, they have not been in 
school since last Friday. Apparently, they have moved out of the residence they previously 
occupied, up until last Friday. 
May we be informed of where the two younger children are currently residing? Has Ms. 
Stone simply taken the children to California, anyway? Please advise. 
Sincerely, 
MCC.ps 
cc: Todd Stone 
Attorney at 
ORON 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
General Offense Information 
Operational status : CLOSED/COMPLETED 
Reported on : Oct-02-2005 (Sun,) 0058 
Occurred on : Oct-02-2005 (Sun.) 0058 
Report submitted by : B92 - ROMERO, DANIELLE C 
Org unit: WASATCH DISTRICT 
Location : 3747 S HILLSIDE LN 
Municipality : East MHIcreek 
District: A Beat: 04 Grid : 04 
Bias : None (no bias) 
Gang involvement: None/Unknown 
Family violence : NO 
Offenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense : #1 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES - COMPLETED 
Location : Residence/Home 
Offender suspected of using : Not Applicable 
Related Event(s) 
CP CO 2005-93203 
Related Person(s) 
Master Name Index Reference 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Complainant #1: STONE, TODD LUND 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex : MALE 
Race : Caucasian/White 
Ethnicity : Unknown 
Date of birth : Sep-02-1961 
Address : 3747 S HILLSIDE LN , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84109-
Phone Numbers: Home : (801)277-9955 Business : (801)239-4202 
Place of birth : Utah 
Occupation ; COLLECTIONS 
Employer : QWEST 250 E 200 S 250, SLC UT 
Height : 6?00 
Weight: 215 lbs 
Hair color : Blond/Strawberry 
Eye color : Green 
Lens type : None 
Master Name Index Reference 
Complainant #1: STONE, TODD L 
Sex : MALE 
Race : Caucasian/White 
Ethnicity : Not of Hispanic Origin 
Date of birth: Sep-02-1961 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Involved 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex : MALE 
Race 
Ethnicity 
Address : 
Phone Numbers: Home 
Master Name Index Reference 
Involved i 
Sex : MALE 
Race( 
Ethnicityf 
Linkage factors 
Resident statusT 
Involved 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex MALE 
Race! 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Ethnicity
 k 
Address 
Phone Numbers: Home 
Master Name Index Reference 
Involved 
Sex MALE 
Race :j 
Ethnicity! 
Dateofbirthf 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Unknown 
Involved 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex : FEMALE 
Race 
Ethnicity1 
Address 
Master Name Index Reference 
Involved 
Sex : FEMALE 
Race :( 
Ethnicityf 
Linkage factors 
Resident statusC 
Involved 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex : MALE 
Race 
Ethnicity 
Address : 
Master Name Index Reference 
Involved 
Sex : MALE 
Race( 
Ethmcityf 
Linkage factors 
Resident statusP 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Related text page(s) 
Document INITIAL R/O 
Author B92 - ROMERO, DANIELLE C 
Related date/time Oct-02-2005 
Todd Stone requested telephone contact to report he believes his ex-wife, 
flHHHHflHB may n a v e left the state to California 
Todd requested I drive past Joanna's address to see if her vehicle is 
there The vehicle was not there 
Todd advised me he had a "restraining order" on ( H U B / where she is not 
allowed to move out of state 
I advised Todd to contact our civil unit division, and his attorney 
Case Status Closed Report Concluded 
Related text page(s) 
Document OTHER F/U 
Author 12 5 - SHAVER, GREGORY J 
Related date/time Oct-03-2005 2151 
I contacted Todd Stone about a criminal complaint he wanted to report I 
called Todd by telephone and he advised me he has a civil restraining order 
that was signed by judge Tyrone Medely on 09-30-2005 With all attorneys 
present on conference call his ex-wife is not allowed to take the children 
out of state 
Todd stated he feels she has left the state to Hayward City, California 
His mother received a call from flMHHHB a t Howard R Driggs elementary 
about the children The children were not at school and flHB (ex-wife) 
could not be contacted Todd then called Hayward City Police and a ofc 
Larry Robison checked flllHHB mothers residence for flHHHi c a r a n^ the 
children Todd was informed at the time the car or children were not there 
and unknown occupants stated they are expected on Thursday Hayward Police 
incident number is 
I advised Todd that at the present time there is not enough evidence to 
charge 9 H 9 B D with custodial inteifeience He was told that proof is 
needed that she left the state I told Todd to go to Howard R Driggs 
elementary to see if the children were pulled from the school and get there 
transcripts I told Todd he needed to have Hayward Police check not only 
H H H I B mothers residence but other family as well I also told Todd I 
would go by her residence again to see if she or the children were there 
Finally he was told to set up a appointment with a deputy at the Sheriffs 
Office civil unit and take his attorney and documents showing the judges 
orders 
then responded to flHHHHHHIHIiHHHIHB t o s e e l f (HHM o r t n e 
children were at the residence When I pulled up I observed the driveway 
empty and the front drapes and blinds closed I knocked on the door at 
2135 hours and received no answer A light was on inside so I walked 
around the residence to see if his allegation that she moved may be 
correct I went into the backyard and could see into a northeast room 
The room was empty and clean with carpet vacuumed I saw the light that was 
on and it was a night light plugged into the front hall electrical socket 
For F9772 Friday November 17, 2006 Page 4 of 6 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
I walked to the rear porch and saw several items stacked on the porch m 
boxes and a mattress I looked into the residence and was able to see 
partially the front room empty and kitchen empty and clean There were 
cleaning products stacked on the window seal of the kitchen sink but no 
other type of object hanging from the walls I then checked the 
garage/shed and saw several items inside that appear to be ready to load 
and move 
I proceeded to leave and saw a basement curtain open I have been at 
this residence in the past and remember that the basement was stacked with 
clutter I looked into the basement and there was no sign of any item in 
the room There was no sign that anyone would be currently be living m 
that residence at the time I checked it The house appeared vacant 
I called Todd back and advised him of my findings I told him he could 
request Hayward Police do a check of the family addresses again if he 
wanted and I said it would be a good idea I asked him if there would be 
anyone they would be living with m Salt Lake or Utah and he said one 
person but he did not know exactly where they lived, somewhere in/near 
Heber I told Todd that he needed to follow up with the school and Hayward 
Police He was told to set the appointment with the Sheriffs Office civil 
unit and that I would complete a report with my findings 
nfi 
Document OTHER F/U 
Author 12 5 - SHAVER, GREGORY J 
Related date/time Oct-04-2005 2258 
Todd Stone contacted me by pager and informed me that his children, all 
three, had been withdrawn from school on this past Wednesday He left 
several names and of who may know where his ex-wife and children are The 
ex-wife made no attempt to inform Todd that she withdrew the children or 
any notification of where they may be Todd has visitation on 10-05 but 
does not know where to find them He contacted the Sheriffs office civil 
unit and a Sgt Hilden stated they could not help him and sent him back to 
me He was informed the case would be sent to the Family Crimes Unit 
I advised Todd that this will need further investigation and advised him 
I was calling the family crimes unit sergeant and advising them of the 
case He requested contact from a detective as soon as possible 
A message was left with Sgt Lassig about this case Contact was not made 
with the individuals listed above 
nfi 
Document OTHER F/U 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO CO 2005-93203 (CLOSED/COMPL) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Author Q9 8 - NIELSON, PAUL M 
Related date/time Oct-07-2005 1034 
I spoke with Todd Stone today by telephone Mr Stone reported that he was 
to have visitation with his children today and all weekend He stated he is 
unable to contact his ex-wife flHIHi and believes she moved out of state as 
stated m previous follow up reports 
I advised Mr Stone that it is undetermined at this time if in fact 
has moved out of state with the children I advised Mr Stone that he 
should contact the Judge involved m the case for possible action for 
violation of the orders 
Mr Stone wished this be documented for possible charges in the future for 
Custodial Interference 
** END OF HARDCOPY ** 
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76-5-303. Custodial interference. 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, without good cause, the 
actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under the age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other 
lawful custodian: 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than the parent-time or custody 
period previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, having actual physical 
custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction 
which grants to another person parent-time, visitation, or custody rights, and without good cause the 
actor conceals or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful parent-time, 
visitation, or custody rights. 
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is removed and taken from one 
state to another, in which case it is a felony of the third degree. 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_05040.ZIP 2,125 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|AU TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 
fbrfcr °S-~ //Zfez 
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September 6, 2005 
Dale Keddington, 
I am planning on moving out of state October 1st and therefore am 
notifying you that my last day of work should be Sept. 16 . 
I have appreciated the chance to work here with you and thank you 
for all you have done for me. I feel I have benefited greatly from 
my experience here. 
Sincerely 
Joanne Stone 
V 
THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARTMENT 
50 E North Temple St Rm 164 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-4000 
November 2, 2005 
Todd Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Todd: 
The Finance Director announced department reorganization on August 26, 2005. 
Attached please find Joanne's resignation statement. 
Thank you. 
Sincere 
Stephen C. Hales 
Legal Services 
THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARTMENT 
50 E. North Temple St Rm. 164 
Salt Lake Crty. Utah 84160-4000 September 15,2005 
Mary Cochrine 
Fax: 363-8243 
Re: Joanne Stone 
Dear Ms. Cochrine: 
This letter is in response to your phone call 1 received requesting information about Joanne 
Stone's termination, Joanne Stone has voluntarily resigned* Her date ofhire was May 9, 
1988 as a Senior Accounting Clerk. If you have further questions, please contact me at 240-
1578, 
Sincerelyn 
StepEen Hales 
Legal Specialist, Human Resource 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L STONE 
Respondent. 
CASE HISTORY 
Case No: 014903655 DA 
Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY 
Date: Feb. 24, 2006 
CALENDAR 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PROPER NOTICE scheduled on Oct 06, 2005 at 10:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - W4 8 with Judge MEDLEY. 
O/A on the issue of proper notice being given to Respondent, by 
the Petitioner, notifying him of her intent to move the minor 
children out of state. 2 HOURS 
Page 1 (last) 
TA%X SCHOOL 
411 Larcfvmont Street • May-ward, CJA 94544 • (510)293-8515 • fax (510) 782-0789 
Mrs. 'Barbara J-CoCCinasworth, TrincivaC 
"November 1, 2005 
To Whom It 9Aay Concern: 
(Broo%nn Stone, ©0(8 11/22/93, 6th grade andCBrylee Stone, (DOB 3/19/96, 4th grade are currentCy enrolled 
at ParkjElementary School (Brooklynn and(Bry[ee Have been enrolled at (par^since October 27, 2005. 
If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
(Donna Johnson 
School Office "Manager 
4 
J-faywardUnified'ScfiooCDistrict • 24411 Amador Street • Jlayward, C3K 94540-5000 
Dekphone (510) 784-2600 
'Building a CuCture of Success M'fiere M(Means JK(C 
'iaxtj (2.. (icttyxyron 
^e/lie r. Wliluimi 
7u6an (2. £t*4oJ 
Utto-d -/-/. QennLnai 
libett A/. ~Pt&nno 
4aceu M- Snudet 
-(-} Ptokeiiional (2otf2otaiL&n 
•fjtt&tntp at JLa.w 
405 ^out/t Main 3ied, 3uLte #700 
<?altJLzJce (2faf, Utak 84111 
&t< • / 
'Telephone (80/) 328-1162 
Ta&imib (801) 363-8243 
October 4, 2005 
Todd Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Re: Stone v. Stone - Case Status 
Dear Todd: 
This letter is to confirm that we have a hearing scheduled on Thursday morning, October 6, 
2005, at 10:00 a.m., before Judge Medley. The focus of this hearing is solely to consider the 
Judge's own concerns about whether Joanne Stone has given you enough notice under statute to 
leave the state, or whether she must give you sixty days notice, and is to consider the implications 
of her failure to give sixty days notice. You must be in attendance at this hearing. We discussed 
this hearing over the telephone on October 3, 2005. 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
& RESEARCH CENTER OAKLAND 
12/19/06 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am writing on behalf of ray patient Brittney Stone (DOB 2/3/90) and her 
mother Joanne. Brittney is a 16 year old was diagnosed with metastatic 
Sertoli Leydig, a life threatening ovarian cancer on 12/7/06, She is currently 
hospitalized, as she is receiving her first round of chemotherapy. In the next 
several months, Brittney will require multiple courses of chemotherapy. She 
may also receive a stern cell transplant For the next six to eight months she 
will be hospitalized regularly for one to three weeks at a tune. During her 
admission for transplantation, it is likely she will remain in the hospital for 
four to sk weelcfi. There will also be unscheduled admissions for fevers and 
oth@r coiftpllcatlons of therapy. 
Throughout fa$r treatment, Brittney will be immunocompromised, leaving her 
vary vulnerable to infection. Since she Is immunocompromised, Brittney 
cannot attend scfoooL Shs will need to return to the hospital immediately 
whenever she has a fever. She will also require transfusions of platelets and 
red blood cells. The timing of when these transfusions will be needed cannot 
be predicted, but do need to be given promptly after we recognize the need 
for them. 
Brittney's mother cannot leave the state of California to attend a January 
court date in Utah, She is needed to care for her daughter* bring Brittney to 
the hospital and clinic at a moment's notice, and to meet with Brittney *s 
doctors, 
Brittney8 s diagnosis is clearly very new and devastating for the entire family. 
Brittney and her mother are just learning new oncology teaching. This 
includes learning Brittney* s medication schedule, how to care for her central 
venous catheter (a& indwelling access line), die necessary precautions they 
must take to avoid infectious exposures, and signs and symptoms of concern 
far ilkess to watch for when out of the hospitaL 
I appreciate the court's postponing this hearing until Brittney's condition is 
more stable and predictable. I can be reached at 510-428-3324 if you have 
any questions with regard to this request Thank you for your prompt 
consideration of this matter. 
I 0^  
ai' 
jolden, MD. 
Asso£lata Oncologist S^Sp£i; 
v^i° 
747 Fifty Second Street 9 OMwd, CA 94609-1809 
520-428-3000 
w^A'wxhildrcnshospitsJoakknd.otf 
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EUion Vichinsky, M.D. 
Director/Division Cfiitf 
James Feusner, MD. 
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Mark Walter*, M.D. 
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Caroline Huringi, M.D. 
Dimorf Fellowship Program 
Barbara Beach, M.D. 
Caria Golden, MD. 
Carolyn Hoppe, M.D, 
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Naveen Qureshi, M D . 
Keith Quirolo, M.D, 
Sylvia Stager, M.D. 
Sarah Strandjord, M.D, 
Lori Scyics, M.D. 
Joseph TorkUdjor^ M.D. 
Adult Hematology 
Ward Hagar, MD. 
Eugene McMillan, MD, 
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RULING 56 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 6, 2005 
2 HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: This is case number 014903655 and let's 
5 start first by having counsel identify themselves for the 
6 record. 
7 MR. CHIPMAN: Brent Chipman representing the 
8 petitioner, Joanne Stone, and she is present, Your Honor. 
9 MS. CORPORON: Mary Corporon representing the 
10 respondent, Todd Stone. He is present, Your Honor. 
11 MR. MORKEN: Paul Morken representing the 
12 grandmother, Annabelle Stone, and she is also present, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 MS. KISHNER: Sharon Kishner representing the minor 
15 children, guardian ad litem. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, thank you, counsel. 
17 First, let me explain to all of you and place on 
18 the record why we're having this hearing, because from my 
19 vantage point this hearing has a very narrow purpose and I 
20 want to make it clear that we are conducting this hearing 
21 consistent with Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37 and it's subparts, 
22 which is in essence the relocation statute. That relocation 
23 statute gives this Court some discretion in holding expedited 
24 hearings on the Court's own motion if it so chooses, and 
25 obviously I have so chosen, if it has questions about the 
1 issues of relocation that are identified under the relocation 
2 statute. 
3 Now, I also want to make it clear that it was 
4 brought to my attention during the course of my review of a 
5 grandparent's petition for grandparent rights and a motion 
6 for temporary restraining order that Mr. Chipman's client in 
7 this particular case, at least according to that motion 
8 anyway, had, I'll use the term served a notice of relocation 
9 which purported to be consistent with the notice of 
10 relocation that's required under the relocation statute. 
11 I've already ruled on the motion for a temporary restraining 
12 order, but during the course of that ruling and that review, 
13 I reviewed the Notice of Relocation. I had some questions 
14 about the Notice of Relocation and I want to make it clear 
15 the only Notice of Relocation - written Notice of Relocation 
16 that I am aware of which motivated me to set this hearing was 
17 the written Notice of Relocation that was attached as an 
18 exhibit to the grandparent's moving papers. Whether or not 
19 there was some other written notice of relocation, I guess 
20 I'm going to learn that here today. But I want you to know 
21 that at least I'm operating from the position of that is the 
22 only written notice that I have seen which purported to be in 
23 compliance with the statute itself. 
24 Now, the concerns I had with the Notice of 
25 Relocation and then I'm going to give you a chance to address 
1 them starting with Mr. Chipman, and then dependent upon what 
2 I hear in response may or may not lead me to require the 
3 necessary of hearing some testimony or possibly some evidence 
4 in the form of a proffer. But here's the concern I had with 
5 the notice I reviewed. First of all, let me say that when I 
6 reviewed the statute itself, the statute, and I'm 
7 paraphrasing now, states that the parent shall provide if 
8 possible 60 days advance written notice. Now when I read 
9 language like that I interpret that language to mean that the 
10 statute is clearly stating a preference for a 60 day notice 
11 because it uses the word shall. It qualifies the Ashall' 
12 language with the term *if possible.' But clearly when you 
13 read the statute as a whole and you read that language, at 
14 least in this Court's opinion, I don't know if I want to go 
15 as far as to call it a presumption but for all intents and 
16 purposes I think it's the same thing. I think there's a 
17 preference that the notice be 60 days if possible, and if 
18 it's going to be shorter than 60 days then if we follow the 
19 language of the statute it needs to be impossible to give a 
20 60 day notice. And when I reviewed the letter that I 
21 referenced before I could not come to the conclusion that it 
22 was impossible to give a 60 day notice. So I thought the 
23 best thing to do would be to set this hearing. 
24 Additionally in order for any results of this 
25 hearing to be meaningful I also entered the order that the 
3 
1 THE COURT: First of all let me - and I should have 
2 made this clear to all of you earlier, I'm not prepared nor 
3 did I set this hearing for the purpose of resolving the 
4 issues surrounding the proposed supplemental decree and its 
5 objections. You should understand at the least since that 
6 stipulation was last placed on the record I have had at least 
7 two bench trials during that period of time, and to suggest 
8 that I can sit here and verbatim recall to any of you each 
9 and every term and condition that was placed on the record, I 
10 do not have that capacity, nor am I prepared to deal with 
11 those issues here today. I do want to make that clear. 
12 MS. CORPORON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: However, I still need to hear from you 
14 consistent with the issue raised by Mr. Chipman. And maybe 
15 you think you've done this already and if it calls for some 
16 repeating of what you've already stated that's fine. But I 
17 still need to understand how it operates in the best interest 
18 of these minor children, for example, if this Court were to 
19 find that the notice is not sufficient to allow for a move. 
20 I've already prevented a move on October 1st, but why the 
21 move, for example, ought to be delayed until November 6 and 
22 what would be accomplished that would operate in the minor 
23 children's best interest if this Court were to do that. I 
24 mean, after all, irrespective of the statutory language, 
25 which I think is important, these decisions still need to be 
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1 stati ite and the 60 day notice. My concern and my question is 
2 1 IOW could anyone think this was in the ki ds' .best interest to 
3 I wait until 4; J O p.in. Lu tile thj-6 motion it no* \ -.e was an 
"^sue, T - ;^r , 4 _ -^^ ^^  ^ h e C o u r t * +~^ or-r-^pt" +-haf t ,
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 s not i n 
their best interest. 
•': jV^y. ^an you pr, - : : ain a question? 
7 I - K I S H N E R : Y P S , 1 ' m :;u r t v. 
8 I •
 t - - c i i take 
• V- position thcr :i •* ' . :!n-u b< •-" nt erest based upo; 
at inu. even L 1: there was - let's assumo, 1' vc-- il ready made 
t fl < i c.i, e n< • 'oviewe-J t h e ta^^ci r e c o r d )f t h e 
1 ; stipulation that was placed on the record. : am aware that 
^iiere aie objections. but ^y * • \ ' 'n^ of relocation^ 
15 are you suggesting to mp ' ria' LC--U- A.,-. • ,
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16 t h e s t a t u t o r y r e l o c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n i^  * .,pply:J rthat s o m e 
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18 • MS, KISHNER: No, and if I could clarify. 
19 THE COURT: We J ] , and before you do, are you 
20 suggesting that the parties stipulated that they could move 
2] at any time ? 
2,2 MS KISI INER: I Jo. 
2 3 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 1 1 1S KISI IN ER: \ J1 l i, I I , i..rn. i: ; I igge ^  31: i i i.g I • I ,  t Ie C c >i i r 1 : i ; 
2 5 that when these parties walked out of court: on that, day in 
1 .'order last Friday or after a hearing that said that wasn't 
2 sufficient notice, then paragraph 10 s^ys she's in contempt 
3 of court. She stayed here, she's here making her argument 
4 for the court to say when she can move. If the Court says 
5 she can move today I believe she'll leave. If the Court 
6 makes her stay until the 7th of November, she will certainly 
7 stay until the 7th of November. If the Court rules we have 
8 to give a whole other notice and see if it passes muster of 
9 the grandmother, then we will do that, but - we would submit 
10 it. 
11 THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. Let me 
12 first say that taking into consideration the facts and 
13 circumstances that were outlined by Mr. Chipman and the 
14 guardian ad litem, I am going to find that the September 7th 
15 notice was proper notice under all the facts and 
16 circumstances and the requirements of the statute. 
17 I want to also emphasize because this is in my view 
18 the most weak factor in this equation. Taking into 
19 consideration the long history of this particular case, the 
20 acrimony between the parties in this hotly contested case 
21 which in this Court's view has had a negative impact on the 
22 minor children, and there's every indication that at least as 
23 of this day that these disagreements are continuing. When we 
24 were here in August and placed the stipulation on the record, 
25 I I, at that point in time, at least had high hopes that this 
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*-vei of conflicL was hopefully going to dissipate, but i t 
2 :• ->;.i : a p p e a r a s u. i;i!4; U i s s i p a t b ., . - ; -i...- t o o c c u r . 
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14 | t n - ' / ' i e m o v i i . j •• t h e 1st of O c t o b e r ui wn . n a a s a l r e a d y 
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16 I q o m g to go t u o,ii i lorn La , ii ihey' ie gr i!iq io m-;v^ lo 
] 7 ' il i f o n d a, j_n u / " -'-u^'s view
 : t ' i* • • " h e n best interest 
18 • ...d t
 M- , ^ ng an^ icipaL^; move to l a h i . . ^ a oc^ur and 
19 establishi nq tha* stability : • , :- - -s - - T 'h-:r nest 
2 0 :i i iterest. 
2 ] I Consequent1y , I rm g oi r i g t o f i nd that once I analyze 
2 2 1:1 I « El i 11 I d e r .1 y :i i I g f a < : t s a i I < :i < : : :i i : « :: i n i t s t a n c: : e s i * e g a r d i n g t h e notice 
2 3 that was given i i I this particular case as described by Mr. 
24 Chi pman, and once I consider what is i r i the best interest ui 
25 I these minor children as described by the guardian ad litem, 
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1 the Court is going to find that the Relocation Statute has 
2 been complied with and in fact is in the best interest of the 
3 minor children, that they be allowed to move to the State of 
4 California. Consequently, the court is going to enter that 
5 order and that order in terms of their ability to move will 
6 mean that they are able to move from the State of Utah to the 
7 State of California immediately. 
8 Mr. Chipman, I'm going to require that you draft 
9 that order. I can't - it would be preferable if it came to 
10 me approved as to form. If that's impossible, submit it to 
11 me consistent with the rules. As I stated on an earlier 
12 occasion, however, in terms of the ability of your client to 
13 move these minor children to the State of California that 
14 that is immediately ordered by the Court, and this 
15 ministerial function of reducing it to a written order is in 
16 fact just that. 
17 Go ahead, Mr. Chipman. 
18 MR. CHIPMAN: Could we have the Court enter a 
19 minute entry with that in it that would show up and we could 
20 print off if necessary? 
21 THE COURT: You mean in terms of being able to move 
22 immediately? 
23 MR. CHIPMAN: Police authority has been contacted 
24 in both California and Utah this last week by Mr. Stone. It 
25 J concerns me that if they're contacted again with an argument 
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L n e n there could 
be problems. 
i • iln il lln'i v i', 1 think 
i^re is a bettei way t.<, do ' rn-i. It" is now Ll:45. What I'm 
'lit t hi*i proposed order • to me 
!:j1' this aftt;rriooi )u can iax a <. upy oi: that proposed 
L± require that if they have any 
Elections t;> iu.o proposed order submitted i ,- .;:. . ,u. 
iv r\ fay ! • • \nd jjy 2; ] S I hope t-> kidve signed an-: 
•uteres an ^: Ju, c u l -.  . ]r expedil ing 'hi'l : .• 
s . i 4, a hpi f-pi substitute than trying to do it by way of 
MR. Cl-IIPMAN: And that should be sent also to Mr.. 
Mo rken V 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CHIPMAN: I think I'll need a fax number for 
you all. 
THE COURT: I'll require that counsel share that 
i ritormation. 
All right, thank you, counsel, we'll recess at this 
Li me . 
(Whereupon the hearing was concl uded) 
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CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
POPY 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 9, 2006 
2 JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY PRESIDING 
3 For the Petitioner: BRENT R. CHIPMAN 
4 For the Respondent: PRO SE 
5 For the Minor Children: SHARON KISHNER 
6 P R O C E E D I N G S 
7 THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is 
8 case number 014903655 and let's start by having counsel and 
9 Mr. Stone identify himself for the record. 
10 MR. CHIPMAN: Brent Chipman representing the 
11 petitioner Joanne Stone. She is not present. 
12 MS. KISHNER: Sharon Kishner from the Guardian ad 
13 Litem's office. 
14 MR. STONE: Todd Stone. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel, and Mr. Stone, you 
16 may be seated. 
17 Mr. Chipman, consistent with the last hearing on 
18 this matter and the direction received from the court, it is 
19 a correct statement that you have prepared supplemental 
20 findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree; is that 
21 correct? 
22 MR. CHIPMAN: I have. Those were delivered both to 
23 the guardian and to Mr. Stone on January 3rd. I delivered a 
24 courtesy copy of those to the court that afternoon. I've not 
25 heard from Mr. Stone or from the guardian with regard to any 
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1 your purposes and counsel's purposes, I do want to make it 
2 clear that it is my intention to keep the purpose of this 
3 hearing narrowed to the potential entry of the supplemental 
4 findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree and 
5 the objections that you filed or the objections I believe you 
6 have filed to those documents. Mr. Chipman described a 
7 document that says Objections No. 3 to August 3, 2005 
8 document. I think or at least that document has a file stamp 
9 on it of January 6th. I have had a chance to review that 
10 document, so I assume that -
11 MR. STONE: That was my question. 
12 THE COURT: - to be the objection that you have 
13 filed. Now keeping in mind the purpose of this afternoon's 
14 hearing is very important that I, at least from my 
15 prospective anyway, that I limit the scope of this 
16 afternoon's hearing because I noticed from the docket text 
17 and my review of the file that there are a litany of motions 
18 that have been filed in the month of December and January, 
19 and clearly from my prospective those motions are not on the 
20 calendar this afternoon and will not be entertained by the 
21 court. 
22 So I guess my question for you, Mr. Stone, keeping 
23 in mind that I have reviewed your written objections, I want 
24 to give you a brief opportunity quite frankly no more than 10 
25 minutes focused on these objections that you think I ought to 
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1 hear about that you've not stated in this document or to 
2 further explain what's in this document. Go ahead. 
3 MR. STONE: Did you read the other objection 
4 previously filed? I believe I called it Objection No. 1. 
5 That was pertaining to that - this particular document too. 
6 THE COURT: I've reviewed every document in the 
7 file, especially those that are entitled objections. I can't 
8 say -
9 MR. STONE: I understand. I was just -
10 THE COURT: I can't say to you that I've read every 
11 motion that has been filed. I at least read their title. 
12 MR. STONE: I understand. I was just pertaining to 
13 the -
14 THE COURT: But I do believe that I have reviewed 
15 the objections and I want to give you an opportunity now and 
16 a reasonable limit I think to make your argument. 
17 MR. STONE: You've given me about 10 minutes. I've 
18 got 10 points that I just mentioned and I briefly covered 
19 them. You said you read that objection. I think that 
20 there's a historical proof that you can look at the 
21 bifurcated decree that Mr. Chipman prepared was far different 
22 from what the court proceedings were. He has a tendency to 
23 change things and I feel that that would also be the case in 
24 his representation now. If you look at the bifurcated 
25 decree, you had actually cross out a bunch of stuff that he 
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1 money. And so the custody evaluation was paid for 
2 fraudulently and I find that out and so that is a problem. 
3 Then the custody evaluatit 
4 with me having access to the children in the re-interview 
5 that guardian Michelle Blomquist, not you, but guardian 
6 Michelle Blomquist had ordered that we re-evaluate things 
7 because - re-interview because of the time had past. And the 
8 custody evaluator takes both the children while they're under 
9 both parents' care. Later it's been revealed that the kids 
10 say that they were told that if they didn't say what was good 
11 for mom and what would get dad in trouble, 
12 
13 And I'd like to point into this also which Sharon's 
14 seen or which the guardian's seen, and I've also shown Brent 
15 in other things, this is or 
16 I've seen in the house once I got possession of it. The kids 
17 were subject to this and so it just reiterates again and it 
18 was - that's so disturbing, it was in my briefcase just today 
19 while I was down in legal aid's office and the guard came and 
20 investigated it because somebody had reported the disturbing 
21 nature of that sign. That's what the kids were subject to. 
22 And then the America First Credit Union loan, we've 
23 talked about that. 
24 The JflNRNHBIHHRnd fear of the kids, they were 
25 I told that their pets would be killed. They know or feel 
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1 strongly that their cat disappeared because of it as well and 
2 now they fear for their lizard. To little kids this is 
3 important. One of the kids reports that they were told that 
4 they'd never see their dad again and so - and to just go to 
5 sleep. And so she's had fears of going to sleep and yet I 
6 was accused unjustly able to document and correct the record 
7 for causing the nightmares and fear of her going to sleep. 
8 But yet when the truth comes out it was because of the 
9 actions of the petitioner and I wasn't allowed the 
10 counseling. Five times, excuse me, pardon me, I correct, 
11 three times I was - the court ordered that I was allowed to 
12 participate in counseling and another time they said that 
13 counseling should not be changed because 
14 or motion 
16 just before we go into court on August 3 we have one hearing 
17 where I show up to the counselor and I'm rebuked for 45 
18 minutes and then the counsel said, A>Would you like to 
19 respond, Mr. Stone? We'll be leaving in 10 minutes." So 
20 what can you respond after 45 minutes of not having ongoing 
21 counseling like the custody evaluator said in the pre-trial 
22 conference and, sir, you were not present at the pre-trial 
23 conference, neither was the guardian - the current guardian, 
24 neither was Mary Corporon. And so we're left to Mr. Chipman 
25 and Mr. Stone to present the views of the pre-trial 
11 
1 I conference with the guardian. And I had requested tha t the 
2 I iPB^^JFI^^Ti^^ a r e c o r d a r 
4 The petitioner also recommended or represented that 
5 the - these are copies, pardon me, let me back up. These are 
6 copies and I have copies if you want to see them of checks 
7 from the America First Credit Union -
8 THE COURT: No, you can describe what you have. 
9 MR. STONE: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: And I want to caution you to really 
11 focus in on the heart of what your objection is all about. 
12 MR. STONE: ^ ^ H l H f f F i s one thing, 
13 under appeal is another, jurisdiction os another, both 
14 
15 this divorce, and binding me who I don't own the property to 
16 dictate the proceeds. Mr. Chipman in that hearing also 
17 referred or misrepresented Joanne's assets. These is records 
18 of saving accounts records and withdraws. Joanne had $25,000 
19 in - or $24,393 in an account but she was able to withdraw 
20 and use or me. Mr. Chipman seemed to represent differently 
21 that this was a retirement account. There's a retirement 
22 account as well, but any employer let's you invest and have 
23 things and then they also invest for your retirement. This 
24 was stuff that Joanne had access to and so that's an issue. 
25 Mr. Chipman threw in all five cases that he's 
82 
1 THE COURT: Mr. Stone, I'm going to ask that you 
2 take your seat. 
3 MR. STONE: - a couple months later was all. 
4 THE COURT: Listen, before I took the bench let me 
5 say that I had an opportunity to review the file, the docket 
6 text, the objections to the proposed supplemental findings of 
7 fact, conclusions of law and supplemental decree. And I'm 
8 going to rule as follows. First of all, I am going to sign 
9 the supplemental findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
10 supplemental decree and judgment prepared by Mr. Chipman that 
11 we've been discussing here today, and I'm doing so because 
12 this Court is of the opinion that those documents are 
13 consistent with the resolution of this particular case back 
14 on August 3rd of 2005, which this Court accepted. 
15 In reviewing Mr. Stone's objections, in this 
16 Court's view, first of all, the objections themselves are -
17 and let me preface these remarks by saying I recognize that 
18 there are occasions where reasonable people can disagree on 
19 interpretations or rulings, so I want to make it clear when I 
20 make these statements I intend no mental attack or disrespect 
21 to any party or counsel when I make these statements. I just 
22 want to make that clear, but in this Court's view the 
23 objections of Mr. Stone are certainly not specific in nature, 
24 and I really do think that they generally constitute a 
25 general diatribe of the history of this particular case from 
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his prospective as opposed to sufficient legal grounds upon 
which this Court should not enter the supplemental documents 
prepared by Mr. Chipman. The objections themselves fall into 
general categories really as best as I can determine. 
There's some objections to some jurisdictional concerns that 
Mr. Stone has and in this Court's view, 
Additionally, there are a category of objections 
that references or suggestion of petitioner's failure to 
disclose certain facts, and Mr. Stone, I think, used the term 
fraud. And in this Court's view for purpose of entering this 
agreement as agreed upon by the parties on August 3rd, this 
Court is going to find that those allegations lack merit and 
are not sufficient to preclude this Court from performing the 
ministerial act that I stated back on August 3, 2005 of 
entering findings, conclusions and a decree consistent with 
the parties' stipulation. 
Additionally, there are some objections that fall 
into a general category of the guardian's purported failures, 
allegations of the guardian failing to disclose certain 
facts, failing to properly represent the minor children. And 
in this Court's view the Court is going to find that those 
allegations lack merit and do not provide a basis not to sign 
the supplemental documents prepared by Mr. Chipman. 
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1 Additionally there's a category of newly revealed 
2 information which attacks the custody evaluation prepared in 
3 this particular case. There's also objections in the form of 
4 allegations of the petitioner's conduct alleging that it's in 
5 violation of court orders. Additionally allegations of 
6 petitioner's conduct alleging that she has not complied with 
7 the agreement of August 3, 2005. And in this Court's view 
8 those types of objections fall into the category of 
9 compliance and enforcement issues which do not serve as a 
10 basis to preclude this Court from signing the supplemental 
11 documents prepared by Mr. Chipman. 
12 And this is may be a small note but I at least want 
13 to make this note of record, and I'm now referencing the 
14 document which I believe Mr. Stone paid most attention to, at 
15 least in his oral presentation, was the document that has a 
16 title Objections No. 3 to August 3, 2005 hearing. I do want 
17 to make apparent that the Court only considered the first 10 
18 pages of that document because beyond that it exceeds the 
19 limitations in Rule 7 and this Court clearly did not give 
20 permission to Mr. Stone or any counsel which I think is 
21 required by rule, even for objections if you intend them to 
22 be longer than 10 pages which that objection is, and I want 
23 to make it clear that the balance of that objection is 
24 stricken. 
25 Mr. Chipman, can I assume you have with you right 
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1 now an original verbatim copy of the Findings of Fact, 
2 Conclusions of Law that you courtesy copied me which I have 
3 reviewed and described in accordance with the Court's ruling? 
4 MR. CHIPMAN: I do. I printed off duplicate 
5 originals. I was just trying to catch the guardian's eye to 
6 see if she wanted to approve them or if you want to just have 
7 them submitted as they are. 
8 MS. KISHNER: Whatever the Court's preference -
9 THE COURT: It's my - I don't have a preference, 
10 you've already indicated that you've reviewed them and you 
11 have no objection, and Mr. Stone's objections are clearly on 
12 the record and preserved, and this Court is going to -
13 MR. STONE: What will be done -
14 THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Stone. 
15 This Court is going to sign those documents at this 
16 time. The Court is going to accept Mr. Chipman's 
17 representation as an officer of this court that these are 
18 exactly the same as the courtesy copies presented. 
19 Just one moment? 
20 MR. STONE: What about the insurance? 
21 THE COURT: I asked you to just wait one more 
22 minute. 
23 MR. STONE: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: Now, and I say this to all three of you 
25 actually, in terms of addressing other issues in this 
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1 particular case, this Court is certainly not going to address 
2 them in the context of this particular hearing because this 
3 hearing as I indicated had a very narrow and limited purpose, 
4 so I'm not going to address issues, for example, about 
5 insurance or other issues that appear to at least be raised 
6 by way of motion format. And I can - and this is just a word 
7 of caution and guidance to Mr. Stone and the guardian ad 
8 litem and Mr. Chipman, I believe that it may very well be 
9 that the motions that were filed by Mr. Stone during the 
10 month of - maybe the latter part of November and all of 
11 December and into January may already be set for hearing 
12 before the commissioner. 
13 Now when I looked at the title of those motions and 
14 tried to consume as much of them as I possibly could, and I 
15 want you to keep in mind that it was impossible to complete 
16 that task 100 percent because there were so many. It 
17 appeared to me that at some point in time it may be necessary 
18 to put some type of reasonable case management and litigation 
19 tools in place in this particular case but I am not in 
20 position to make that determination here this afternoon 
21 primarily because these matters are now scheduled on the 
22 calendar before the commissioner and I think this court, at a 
23 minimum, ought to at least benefit from the commissioner 
24 system that we have in place and what recommendation, if any, 
25 the commissioner may have in terms of now only potential 
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merit of the motions because I'm not intending to address 
them here today, but it just might be, because of Mr. Stone's 
pro se status it may be necessary to include some additional 
management tools in place so the issues being prosecuted and 
defended in their most expeditious and efficient manner, but 
with that we will recess. 
Thank you counsel and Mr. Stone. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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7 THE COURT: This is case number 014903655. 
8 Counsel, would you identify yourselves for the record please? 
9 MR. CHIPMAN: Brent Chipman representing petitioner 
10 Joanne Stone. She moved to California as the Court may 
11 remember and is not present today. 
12 MS. CORPORON: Mary Corporon, I am the attorney for 
13 the respondent, Todd Stone, and he is present in court, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 MS. KISHNER: Sharon Kishner, guardian ad litem's 
16 office, Your Honor, representing the minor children. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. And counsel, I 
18 think first we probably ought to go to a motion to withdraw 
19 as counsel of record filed by Ms. Corporon and I've had an 
20 opportunity to review that particular motion, and Ms. 
21 Corporon, I'm inclined to deny that motion at this point. 
22 MS. CORPORON: Could I be heard, Your Honor, may I 
23 just briefly make my argument on that. 
24 THE COURT: And I've read your moving papers, so I 
25 didn't anticipate that there was something in addition 
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motions filed in juvenile court, there's been a request by 
Mr. Stone to do mediation which almost went forward until I 
let the mediators know the status of this case. We've got 
too many channels going here and we need to consolidate. We 
need to get the stipulations that the counsels that were 
present in August that they agreed on in paper in written 
form with Mr. Chipman and Ms. Corporon in my office and then 
move forward. Right now everything is still in limbo. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you wish to say 
something, Ms. Corporon? 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, just that there is much 
in response to all of this which I think Mr. Stone wishes to 
present to this court and perhaps 
For example had my motion to withdraw had 
been granted when it was made, we would have been 20 days 
past my withdraw and we'd be at this hearing today. I really 
in this case even to argue these particular issues, even to 
argue these documents. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHIPMAN: May I speak please? 
THE COURT: No you may not right now. 
Let me turn this question to the guardian ad litem. 
I recognize at this point we share a concern but I want to 
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make sure I'm not leaving anything out of this decision-
making process. If I let Ms. Corporon out I don't know what 
the time frame is, but we're probably talking realistically 
at least 25 to 30 days probably before we get to a point 
where, consistent with the rules I would be able to enter a 
findings and supplemental findings and decree consistent with 
the stipulation. Can you help me with any potential 
Lght not be able to appreciate 
what may happen upon them within that block of time? You may 
not be able to do so, I don't know. 
MS. KISHNER: I don't think I can with the detail 
that I would like to. Other than Q H H H H R M H H P ^ t h e kulk 
of the major holidays that most people celebrate take place 
this month. The kids are on the year-round schedule and so I 
know that there's been discussion between the parties as to 
when and in which state dad would have contact with the 
children. I do know and I don't think that I am violating my 
attorney/client privilege in terms of certain representations 
I made to my clients the last time I saw them which was the 
day before the October 7 move and I was under the impression 
that given their year-round school schedule and my 
that they would be returning to 
whether that would happen at H i H H H i ^ H H I or 
whether that fell within the year-round provisions, and I'm 
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concerned that without counsel walking through what I have 
booked in the docket and with pleadings that have gone back 
and forth to keep on the track of what I believe the parties 
It's just going to - I can't think of the word, 
it's going to certainly throw ai 
what can be worked out between these people for the next 20 
days. And I certainly - I can't even put myself in Ms. 
Corporon's position. I don't know what the issues are that 
she's struggling with. But - and I don't know if perhaps 
there's a financial nature of some of these issues that were 
argued before Your Honor in August, 
tiHHtiM|Hriy|^ta^tt^AtfflHMttHHHUHHHSflK&Ls' -*- can't imagine 
that there are concerns that would not allow her to act in 
[inaudible]. 
That's the only thing that I could put forward. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Chipman? 
MR. CHIPMAN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's recess for just five minutes. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Counsel, this is what I'm going to do, 
and before revisiting this issue of the objections that are 
currently of record and on file, what I'm going to do is as 
follows. lii^iHH^BHfl^flHHJi^^^^^^^HflHHHHHHBHHHHi 
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instruct Mr. Stone to hand deliver or mail his responses to 
me? Of the six motions he has filed since October 6, he has 
not mailed or delivered a single one to my office or on the 
appeal and I've had to contact the court to get those 
documents. 
THE COURT:££H££SS9*T That's appropriate and 
consistent with the rules. 
Go ahead, counsel. 
MS. KISHNER: Your Honor, and i ^ J g 5 B H H 8 P W v i t h 
today's ruling, and I realize this is outside the scope of 
what was set for argument today, but again 
H>egins on the 19th of this month and they 
are out of school until the 9th of January, that is three 
weeks time. 
excess of a week since they have relocated, however, they 
have had some holidays of a day or more, 
'andi 
parent-time schedule would be, 
court with drafts of supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as well as the decree of divorce that 
initially had been prepared by Mary Corporon representing her 
client, and I also now have copies of objections of the final 
orders that Mr. Chipman has filed and I don't believe any of 
My concern 
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period. And perhaps it's appropriate for me to file another 
motion which is going to take more time, but I would like to 
ask the Court to at least acknowledge what I believe the 
parties agreed upon or was ordered during the trial which was 
a parent-sharing schedule that addressed one-half of the two 
younger children's off-track time, vacation or holiday time 
from school as well as any other time when the petitioner 
elects to bring the children to the State of Utah. It's been 
indicated to me that mom does not have time off until Easter, 
and so she personally will not be available and Mr. Chipman 
has represented to me that he, in correspondence to Mr. 
Stone, has extended that time frame to Mr. Stone, however 
THE COURT: Counsel, you are -
MS. KISHNER: I'm going way over. 
THE COURT: Yes, you are and don't get me wrong. I 
understand your position. 
MS. KISHNER: Yeah, I told these -
THE COURT: And I recognize that ruling in the 
mannerj@^^tttaJBMteMMHHMBHBBBBAAriHIMittHflfeHBtt^^e 
ild know or at least I would hope 
you would appreciate I'm in no position right now, for 
example, to determine what the parties did or did not agree 
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to. I have not, for example, revisited a copy of the 
transcript or the videotape of the hearing to be able to say 
those agreements are controlling for this block of time that 
you're now talking about. 
MS. KISHNER: And would the appropriate forum be 
for me to file a motion with the commissioner just to do some 
kind of -
THE COURT: Short of some agreement I'm sure you're 
going to have to do that. 
MS. KISHNER: Okay, and I believe the parties agree 
on the time frame. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chipman, were you trying to say 
something? 
MR. CHIPMAN: I'm just saying I'm happy to talk 
with counsel. I've sent her copies and the correspondence 
was with Ms. Corporon but the last several letters to Ms. 
Corporon I've also sent to her client in light of the 
breakdown in communications that she testified to today. 
MS. KISHNER: Okay. I'll attempt to discuss it 
with all the parties involved and then take the proper 
action. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. We'll 
recess at this time. 
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MR. CHIPMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, may I be excused at this 
point? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Now Mr. Stone, before I hear from you, let me just 
briefly state to you I have resolved the issues that were set 
on the calendar today and I'm really, really struggling to 
appreciate and understand what it is you wish to say today 
that's going to have an impact on the issues that need to be 
resolved at some point in time in the future. But in an 
abundance of caution, I'm going to give you an opportunity to 
briefly identify what it is you wish to say, but please keep 
in mind I may very well cut you off for the purpose that I've 
just described. 
MR. STONE: I understand. 
question? 
THE COURT: I'm not going to address those issues 
at this point and I'm not going to give you counsel or advice 
as to how those issues ought to be addressed. 
MR. STONE: If you're disregarding anything that's 
been filed previously do I need to refile them? 
THE COURT: I'm not going to advise you on what you 
need to do. And if this is the purpose of the discussion 
then I'm going to stop it right now. 
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MR. STONE: There was some 
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been revealed and different from what the August 3rd hearing 
date was, and those issues I think needed to be considered or 
taken into effect - into account because they in essence 
That's one thing, 
able to speak 
There was information that the guardian insinuated 
THE COURT: I'm going to stop you right now, Mr. 
Stone. This is quite frankly far outside the limited scope 
of this hearing and 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-C-
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9 THE COURT: Good morning. Well, we've got a matter 
10 scheduled for hearing, Joanne Stone vs. Todd Stone. I see 
11 Mr. Chipman is here representing Ms. Stone and Mr. Stone 
12 representing himself. 
13 Mr. Stone, you filed and noticed up for hearing 24 
14 motions. I'd like you take about two minutes and tell me how 
15 you propose to get through those motions in the time that we 
16 have available, and then Mr. Chipman can give me his input so 
17 we can manage this in a way that's not going to impose on the 
18 other people that have to come into court. I want you to 
19 tell me how you think you can get through these 24 motions 
20 and what you would like to propose in that respect. 
21 MR. STONE: Okay. I know it's a lot but basically 
22 it comes down to a couple basic points. First off you told 
23 us not to use joint funds. Joanne used joint funds -
24 THE COURT: You're going to the merits now. Are 
25 J you saying that you could collapse your argument on 
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1 realtor and then he also in another letter responds back that 
2 Joanne would work with Carl Marcozian to sell the houses. 
3 The order was not to use favor - not to use a friend realtor, 
4 someone, a third party. He's suggesting that either 
5 neighbors in the ward buy the house or realtors in our ward 
6 and neighbors, one of them even had some of the property 
7 that's on the house is from that realtor's house. 
8 Mr. Chipman failed to represent all of the joint 
9 debts in this so-called agreement, and so there's a lot of 
10 things going on. We need to establish before the properties 
11 can be sold how much Joanne needs to pay for the properties 
12 because the deal is how much is the net amount, but nobody 
13 has rule don what the net amount is because if you say Mr. 
14 if you say Joanne owns the condo property, we have three 
15 different properties, what has she paid for it or what does 
16 she need to pay for it in order to own it? She hasn't paid 
17 anything for it. It's $150,000 to $200,000 of debt on the 
18 condo alone, and the condo has an offer on it for $95,000. I 
19 have several offers to propose with or without the condo 
20 property being included because under Mortensen and under Cox 
21 and other cases in the Utah Supreme Court and appellate court 
22 they've ruled that what a person brings to the marriage is 
23 pre-marital is his to take away from the marriage. Just the 
24 passage of time isn't determined if to say. Joanne has not 
25 J put in any money for the price of the condo, so the rights of 
108 
1 Annabelle were being infringed on if they're saying that she 
2 has to pay for stuff that isn't really her responsibility. 
3 Joanne has -
4 THE COURT: Unless I'm mistaken, do I understand 
5 there is a separate lawsuit out there in which you and she 
6 and your ex-wife are fighting over this condo? 
7 MR. STONE 
8 THE COURT 
9 MR. STONE 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Because my mom's forwarded $300,000 to 
10 I advanced $300,000 or more for the real estate because when 
11 we appeared before you the first time, Commissioner Casey, 
12 you said for me to do my best efforts to maintain the 
13 properties, the equity, and so I did. I did that on the two 
14 properties I had so they didn't go to foreclosure, they were 
15 close to being foreclosed on because I couldn't afford them. 
16 My mom stepped up with some money and paid them off because 
17 she said if I'm paying interest I may as well pay interest at 
18 a better rate than what you've got. And so she was able to 
19 get a four percent loan instead of a eight and a quarter 
20 percent loan. 
21 And so Mr. Chipman throws out that my mom has a lot 
22 of money and should pay the travel expenses for the kids and 
23 should pay all this and this and this, well, let's consider 
24 Mr. Chipman's own money. He has a lot of money and he can 
25 I pay this and this and this. And you say, you laugh, and say 
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1 that's irrelevant. It is. It's irrelevant for Annabelle 
2 Stone to pay things that she's not a party to, whether it's 
3 the travel expenses for the kids or whether it's continuing 
4 on the third property, the Melanie Drive home, which is going 
5 into foreclosure on the 15th of the month. That's why I've 
6 tried to bring everything into court soon because it needs to 
7 be resolved. If it goes to foreclosure, there's a six month 
8 right of redemption if Mr. Chipman and Joanne wanted to 
9 redeem the property, they have six months. It still doesn't 
10 take their name off of it for foreclosure unless it isn't 
11 redeemed. 
12 THE COURT: How much equity do you think is in that 
13 property? 
14 MR. STONE: Well, that's another thing because I 
15 was told on August 3rd to do the best I could to sell it, and 
16 so I have been able to formulate, get several offers on the 
17 properties, they want to buy all three of them, and so if you 
18 look at the price all three, you'd have to look at what the 
19 equity is. Mr. Chipman represented last time we were in 
20 court that his party wants to buy it just to tear down the 
21 house. The tax notice shows that the price of the land is 
22 $90,000. There's $115,000 owing to Wells Fargo and $116,000, 
23 excuse me, it's three months not paid, so it's $116,000 now. 
24 There's a home equity loan of $33,000 or $32,000 that Joanne 
25 has used inappropriately, and so to decide first off with is 
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1 offense I understand. 
2 THE COURT: This court isn't prosecuting anybody. 
3 We do consider claims of contempt. 
4 MR. STONE: Right, and so that's what I was looking 
5 at as a side bar of that. 
6 The idea of the ownership and who owes who what in 
7 payment. As it relates to Brittney, I was more or less had 
8 to give up my father's rights. And we didn't have a hearing 
9 on it. That's what Joanne said she wanted, or that's what 
10 somebody else says to happen. I care about all three of our 
11 daughters and if you recall when we met with Matt Davies in 
12 the conference, he said that the fractured relationship 
13 should be repaired before Brittney was taken to California. 
14 And so you ordered on October 2004 that none of the girls 
15 should be taken until counseling and ongoing counseling. The 
16 counseling wasn't allowed to happen. Joanne didn't let it 
17 happen. Even when you said I shouldn't have to pay for 
18 counseling more than what Joanne was paying for, I conceded 
19 the change of counselor because you said that I shouldn't 
20 have to pay, we go into the one counseling session she 
21 allowed Brittney to yell at me for 45 minutes and I was 
22 charged $300. And Joanne said that didn't happen. You 
23 weren't told that you didn't have to pay. You have to pay 
24 full price. And so they socked me $300 and in an effort to 
25 try and bring about some start to the counseling, we went 
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1 ahead and paid that to try and resolve it later. Mary said 
2 pay it now and resolve it later. All these pay nows and 
3 resolve laters never get resolved. That's what Chipman and 
4 my wife want you to do on the house, they want me to do on 
5 all these other things, pay now and give Todd credit for 
6 travel, pay now and give Todd credit for something else. Pay 
7 now -
8 THE COURT: You're going to have to focus yourself 
9 a little bit because you're running out of time. Mr. 
10 Chipman's still entitled to have an opportunity to respond 
11 once you -
12 MR. STONE: I do need a copy of the leases and the 
13 other papers I've asked for and requested. I'm looking at 
14 child support amounts. I've been approved designed as 
15 partially disabled by the state, Worker's Comp Fund, Worker's 
16 Compensation of Utah, and State Rehabilitative Services. 
17 They're going to send me to school to get some credentials. 
18 My child support I asked to be reviewed and looked 
19 at to be in line. It was a sum certain amount of $600 a 
20 month. If I have to give up my parental rights to Brittney, 
21 then let's look at reducing that too, because if we have a 
22 hearing - there never was a hearing on the best interest of 
23 the kids. Mr. Chipman represents that the hearing on moving 
24 to California was, but it wasn't. The hearing if you read 
25 J the docket was only on the notice. The notice was given to 
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1 further. Does the Court have any questions? 
2 THE COURT: Reading through Mr. Stone's motions, 
3 the one thing that did stand out in this decree is that it 
4 doesn't say anything about who's responsible for payment of 
5 the mortgages or any debts or anything like that, at least 
6 that I saw. It says who gets possession of them-
7 MR. CHIPMAN: At the time that was negotiated, Your 
8 Honor, my client had no intent on moving and had been in the 
9 home for four plus years and had made every single mortgage 
10 payment. 
11 THE COURT: So at that time she was assuming she 
12 would continue to make all the mortgage payments on that 
13 residence. 
14 MR. CHIPMAN: That's right. 
15 THE COURT: And her assumption was Mr. Stone would 
16 make the payments, any payments on the other two properties 
17 that -
18 MR. CHIPMAN: Which he has been or his mother has 
19 been, and he's had the use of all of that rent and all of 
20 that. Now the court didn't address that because we had a 
21 hearing only on the sufficiency of the notice. There's been 
22 no hearing on the best interest of the child except the 
23 J August 3rd hearing where the parties agreed it was in the 
best interest implicitly by agreeing to the custody 24 
25 arrangement 
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1 THE COURT: I understand that. 
2 MR. CHIPMAN: Going back to the home, when Your 
3 Honor allowed my client to move a year prior in the fall of 
4 2004, you did say she could move with Brittany but she 
5 couldn't take the two younger children until we had the 
6 custody matter resolved and then said that he could move into 
7 the house and make the payments or if he didn't want to move 
8 into the house there would have to be some arrangements for 
9 who was going to make the payments. So when we moved our 
10 intention was to rent it and to use the rental money to make 
11 the proceeds. We were effectively locked out by Mr. Stone's 
12 actions in contacting the mortgage company and tattling to 
13 them she's abandoned it so that they locked it up. 
14 THE COURT: All right. So there is a sort of an 
15 open issue that really is not addressed in the decree about 
16 that. 
17 MR. CHIPMAN: Mrs. Stone made one mortgage payment 
18 and I believe that we'll have an agreement that she'll make 
19 the other ones pending the sale. I believe we can sell the 
20 house, if I get an agreement, we can sell the house tomorrow 
21 because I've got somebody that I think will buy it for more 
22 to knock it down than to list it on the multiple listing 
23 market. I've not received any of the offers that Mr. Stone 
24 says he has for some sort of package deal, and the ownership 
25 of the properties is no longer in doubt either because the 
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1 recommendation of the court, the order of the court is that 
2 all the parties will be sold and the proceeds escrowed 
3 pending the resolution of the other case. 
4 Now that other case is an action only to collect 
5 monies paid on the properties, not to determine ownership. 
6 So my view is that my client owns half of each of those 
7 properties and her former mother-in-law owns the other half. 
8 And she's going to recoup the money she's paid off the 
9 mortgages with because she stands in the place of the bank 
10 and then she'll get half of what remains which is what Mr. 
11 Stone would have received if he had not conveyed the 
12 property. 
13 The court has another question or -
14 THE COURT: Well, that's not what the decree says. 
15 I mean, doesn't the decree say that any proceeds subject to 
16 whatever claim that Ms. Stone has, Annabelle Stone has, after 
17 payment of your fees and $5,000 to Mr. Stone would be divided 
18 evenly. 
19 MR. CHIPMAN: Right. 
20 THE COURT: But he's been dismissed out of that 
21 other action? 
22 MR. CHIPMAN: He has. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think you've answered 
24 the questions that I have to the best you're able to. 
2 5
 Where did Ms. Kishner go? Did she have another 
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hearing she needed to attend? 
COURT CLERK: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Did she 
of these documents and things 
the guardian? 
MS. ?: (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Well, Mr 
as well as you can to what Mr 
probably going to have to rule 
want to weigh in on this issue 
that apparently was directed at 
. Stone, why don't you respond 
. Chipman has said. I'm 
B on all of this stuff in 
writing just so that I'm clear and I don't overlook something 
because there's so much here. 
and when Ms. Kishner comes in 
you can finish up as quickly 
And so if you can be concise 
I might interrupt you and then 
as we can. 
MR. STONE: I understand. 
THE COURT: We have a number of people scheduled 
for hearing at 10:00. 
MR. STONE: In regards to Ms. Kishner's stuff, it 
was just because she said she had writings that showed that 
all three of the kids were afraid of me. I know that's not 
the case. And if so, then yeah, I want to know about it so I 
will walk away. But if they're not, if they go with what 
they've told me they want to be close to me, they want to be 
involved with me, they want to be here in Utah and all these 
other things, then I as a father owe it to them to do the 
best I can. And so if she can show me that the other two 
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1 kids don't want anything to do with me, that can easily put 
2 some closure on that aspect of it. 
3 Let me read what the transcript says because Mr. 
4 Chipman seemed to embellish it a lot between the two 
5 translations of the preparers. It says, neither party would 
6 be awarded any alimony from the other party and each would 
7 waive any claim of alimony from the other. The petitioner 
8 would specifically, pursuant to all the terms and conditions 
9 of this settlement consider to be satisfied and paid in full 
10 all judgments she has received in this and other litigation 
11 for attorney fees against the respondent here for judgments, 
12 for items in the nature of child support such as judgments 
13 for daycare expenses and would waive any claims for sums not 
14 reduced to judgment for any alleged arrearages of child 
15 support or something in the nature of support and both 
16 parties would waive those claims against the other and they'd 
17 start with a clean slate as of August 1, 2005. 
18 That is what - that's a whole paragraph that 
19 pertains to that what Mr. Chipman seemed to draw up a lot 
20 more and Ms. Corporon, he says some of it came from Ms. 
21 Corporon some of it came from him, but it's the idea that 
22 neither one was in compliance with what this actual 
23 J transcript says. So that is I was claiming child support 
problems for, I mean, daycare things because of the money 24 
25 J that was on the flexible spending thing, so that was waiving 
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1 that aspect. It didn't waive the things from my father. You 
2 told me I was allowed to pick up everything I brought from 
3 California of my fathers. There's a lot of things that he 
4 had in his home that I brought back and I never got back. 
5 And if you're thinking that I'm bad for preparing 
6 these orders and Mr. Chipman wants to punish me and you want 
7 to punish me $500 per thing, I was trying to do my best to 
8 resolve the problems because the decree as it is prepared 
9 Judge Medley said he would sign the transcript as the order. 
10 But if you look at the transcript he said if we both didn't 
11 agree on it. We don't agree. I presented my objections and 
12 he said he only read 10 pages of my objections. There are a 
13 lot of things that I'm trying to clear up and have a 
14 workable, enforceable, valid decree so it doesn't have to go 
15 to appeal because there are a lot of holes in it or errors. 
16 But as far as that aspect, the counselor won't deal 
17 with me because they said that we're not - we don't have 
18 instructions from the court to deal with you, Todd. Even 
19 though you have legal custody we want it in writing from the 
20 court. And so that's why I'm asking you for that. 
21 As far as email to Brittney it said it had to go 
22 through her counselor. The counselor here doesn't have her 
23 email address and the counselor there won't talk to me. So 
24 if I can send some email to Brittney and talk to her that way 
25 I that's fine. 
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1 Foreclosure reinstatement person that does - that 
2 buys it, until they are reinstated, that person is entitled 
3 to the rent. So Mr. Chipman saying that I had full run of 
4 the rent, it was Annabelle who did, by law she's entitled to 
5 those. 
6 It's interesting that Mr. Chipman says now that on 
7 August 3rd there was no intent of moving because that was my 
8 argument as well. Judge Medley said, oh no, you were told 
9 August 3rd about that and so the intent was 60 days from 
10 there which made it August 6th and they moved because that's 
11 - but it's interesting that Mr. Chipman says that because 
12 that the very same thing that I think the transcript shows. 
13 There was no intent on moving. 
14 We need to determine the ownership of the houses 
15 and so who can - who has to pay for what. Offers, he says he 
16 hasn't seen any offers, that's because the people have given 
17 them to me and if someone wants, as a receiver or a 
18 conservator review them, there's about 27 offers on the three 
19 properties, and most every one of them wants to buy all three 
20 together. Most of them will close in three day period of 
21 time, but you can't close on something that you don't know 
22 how much Joanne's going to be getting because that 
23 determines, if you look at the prices what price you want to 
24 accept or whatever, and I think Mr. Chipman's trying to 
25 inflate the price. When you look at - take the average 
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1 price. There's enough of these open market, fair market 
2 prices that say okay, the average price, that's a fair 
3 determination. No, the Melanie Drive home was appraised at 
4 $192,000 and that's an appraisal that I have here. And so 
5 that's an aspect I'm willing to show it to you, Your Honor, 
6 or anyone that you appoint as a conservator. But if Mr. 
7 Chipman gets these offers, there's a chance that he can go 
8 and sabotage them for his benefit rather than what the open 
9 market is. 
10 MR. CHIPMAN: I gave him $90,000 more, excuse me, 
11 Your Honor. 
12 MR. STONE: No, because if my mom - she doesn't 
13 have to sell it. She is not bound to sell it and so she can-
14 THE COURT: Well, do I understand Mr. Chipman 
15 correctly you quit claimed all of these properties to your 
16 mother? 
17 MR. STONE: Legally yes, based on the advice of 
18 counsel. 
19 THE COURT: So what's your involvement in these 
20 properties at all? Isn't it kind of between her and 
21 MR. STONE: It isn't determined 
22 THE COURT: I mean, there is a division of 
23 something pursuant to this decree and I would think that Ms. 
24 Stone's interest once you work it out ought to be paid out, 
25 but I think there's still a question of the remaining 
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this conflict, it's your job to do that. 
MR. STONE: I'm trying to resolve it. 
THE COURT: So those offers need to be disclosed if 
you're going to argue that they're legitimate and that they 
ought to be taken into account so that Mr. Chipman and his 
client can evaluate them. I would assume you have disclosed 
them to your mother, but if you haven't you certainly need to 
do that as well since she's the one that's legally on the 
title and the available proceeds from the sale of these 
residences may affect her interest, although it sounds like 
it's what's left that really is going to be in dispute for 
the most part. 
MR. STONE: Right. 
THE COURT: I don't know why Ms. Kishner is held up 
and I don't think we ought to prolong this hearing. 
It would appear to me that the requests that are 
made for documents from the guardian ad litem that pertain to 
the statements or things that were received by them is 
requesting things that are probably, to the extent they were 
from the children, confidential and privileged, and in any 
event, you got a decree of divorce that doesn't cut you off 
from Brylee and - what's the other one? Brooklynn. It does 
say that Brittney's contact is going to sort of governed by 
her desires and you're going to have to work through the 
counselor. And I think we ought to clarify if there's any 
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1 I question about this that Mr. Stone is to have free and 
2 unfettered access to communicate with the therapist subject 
3 to whatever limits the therapist has, ethical limits 
4 obviously which would be true for both parents, and if you 
5 need an order to that effect so that the therapist will 
6 recognize that, I think that's an absolutely appropriate 
7 order. 
8 MR. STONE: They said I did when I talked to them. 
9 THE COURT: Fine. So if they need that I don't 
10 know why Ms. Stone's release wouldn't be adequate or maybe 
11 she hasn't provided the release, but I think she should do 
12 that as well as provide whatever written release the 
13 therapist wants to make sure there's no HIPAA or other 
14 ethical reservations they have about communicating with Mr. 
15 Stone or about performing the function of passing along the 
16 emails to Brittney. 
17 MR. STONE: Do I get equal treatment like they talk 
18 to her about things do they get to talk to me about it? 
19 MR. CHIPMAN: The guardian wrote a letter and sent 
20 a copy to me and to Mr. Stone just recently and addresses the 
21 counselor and says that there should be equal treatment, 
22 meaning my client should be able to talk to them ad nauseaum 
23 and 
2 4 THE COURT: Right. 
25 MR. CHIPMAN: - Mr. Stone. What we can't agree to 
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1 is that if my client is talking and her bishop pays for her, 
2 then if Mr. Stone talks he can't ask for my client's bishop 
3 to pay for him, he ought to pay for his time. She makes it 
4 clear in there. He doesn't have a copy of that I'm sure -
5 MR. STONE: I haven't received it. But one of the 
6 things with the church financing is it's the children's 
7 counseling and the children are only paid for with the ward 
8 they're in. My bishop has made it clear to Ms. Kishner that 
9 he's not allowed to pay for counseling that pertains to the 
10 kids that aren't in his ward. 
11 THE COURT: That's way beyond the scope of anything 
12 that I think is properly before me here today. 
13 MR. STONE: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: But certainly you should not be 
15 prevented from communicating appropriately. 
16 Now given all the massive filings that we've had on 
17 several occasions, I mean this case is into five volumes and 
18 I would not want to go back through and try to count up 
19 pages, but I know a good majority of this is papers that you 
20 filed with little margins and single spaces so you can go on 
21 as long as you want to about stuff, and I am feeling there 
22 might be some tendency to go on a bit with the therapist, so 
23 you need to understand they're not going to want to have 
24 prolonged hour-long conversations with you as a general rule. 
25 MR. STONE: Understood. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. But clearly if there isn't any 
2 question then I think the decree is very clear. You should 
3 be having equal opportunity to communicate with the therapist 
4 and address any questions and concerns you might have with 
5 them. And are all three of the children seeing the same 
6 therapist? 
7 MR. STONE: I have no idea. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Is that -
9 MR. STONE: I just know one of the orders you said-
10 MR. CHIPMAN: We represented that in the mediation 
11 and I believe that's correct. If Brittney is seeing a 
12 separate one, we'll -
13 THE COURT: You need to make sure it's her 
14 therapist that has an order to -
15 MR. STONE: One of the orders you had issues was 
16 Brittney was to see a separate therapist because of the 
17 conflict of the two parties. 
18 THE COURT: And I don't know if that necessarily is 
19 still the case. I think the decree says her to be in 
20 therapy. So, I mean, I don't think there's any magic. 
21 MR. CHIPMAN: I've got the letter if we can make a 
22 copy. I see it was sent to Mr. Stone at Promenade Drive 
23 where he hasn't resided for three or four years. That's one 
24 of the rental properties, and so it probably - it's dated 
25 February 2nd. I believe I got it Monday the 6th. 
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1 THE COURT: All right, well, straighten that out. 
2 The worst thing that can happen is - you've got a whole bunch 
3 of financial things - but the worst thing that can happen is 
4 you can continue to have this sort of problem as far as 
5 maintaining what is the best you can maintain as far as a 
6 healthy relationship with these children given the distance 
7 and given the conflict. If you can get over that conflict or 
8 if you can get at least use the therapists effectively to 
9 deal with that conflict and to help the children get through 
10 this because they've been the victims of a very long divorce 
11 case at this point in time, then - I mean, that should be 
12 goal number one apart from all the rest of this. 
13 MR. STONE: I do look to try to do what's best for 
14 the kids, if I know really what they want I do the best I can 
15 for them. The idea of the other orders that you've issued I 
16 feel that there is some really some violations of those, so I 
17 don't - I ask that you don't fine me a penalty because I'm 
18 trying to resolve the issues for my father's stuff and for my 
19 stuff. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Chipman, what do you know about 
21 these leases and documents that are not of a discovery nature 
22 but of a substantive -
23 MR. CHIPMAN: Your Honor, we delivered what we had 
24 as part of discovery in August 2003. Everything else was 
25 left when my client left the property. She didn't take any 
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1 some additional burdens by being away from here that she 
2 wouldn't necessarily be expected to have if she had stayed 
3 here and both parties could have more equal opportunity to 
4 see -
5 MR. STONE: And not being allowed to get in the 
6 house at the time you ordered that I could to look at those 
7 to put on the list. The thing is about the orders of equity 
8 loan and things like that. Those are major things that have, 
9 you know, ramifications all the way down through because and 
10 I think I hope that you consider my points I've mentioned, 
11 Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: I will. 
13 MR. STONE: Plus my father's return of his stuff 
14 too because there's expenses for things I have pictures that 
15 I can try and document what he wasn't able to get back or 
16 what I wasn't able to get back of my father's stuff because 
17 she took them and one was a mattress that she took, one was a 
18 weed eater, one was tools, yard tools, one was other things. 
19 These are things I've tried because you said I was entitled 
20 to get them and I wasn't able to. 
21 THE COURT: Basically I don't think she needs to 
22 worry about addressing that. Those issues are beyond the 
23 scope of what we're going to order. 
24 The next thing I need to say and this is the last 
25 thing, I will rule on the merits of everything that's before 
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1 me. You filed a whole bunch of motions, I requested that you 
2 make some good-faith effort to comply with the court's rules. 
3 New motions you've apparently come closer to that I think 
4 your margins are still not in compliance, but I'm not going 
5 to be nit picky about that, the whole point is to try to give 
6 the court something that's readable. Most of us here on the 
7 bench are old and our eyes aren't good, even with bifocals. 
8 So single space things and things where the margins run out 
9 to the edge of the paper and that sort of thing are just 
10 really hard to read. It's just a physical thing. It really 
11 is. The same thing with top margins. If I have to pull 
12 stuff out of the files then I've got to dissemble the file, I 
13 don't know if it gets put back right or run the risk that 
14 something's going to get misplaced, and we're trying to 
15 preserve our files intact as much as we can. It's not good 
16 to be having to go dissembling things. Mr. Chipman's office 
17 was good enough to produce courtesy copies of all of these 
18 things that you referred to, and I think to go to the trouble 
19 of actually figuring out what it was that you noticed up 
20 because there weren't dates and there were, you know, they're 
21 spread throughout two volumes and I think he's entitled to 
22 reimbursement for the photocopy and the costs. 
23 MR. STONE: What about asking me for them? 
24 THE COURT: As far as I can tell the clerk wasn't 
25 able to reach you. But the minute entry that was sent out 
154 
reminded you of the requirement to produce courtesy copies to 
the court and we never got them. So I am going to require 
that you -
MR. STONE: I did after that, Your Honor. I did 
provide a -
THE COURT: I am aware of the new stuff but not of 
the things that you were asking me to hear. I had no - and 
the file was at the Court of Appeals. I had no way to even 
review this file until late yesterday afternoon. 
MR. STONE: Okay. 
THE COURT: So, your failure to provide courtesy 
copies imposed a bit of a hardship on my ability to be 
prepared for this hearing. And Mr. Chipman's office got them 
over either after I left yesterday or this morning or 
something because I was able to review them this morning 
before the hearing, and I was able to review a lot of it 
yesterday because I could find most of it in the file. But I 
just want to admonish you that every time you file a motion I 
want you to send a courtesy copy to the clerk. I am also, I 
don't know what you've noticed up for hearing on March 3rd, 
but I'm going to review anything that you have noticed up for 
hearing and determine whether it's in compliance with the 
rules and whether it is something that's even properly 
brought before me, and I'm reserving the right to simply send 
out a little minute entry saying this one is not properly 
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1 before me either for non-compliance with the rules or because 
2 it doesn't state a claim that I can hear. I cannot hear a 
3 habeas corpus petition. 
4 MR. STONE: And that's not part of it, but -
5 THE COURT: So it's in the file and I wasn't clear 
6 on what you were asking and I haven't seen a new notice of 
7 hearing so I want you to make sure that's transmitted to the 
8 clerk in time that I can review it and don't have to, at the 
9 very last minute say, you know, I've looked at this we can't 
10 hear this and waste your time and Mr. Chipman's time and the 
11 time that's on the court's calendar for other people to be 
12 heard as well. 
13 MR. STONE: One of the things I thought I motioned 
14 - a motion to hear the previously submitted ones, that was a 
15 motion, so I was hoping to have that addressed, which you're 
16 telling me now but not having heard that motion of previously 
17 submitted ones being acceptable, okay, and/or needing to 
18 resubmit them because the information was the same it was 
19 just the size and so -
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm not - whatever's in the file 
21 I'm going to throw it out because it's not double spaced or 
22 something, you know. 
23 MR. STONE: Does that pertain to next March's ones 
24 too? 
25 THE COURT: If there's something that you 
156 
1 previously filed before my minute entry, I'm not going to 
2 exclude those things. They're hard to read and partly 
3 they're hard to read because you have way too much 
4 information in them for the court to be able to look at what 
5 you really, is in dispute, and there's all these complaints 
6 about she's not being treated the same as you and all that, 
7 and you can make that argument and you can make it once in 
8 oral argument and that's plenty sufficient. But I will take 
9 a look at what's there what you've noticed up for hearing. 
10 I'm telling you I'm reserving the right to going 
11 forward at any point determine that either the motions don't 
12 state claims that are properly before me or they're not 
13 sufficiently in compliance with the rules that we have to be 
14 expected to respond to them. And I will look at the notice. 
15 I assume you sent a notice of hearing now that I haven't 
16 seen? 
17 MR. STONE: I was going home to prepare it right 
18 now because I just got the date yesterday. 
19 THE COURT: On what the motions are that you 
20 MR. STONE: Yes. 
21 MR. CHIPMAN: [inaudible] today but if you'll get 
22 MR. STONE: I have them in my box but I would try 
23 to double space it. 
24 THE COURT: The March 3rd is still more than 
25 MR. CHIPMAN: Thirty days. 
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THE COURT: Yeah, so you're fine time wise, but get 
that notice out so we all know what we're looking at and I'll 
take a 
they're 
look at them 
motions that 
that really is impor 
anybody 
shouldn 
and we' 
but jus 
conside 
motion 
's disadvanta 
't be hearing 
and I'll see if, you know, and frankly if 
are in there that take away from stuff 
tant for the court to hear, I don't think 
ged by not hearing things that I 
So I'll take a look at those things 
11 see what that hearing will look like on March 3rd, 
t understand 
r the claims 
is excessive. 
air penalty. I can' 
of fees 
I will 
your re 
ruling. 
workabl 
incurred jus 
I'm reserving that right. I will 
for attorney's fees, but I think $500 per 
I think that's just a sort of out of 
t imagine that there's been $12,000 worth 
t as a result of this round of motions. 
take a look at the claim though and I will respond to 
quest for att 
MR. STONE: 
e decree. 
THE COURT: 
(Whereupor 
orney's fees as a part of my written 
I've tried to do my best to get a 
Okay. Thank you. 
L the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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ADDENDUM "35" 
Tab 10 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - HB230 - FEBRUARY 26, 2003 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
READING CLERK: First substitute House Bill 230. 
Parental Relocation Amendments, Mike Thompson - this was 
heard in Judiciary with a vote of 10 yes, zero no and three 
absent. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Thompson. 
REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 
This bill is on - as it says, Parental Relocation Amendments 
- required - it's a requirement that divorced or separated 
parents provide a notice of relocation to the other parent. 
We go down to line 28 when we talk about the 
parenting plan - and what the parenting plan shall contain 
the language - in the law already says the parenting plan 
shall contain provisions for resolution of future disputes 
between the parties, allocation of decision making authority 
and residential provisions for the child. And then we're 
adding, XAAnd provisions addressing notice of parent time 
responsibilities in the event of the relocation of either 
party." So that would be part of their original parenting 
plan. 
Then you go down to line 73 really is where the 
next, 74, where the next amendments come where it used to be 
or is right or as it is right now, reasonable and advanced 
1 written notice, which nobody knows what that is. So in 
2 working with the Bar with Lori Nelson from Family Law 
3 Division, we came up with 60 days. They thought 90 days 
4 would be better, but I thought that was too long. So we put 
5 60 days there written notice, and the written notice of 
6 relocation still contain statements affirming the following, 
7 the parent time provisions in subsection (5) which is 
8 basically the standard visitation time, or a schedule that 
9 the parties together agree on, and that it would be followed 
10 and that neither parent would interfere with the court order 
11 of parent time arrangements of the schedule approved by the 
12 parties. And then there's a provision if you do violate that 
13 for the contempt of the party that violates it. Thank you. 
14 MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion? Representative 
15 Holdaway? 
16 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: Will the sponsor yield to 
17 a question? 
18 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Thompson, will you 
19 yield to the question? 
20 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: Yes. 
21 MR. SPEAKER: Proceed. 
22 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: Not being involved in 
23 family court and whatnot, can you tell - give me some 
24 examples of in the event that somebody didn't give 60 days 
25 notice that the penalty is contempt of court. And what are 
1 some examples of penalties being imposed related to contempt 
2 of court? 
3 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: Well, contempt of court 
4 is totally left up to the judge to what the judge feels the 
5 penalty should be. A lot of times, an attorney for either 
6 party will ask for a specific contempt or something like 
7 that, but it's totally the judge's decision. 
8 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: So is it a financial 
9 penalty, or jail time, or -
10 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: It could be, or it could 
11 be make up visitation time or more visitation time, or 
12 anything - but the -
13 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: So it's something that is 
14 - let me just throw out a scenario to you. If somebody 
15 didn't give the 60 day notice that they were relocating, 
16 could they then be held in con - and subsequently move 
17 without notifying the other parent, could they then be held 
18 in contempt of court for doing that? 
19 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: Yes. And they can right 
20 now actually, if they move without notification. There is a 
21 notification provision. It's just there's no provision in 
22 the code right now of when that is. Like, I do a lot of this 
23 practice of law myself, and we have had some cases where it 
24 says reasonable advance notice now. We've had cases where a 
25 party will leave the state, put the notice in the mailbox as 
1 they' re leaving, and the judge will say, well, I don't care 
2 what the statute says reasonable advance notice. I'm going 
3 to say that's reasonable advance notice. That's really not 
4 reasonable advance notice. So we do have a provision right 
5 now where you can be held in contempt for leaving the state 
6 without notifying the other parent. So this is just defining 
7 a little better what it is. 
8 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: And we're talking about 
9 just leaving the state? We're not just talking about moving 
10 from one residence to another residence? 
11 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: No, it says in here which 
12 is in the statute right now - leaving the state or 150 miles 
13 from the jurisdiction where the divorce was granted... or the 
14 separation is. 
15 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDAWAY: Okay. [inaudible] . 
16 Thank you. 
17 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Daniels? 
18 REPRESENTATIVE DANIELS: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I 
19 want to speak in support of the bill as well. I do that 
20 partially because I have so few opportunities to agree with 
21 Representative Thompson on anything. So I should say 
22 something when I do, but I think this is quite a good bill. 
23 One of the best parts of it which I think is very original 
24 and quite a good thing that Representative Thompson has 
25 figured out here, is to put in the parenting plan ahead of 
1 time that they'll have to consult with each other on what 
2 they're going to do. A lot of times when people get 
3 divorced, they kind of know that one of the parties is going 
4 to move. They, you know, their family lives somewhere, and 
5 in all likelihood - and you just know that when that 
6 happens, the visiting schedules - parent time schedule they 
7 call it now - isn't going to work anymore. This once every 
8 other weekend doesn't work when one of the parties lives in 
9 Oklahoma. And so, this is a good thing, and it's a really 
10 good thing to have it worked out ahead of time before the 
11 dispute arises. It's a good thing to give this some definite 
12 parameters about how much notice has to be given, and I think 
13 it will cut down some of the acrimony that we have in some of 
14 these terrible divorce situations. Thank you. 
15 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you. Seeing no further lights. 
16 Representative Thompson for summation. 
17 REPRESENTATIVE THOMPSON: I will waive. 
18 MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waived. Voting is open on 
19 first substitute House Bill 230. 
20 Seeing all present having voted, voting will be 
21 closed for First Substitute House Bill 230, having received 
22 71 yes votes, and zero no votes, passes this body. Referred 
23 to the Senate for further consideration. (inaudible). 
24 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
25 -c-
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I EXHIBIT 
Todd Stone Defendant Pro Se I fc 
3747 Hillside Lane I I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 I S 
(801) 277-9955 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Joanne Stone 
Todd Stone 
-V-
Respondent's Appeal and objections to prior 
Court actions and contempt 
Case #014903655 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Respondent Todd Stone objects to the previous court actions before Commissioner Casey in that Commissioner Casey stated 
that a child does not have standing in their parents divorce case, but still allowed the child's issues to be heard, and advance 
in the court process. Clearly State Statute dis-allows anyone other than the divorcing parties to hold standing in the 
couple's Divorce action. 
Respondent appeals jhe prior court ruling that no adjustment of Ordered Alimony or Child Support since significant 
changes have occurred in the lives of the parties thus warranting a change in the Temporary Orders. 
Over three months ago, Commissioner Casey order#ed that a property list be prepared by Plaintiff, and given to 
Respondent. In the same hearing, Respondent was allowed to have entrance into the marital home to confirm such 
property, and review with witnesses, what was to be considered marital property. The same allowance for full disclosure of 
property remaining at the marital residence was also granted to Respondent in 2002, but was also denied from happening by 
Plaintiff then as well. After all this time, Plaintiff has failed to provide such property list, or grant such inspection of said 
premises or property to or by Respondent. Respondent is being unduly harmed by such information being kept from him. 
Respondent requests the Court's sanctions, assistance to achieve what was previously ordered and agreed to, and also the 
issuance of the appropriate Writ of Assistance thus allowing the Respondent the right to equal information and distribution 
of the marital property. 
Respondent Appeals the Commissioners lack of consideration of his prior orders of the court that stated that each party once 
they determined who owed who what, were to work out the repayment of such funds. It was originally so ordered in the 
July 2001 hearing, and then when the amounts were known, and determined that the Plaintiff had stolen the said funds, and 
Respondent dealt with it appropriately as directed at that time, then Commissioner Casey ruled against Respondent for his 
actions. Then in January 2005 Commissioner Casey, rather than hearing argument and facts of the issue of funds in 
question just ordered that there was still an issue to be worked out among the parties, and that Respondent still had an issue 
for reimbursement. Now Plaintiff claims that said funds were for Alimony and Child Support for the period of time when 
the Commissioner did not order Child Support or Alimony to be paid by the Respondent. Now this issue still remains 
unsettled, and Commissioner Casey has failed to properly resolve such from his disjointed rulings. 
When the Custody Evaluation was ordered by the Court, Commissioner Casey ordered that Joint Custody should not be 
precluded. In the October Conference with the Custody Evaluator, it was stated that Plaintiff failed to provide him with her 
Joint Custody Plan, thus Joint Custody has been precluded from happening. 
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On multiple occasions in court, it was represented by Petitioner, to the Court, that mediation for Visitation, Custody, and 
the other Divorce issues, would be worked out through mediation. Such mediation was also represented as going to happen 
in the many different correspondence that the Plaintiff provided to Respondent. After all this time and false representations 
of the Petitioner, of such as going to transpire, Mediation between the parties has not happened. In Commissioner Casey's 
minute entry regarding the Custody Evaluation conference, it was said that the parties have not worked out their 
differences. Yet it was only at the conference that there was any information available from the Custody Evaluator that was 
then able to be discussed. It is hereby requested that in light of the many representations that have been made to the court 
and the Respondent, that mediation of custody, Visitation, and other divorce related issues be ordered to be engage in by the 
parties. This is further supported by the State Legislature that has also further ordered via Legislative action, that Divorcing 
parties are required to enter mediation prior to the settlement of their Divorce. The cost of such, should not be unfairly 
placed upon the parties. Additionally it is requested that Petitioner be released by the court to be allowed to use her savings 
for such expense. Additionally, Mediators are then not placed in the position to lean one way or the other because of which 
parry paid for their services. 
In the parties last appearance in court before Commissioner Casey, it was represented in court by Petitioner that she has 
been fair to allow Respondent extra time for parent time, and to assist the children in their school activities. However, facts 
show differently. As recent as this week after being advised of the children needing parental assistance with their school 
activity, Respondent requests time to assist the children with their activity, and after several days of Petitioner being 
available to assist the children with such, Respondent is denied an additional hour or two to aid the children in their needs. 
Additionally, just recently, when one child requested Respondent to come to her school activity with her, The Petitioner 
kept the child from attending such with her Father. Additionally, when the children are out of school for their school 
holidays and the Petitioner is not at home, and these school vacations are not part of standard minimum Statute holiday 
time, and Respondent is home from work and available to watch the children, Petitioner does not allow the Respondent to 
have any involvement with the children. This is a historical problem, that the court fails to deal with, and yet it is in the 
children's best interests to have a greater amount of time with their Father. The ruling of the lower court is thus appealed 
since State Statute is clear on that parental care is preferred over surrogate care of the children. Consequently, the prior 
action of the court has been contradictory to State Statute. Additionally, it has not been recommended or supported by the 
Court appointed expert Custody Evaluator that the children should be kept from their Father, or that he poses any danger to 
them. 
Additionally, It was ordered by the court that Family counseling should begin with aims to rectify the strained relationship 
that Brittney has with the respondent, and that this process should have begun. This was also supported by the Custody 
Evaluator, when he recommended that Brittney was also not to be taken to California. To Date, Petitioner has caused this 
not to happen. The counselor has also failed to abide by or with such order of the court either by direction from Petitioner, 
or the Counselor's own refusal to be bound by the court. Either way, it is requested of the court to so enforce such to 
happen so that relationships and issues can be remedied and all parties treated fairly in the upcoming court matters. 
[n respect to the Court Ordered Custody Evaluations that were ordered PRIOR TO the effective date of the new Custody 
Evaluations Rules, accordingly, a Custody Evaluation is not complete, until a written report is thus prepared or waived by 
)oth parties. Therefore, when Petitioner was ordered to pay everything that was needed to complete the Custody Evaluation 
ifter Respondent had paid his $4,720.00, it is hereby appealed the responsibility for Respondent to have to pay more money 
or the completion of the Custody Evaluation. It was not presented to the court fairly or without prejudice by the Petitioner, 
md thus the actual facts, or ruling of the official record were thus ignored by the court in ordering Respondent to continue 
o pay additional funds he does not have, and was not to pay. Thus, the full amount needed by the Custody Evaluator to 
omplete the Custody Evaluation is requested to be paid by the Petitioner additionally, since Petitioner owes such a great 
urn to Respondent for her theft, that Commissioner Casey again most recently recognized and ruled should be worked out 
mong the parties. Petitioners counsel just rail-roaded and rammed the Pre-Settlement Custody Conference through 
/ithout the parties agreement, as do the rules state should happen, so that his client could get off with paying less money to 
ave the Custody Evaluation completed, and Joint Custody precluded. Which also conflicts with what Commissioner Casey 
ad previously ruled should not happen. 
additionally, Petitioner has denied Respondents other requests for flexibility in Parenting Time with the Children, 
respondent's request in court was not denied, but not allowed to happen. 
Respondents objections to the Order on Motions Heard on February 18, 2005 are as follows. 
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2. What month is the cost of Health insurance to be upon the Petitioner to be effective. Since the Petitioner owes such 
great sum of money (at least $5,000.00 but more but yet to be determined) to the Respondent for funds she stole or 
mis-appropriated for personal use. Petitioner could use some of that money for full payment of the Custody 
Evaluation remaining amount, and many years worth of insurance premium. Also with the Petitioner getting all of 
the Tax advantages, and not paying the proper amount of Income Tax because she fails to report all of her Taxable 
Income, and also claims the children inappropriately and took other funds or taxable savings from the Respondent, 
could pay all the insurance premium for the children since it is a Tax deduction for her, and not allowed to be for 
Respondent If her Tax Rate is 25% or more, she actually is only faced with paying a disproportionate amount of 
the children's insurance premium than is the Respondent having to pay since his contribution would not so be Tax 
Deductible. 
3. An Order for such Health Insurance coverage of the children is sufficient for the Insurance Company to take on the 
coverage of the children. No other information from Respondent's Insurance is needed or available except that 
they are no longer qualified as being covered. 
4. Is the counselor in agreement with such and willing to be bound by such, as per issues noted above. 
5. Brittney does not have standing in this matter, and thus should be stricken until it is determined that children have 
standing in their parents divorce action. 
6. Objection to detail of violating orders, when communication between the parties involved is an important aspect, 
and the only one allowed or promoted by the counselor. Therefore such should be struck until normal, or standard 
forms of family counseling is in place., ant therefore, it would not be found that in order for Respondent and Child 
to abide by previous order of the court places Respondent in jeopardy of violation of another Order of the court, 
such as happened in the past with Commissioner Casey's contradictory, or confounding orders. Also such breach 
of patient relationship should not be allowed to broadcast confidential or privileged matters. 
7. The financial stranglehold of the Alimony and Child Support should not be allowed to continue or held as ransom 
against the already impoverished Respondent. Such change has good cause to be adjusted at the present time, and 
such is within the powers of the court. 
8. The Tax Dependency issue was inappropriately adjudicated because of the mis representation of the facts and prior 
orders of the court, and the contradictory orders of the court. 
9. A determination of Respondent's Impecuniosity is relevant because of the Guardian Ad Litems request at the 
hearing for Respondent to pay her fees. 
10. The Court's refusal to be guided by the legislative intent, and State Statute regarding parental childcare over 
surrogate childcare, and the Best interests of the Children are grounds to object to and appeal this issue itself. 
11. The Court ordered re-evaluations and re-visits with the children, but not with the Respondent. Additionally, this 
issue was not presented in the same light as counsel presents it here. Is Respondent allowed to further address 
Custody Evaluator prior to the completion of the Evaluation and report. 
12. Mediation is now a requirement of State Statute (soon) and also should be addressed by Commissioner Casey since 
so many representations by Petitioner were made in court to Commissioner Casey that Mediation was going to 
happen and then Petitioner blocked it from happening. 
13. Objection for Petitioner's Attorney fees as a Trial Issue, just because Respondent is not currently represented, is not 
a ground for Respondent's actions not having validity to bring before the court, because of Petitioner's refusal to 
abide by the other prior orders of the court, and now consider Alimony and Child Support for times that the 
Commissioner DID NOT ORDER IT. When Counsel continually tries to barrage the Court with the false sense 
that his client is faultless, when in fact she is not, and dodge some of the real issues, and it is because of counsels 
unprofessional conduct, and IJiased and Tainted Orders he prepares incorrectly prepared, (the Bifurcated Divorce 
Decree Order he prepared, is one pf jnany such Orders) that have given rise to the need to return to court for 
adjudication, clarification, and fairness. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2005, I caused to be delivered a true and exact copy of this document to the 
following: 
Brent R. Chipman Attorney for Defendant Joanne Stone 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michelle Bloomquist Gaurdian Ad Litem 
P.O. Box 140403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
C. Jeffrey Thompson Attorney assisting Brittney and who prepared paperwork for Brittney who does 
not have standing in this case 
4001 South 700 West # 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Frances M. Palacios Attorney for the other Children 
244 West 300 North 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Todd Stone Defendant Pro Se 
1. The following matters apply to the individually identified paragraphs of the March 
2005 Appeal that the Third District Court failed to properly adjudicate: 
a) Paragraph #1: Objections to Lower Court's actions & issues remain 
adjudicated- not objection to Scheduling Conference. This Paragraph states 
that there was an issue of who the court treated as the parties to this divorce 
action. This paragraph presents to the court, that Appellant questions if the 
parties children are parties to their parents divorce action. The Court 
allowed one of the children of these parties (Brittney) to have standing in 
the divorce action to sue her Father for something or the action of her 
Mother. The Court, as matter of important legal principal needed to 
determine as to the constitutionally protected right of the Father not to be 
sued by his Daughter in the same divorce action started by the Wife, and for 
action that the Wife had committed that caused the Daughter to be harmed. 
This may seem so insignificant, that the Appellate Court feels like 
refraining from even discussing the matter, because it is considering 
children's videos and the value is small. However, it is the legal 
precedence that the Guardian ad Litem was trying to establish, of being able 
to paint the Father negatively to the court. Such a defense of my reputation 
and my property, or the property of our children was our Utah 
Constitutional right. The Third District Court under color of title, denied 
me, and our children the right to defend our property. The Third District 
Court under color of title denied me the right to defend my reputation 
against improper prosecution, slander, and unjust enrichment of another at 
my expense. Furthermore, the Third District Court denied the 
accountability of my Wife's actions to be properly accounted for and 
properly placed. Additionally, the Third District Court assumed that 
property that was provided by the parents for the children, was allowed to 
be converted (conversion of) to the personal property of one child at the 
expense of the other two children of the same family. The Court failed to 
define what is a child's property, and who has the right to such ownership 
when the court allowed one of our daughters to seek court action against me 
in this divorce action, for what property my Wife had given, and instructed, 
and ordered me to take from the marital residence to begin with, 
i) The Court erred in allowing the court action of the one Daughter, to 
continue against the Father in this court action, and therefore, should 
be appealed, and therefore, I attempted to appeal (to the higher 
court) that and many other issues in their entirety of the 
Commissioner's Court (Lower Court), as this Appeal is an appeal in 
the entirety of the (Lower Court) Judge Medley's Court to the Utah 
Appeals Court (Higher Court). 
ii) There is much debate as to how high the Commissioner's Orders 
(Temporary Orders) are Appealable. Such was addressed by Judge 
Medley, in his ruling of September 2003, where he stated that 
Temporary Orders carry as much weight as permanent Orders. 
Additionally, several other Utah Cases also supports that Temporary 
Orders are as significant in authority, lasting effect, and subject to 
correct principle as Permanent Orders are, and are thus Appealable if 
there is no other means to appeal even an Extraordinary Writ is 
available to obtain, or an interlocutory Appeal is available to appeal 
temporary Orders, if the District Court is unwilling to hear or 
consider the Appeal of a Temporary Order. 
This attempts to seek definition as to who has standing in a divorce 
action. Failure by the Court to properly address such idea, made this 
court action a "free for All" that was only allowed to advance the 
position of the Petitioner, at the Respondent's, and other children's 
expense. The Court recognized the constitutional rights of one 
person, and violated the Constitutional rights, or looked the other 
way, when it came to considering the Constitutional rights of another 
child involved and affected in these proceedings. The Court 
discriminated unjustly. The Third District Court seemed to act such 
that if the item cost minimal, you could seek counsel of your choice 
to assist you, and direct the court to act on your own interest at the 
expense of someone else, but if the transaction might include a 
greater amount, then that proceeding was not allowed. Yet Justice is 
no respecter of economic status, as held by the court so many other 
times. (See Case # ). 
The importance of this aspect of the March 2005 Appeal was also 
very significant, in that, if the Court held that children have standing 
in their parent's divorce action, then, what right do the children have 
to proper representation of their choice to represent their interests in 
any legal proceeding in which the children hold standing in? 
Standing is defined as a person with a demonstrated or shown 
interest in the outcome of the court proceedings. 
Proceeding is defined as any court action, hearing, adjudication or 
action. 
Ones' interests is defined as largely as someone that is significantly, 
legally, financially and otherwise affected by the outcome or ruling 
of the court or evidence presented, or claims made by the parties. 
Representation is representing to the court, or to speak to the court 
for and in your behalf as per your interests, desires, as well as to 
serve to protect your rights, interests, etc., and to protect you from 
abuse by the legal system, and to have your issues heard and tried 
before the court or agency. An agent of yourself. 
viii) The Court failed to adjudicate the March 2005 Appeal properly, and 
thus I was prosecuted, and threatened, and slandered right up until 
the end by the Guardian's ad litem continual pressure, and slander 
upon me, my Character, and my image and reputation held by others, 
and also held by Judge Medley's Court. 
ix) Since there is little support in the court's to give standing to the 
children, in the parent's divorce action, there also holds very little 
support for the State to appoint a Guardian ad Litem to represent the 
children in the first place, since there was no valid evidence or valid 
cause or support shown in the court (outside of the suit by our 
daughter against me, that there was need for a Guardian Ad Litem 
involvement for the children). Therefore, the inclusion, and 
introduction of the daughters legal action against me for the actions 
of her Mother, only caused to incite hysteria and inappropriately 
influence the court by the Petitioner or Petitioner's counsel. Such 
inciting of incorrect representations has been found to be unethical 
conduct of counsel in several different Utah attorney misconduct 
cases. 
x) The court erred in allowing our daughter's claim against me to 
continue when it was based solely on the actions of my Wife, and 
not on the actions of me. My Wife directed what items I could take 
from the marital residence, only to incite anger, and hostility in our 
daughter against me. My Wife then fueled and facilitated that 
hostility to arouse "alienative" actions or thoughts , and influence 
our daughter against me. I had previously requested of the 
Commissioner Casey's Court to be allowed to have many of these 
issues addressed and reviewed by professionals in their field of child 
welfare, counseling, and therapy, and Commissioner Casey denied 
my motion for such because of his inaccurate assumption of how 
such services were to be paid for. And thus denied me my right to 
Due Process that much further. 
If a child has standing in their parents divorce action, then they are 
entitled to the representation of their choice, for the pursuits of their 
interests, and a parent is entitled to defend against the slanderous 
incitement caused by one parent against the other parent. Therefore, 
this case is requested to be remanded back to District Court with the 
direction to allow all of the parties having standing, to have their 
interests represented by their previously selected counsel of their 
choice. Payment of such counsel would not be allowed to be a 
defining aspect of their selected counsel. 
If, on the other hand, the court holds that children are not allowed 
standing in their parents divorce action, then this case is requested to 
be remanded back to Third District Court with the instruction to 
remove the Guardian Ad Litem from the case, and all representations 
such made or influenced also be overturned, vacated, or reversed, 
and testimony to the court stricken, along with direction to others 
involved not to be influenced by any of the mis-representations of 
the past. 
This issue was also denied due process of adjudication because the 
Third District Court failed to process the March 2005 appeal 
properly. This Appeal was important to determine if children hold 
standing in their parents divorce action to sue one parent for the 
actions of the other parent, and also of even greater significance, is if 
children are allowed the same Constitutional rights to the same right 
of counsel of choice to represent them, and/or, if children may have 
counsel of their choice overseeing the actions of the Guardian ad 
Litem as other parties to both Civil litigation, and Criminal Litigation 
are allowed to have multiple or co-counsels as per their interests, 
specialty, or to meet the demands of pressing workloads, or for 
separate counsel of different warring parties. This Court may not 
want to take on such a plethora of novel ideas to the rights of minors, 
yet Just because State Statute does not specifically deny such rights 
of minors, that does not circumvent the issue from needing to be 
resolved and addressed. The Third District Court instead elected to 
ignore the Appellant's March 2005 Appeal, and failed to adjudicate 
the issues, or address the rights of the parties, and the rights of the 
children. The Bury their head in the sand approach of the Third 
district Court on this Appeal and these issues is not conducive to 
Justice, and thus violates the Rights of the Appellant and the Rights 
of the children. The Doctrine of Stare decisis that the court has 
already established a precedence is applicable here, in that the Lower 
Court (Commissioner Casey's Court) had allowed to enter a child's 
claim against her Father in the parties Divorce action, thus 
establishing the children have standing in their parents divorce 
action. Because the court allowed into the legal proceedings, that 
one of the parties child was allowed to have the assistance of outside 
counsel in presentation of the legal claim against the Appellant, the 
court opened the Pandora's Box, so to speak, to begin with, and such 
can not be closed without irreparable harm to the Children, and the 
Appellant, and violation of the parties rights by one under color of 
title of the State. Denial of Due Process was not by a Familial 
entity, but by the State, and thus the State (District Court) should 
thus be accountable, and responsible for such flagrant malfeasance 
of office. 
PARAGRAPH #2 Adjustment to Alimony amount - not objection to 
scheduling conference. This paragraph seeks correction or adjustment for 
amounts Appellant is ordered to pay Petitioner, since Appellant was fired 
from his employment because of actions of the Petitioner. Adjustment of 
this amount due was justified to be reviewed. 
i) Later, because the District Court ignored this issue for eleven (11) 
months, the Petitioner was allowed to abuse the legal system further 
and withhold the children from visitation with their Father. 
Additionally, the Petitioner gained unfair advantage because of the 
hysteria she was able to incite with the notion to the court and 
Guardian ad Litem, that "the Appellant had arrearages of amounts 
owed her". Additionally, because the District Court failed to address 
adjusting Alimony and Child Support, because the Appellant was out 
of work for an extended period of time, and then later was unable to 
obtain the equivalent wage, the Appellant suffered financial loss 
from O.R.S. garnishing wages of the Appellant than rightfully would 
have to pay. Thus further causing Petitioner to be unjustly enriched 
at the expense of the Appellant, by her continued abuse of the legal 
system. 
ii) To this Date, Guardian Ad Litem is still mislead into believing 
Appellant owes Petitioner funds, when in reality, Petitioner owes 
Appellant a great deal of funds. The Guardian ad litem has even 
used such misinformation to threaten and intimidate the Appellant, 
the children, and the Appellant's Mother, who is not a party to the 
divorce proceedings, 
c) PARAGRAPH #3 Appeal of the improper, and un-enforced property 
distribution - not an objection to a Scheduling Conference. This paragraph 
of the March 2005 Appeal, draws the court's attention to their failure to 
uphold the previous order of the court that afforded the Appellant to view 
the marital property in order to A. verify the property that was his Fathers 
that Petitioner had kept had been fully returned to the Appellant, and B. to 
allow the Appellant to view the marital property to ensure an equitable 
distribution of property that had been overlooked, or neglected to be 
included was part of the marital property distribution to the Appellant. All 
this that had previously been ordered had not been complied with by the 
Petitioner, thus the Petitioner was able to benefit from the Petitioner's 
conversion of Lewis Stone's property to her own personal property. Later, 
in a Small Claim Court action brought by the Appellant against the 
Petitioner, in seeking to be reimbursed for the property loss the Appellant 
was caused to suffer, Judge Roth directed the action to recover financial 
losses due to the Petitioner not returning the Appellant's Fathers property 
was to have been remedied in the parties divorce action. Judge Roth 
directed that Petitioner, or Petitioner's counsel was just being mean spirited 
and spiteful not to return the Appellants Father's property to the Appellant. 
Without hearing of this issue in the Divorce proceedings, the court 
ultimately denied the Appellant his Due Process Right to adjudicate the 
issues between the parties, and denied the Appellant the finding by the 
court of the Petitioner's contempt for the orders of the court. Failure by the 
court to hear this issue also caused there to be a lack of determination of 
what property was pre-Marital property of the parties, and what property 
was joint marital property of the parties, and what was the parties joint debt 
obligations to be considered at trial. Thus the court was ill informed as to 
the full amount of, and value of all the parties Joint Debts to consider in the 
court's subsequent August 3, 2005 hearing and also in it's January 9, 2006 
order. The court also failed to establish value of the parties marital 
property, so as to make legal determination as to what value was able to be 
accessed or assessed by any other party or creditor. Personal Property is 
defined as tangible items other than Real Estate. The Appellant was in 
need of copies of important documents pertaining to many of the 
Appellant's interests. The Petitioner refused to provide those documents to 
the Appellant, and thus Appellant has been denied his right to the aspects of 
those documents. Petitioner claims the documents were not available for 
her retrieval, or that the papers were packed up in boxes ready for shipment 
out of state. Two times previously, the Petitioner had attempted to move 
out of State, and each time the Court had ordered her not to. The Petitioner 
had to unload the moving truck she had previously loaded. When asked to 
produce various items, the Petitioner was unable to produce them, saying 
they were packed up, yet she had been ordered to unpack or reverse her 
prior attempts at moving away. Thus for the Petitioner to use the excuse of 
not being able to produce the document or item needed for the Appellant to 
find justice or equitable distribution of the marital items, was another unjust 
advantage bestowed upon the Petitioner for her refusal to comply with the 
prior orders of the court, and the Appellant was caused to suffer the harm or 
loss. Therefore, the Appellant has been unable to protect his or others 
rights to ownership claim of marital poroperty or premarital property. 
Other parties have also been caused to suffer loss because of the error of the 
court to uphold it's previous orders for the Appellant to be allowed to view 
the property, and to establish evidence of their ownership or expense 
interest. The court erred and the Petitioner was unjustly benefited in this 
case, and other pending cases against the Petitioner, 
i) Because the Court ignored the March 2005 Appeal, a full disclosure 
of the damages the Petitioner had committed to the marital property 
was also not allowed to be made public for the Appellant. 
Therefore, for failure to disclose all pertinent facts, and attempting to 
deceive the Appellant, the Petitioner and her counsel were able to 
fraudulently obtain voidable Agreement from the parties August 3, 
2005 hearing, because the Appellant was unaware of the loss of 
value, and damage from the actions of the Petitioner. It is requested 
of this court not to reward the acts of fraud, mis-representation, and 
or collusion committed by the Petitioner. Also, because the August 
3, 2005 hearing and the subsequently resulting Supplemental Decree 
of January 9, 2006 was obtained under false and fraudulent means, it 
is respectfully requested such Supplemental Decree be vacated, 
reversed, and all together thrown out, ruled void and unenforceable, 
and counsel be sanctioned for his contributory and dishonest acts. 
By the Court failing to hear the March 2005 appeal, the Appellant 
was caused to not have any negotiating leverage and or means to 
equalize the bargaining table if or when mediation ever took place or 
attempted settlement occurred, and was unable to prepare evidence 
to submit in the Appellant's defense. Because of the reoccurring 
problems the Appellant was caused to suffer because of the 
Petitioner's habitual disregard for the orders of the court, and failing 
to abide by them, the Appellant in this paragraph even requested the 
court's assistance for a Writ of Assistance to help the Appellant gain 
the ordered access to view the marital property. With that request 
alone, it is unbelievable to think that Judge Medley took this March 
2005 Appeal as a mere objection to a scheduling Conference, or 
dismiss such an Appeal all together without even understanding 
there are issues yet to be resolved and which the Supplemental 
Decree of January 9, 2005 failed to address. 
PARAGRAPH #4 Related to the Petitioner's stealing of funds, not to a 
Scheduling Conference. This paragraph seeks to have the court establish a 
determination of what party owes what party what amount and for what 
period. Previously, the Court had not ordered Alimony and Child Support 
to be paid to the Petitioner by the Appellant for the period of June 2001 
(See Exhibit # & ). The Petitioner and 
Appellee still took money from the Appellant that was due him, and 
claimed that those funds were for Alimony and Child Support for the period 
of June 2001. Yet the court had not ordered such funds be paid the 
Appellee for that period of time. Contrary to that, the court had ordered the 
Appellee (Petitioner) to produce documentation as to where those funds had 
gone to that the Petitioner had stolen from the Appellant. The Petitioner 
(Appellee) has failed to give such documentation to the court, or the 
Appellant. It is believed that the Petitioner's counsel received those funds, 
and has not conveyed them to the Appellant, but has converted those 
specified funds to or for his own personal use, as he had done with other 
funds also addressed by the court. Failure of the District Court to so verify 
where those funds were applied as they had previously ordered or directed 
has caused the Appellant to suffer excessive financial loss and other parties 
have also been so negatively affected as well, because of the contemptuous 
actions and deceitful dealings of the Appellee and her counsel. 
Commissioner Casey has seemed completely opposed to issue any order of 
contempt of the Petitioner, even though her actions of contempt have been 
far more numerous, and egregious, and caused far more financial loss upon 
others, than the mere act the Commissioner punished the Appellant for 
having improperly prepared forms before the court. It is respectfully 
requested that the court hear argument on the many actions of contempt of 
the Petitioner. The actions of the the Petitioner and failure to be forthright 
and fully disclose the facts to the court, has caused the Appellant to act 
differently than justice would direct. This is grounds to disregard the 
January 9, 2006 Supplemental Decree, since there was little fairness served 
by the court up until this court returns the case to the District Court with 
specific directions to remedy the error of the court. Case # 
. The issue of stolen funds by the Appellee (Petitioner) 
still remains an issue to be resolved by the court, and thus the January 9, 
2006 Supplemental Decree still lacks being a Final Order, when compared 
to the concessions made and documented by the transcript of the August 3, 
2005 hearing. In the said Transcripts, it is shown that Appellant never 
agreed to such concessions as the Petitioner's counsel had included in his 
rendition of the August 3, 2005 proceedings. Previously, Commissioner 
Casey ordered (July 2001 to December 2001 court proceedings) that once 
the parties knew what amount was stolen by the Petitioner, that 
"determination was to be made as to who owed who what amount, and then 
it was to be determined how those funds were to be repaid to either party" 
When I determined what amount was owed me by the Petitioner, I 
attempted to withhold some of that amount from the Alimony I was ordered 
to pay her. This repayment plan was to extend over a long period of time 
so as not to leave the Petitioner completely penniless, yet still provide 
repayment of the funds Commissioner Casey said was to be determined. 
When such repayment plan was initiated as per the Commissioners orders 
(see Exhibit # ), Commissioner Casey failed to uphold 
the prior directive, and found me violating his prior order. The court had 
issued two orders that were in direct conflict and contradictory of each 
other. Therefore, the court needed to clarify their vague and confusing and 
contradictory orders. Thus the need for the March 2005 Appeal to be filed 
by the Appellant. 
e) PARAGRAPH #5 Issues dealing with the Custody Evaluation - not a 
Scheduling Conference. This paragraph attempts to draw the court's 
attention that the Petitioner (Appellee) had failed to provide the court or the 
Appellant a Parenting Plan as directed to be provided by State Statute, and 
also noted as needing to be provided in the Custody Evaluation Conference 
held with the Custody Evaluator October 8, 2004 some six (6) months 
previously, and still was not provided by the Appellee (Petitioner). Later, it 
will be shown how this aspect alone failed to be in the Best Interests of the 
children, and lacked compliance to Statute by the Petitioner, 
i) By the Appellee not complying with State Statute to provide a 
Parenting Plan, the Court, the Custody Evaluator, the Guardian ad 
Litem, and the Appellant were all unable to be informed as to make 
informed decisions or recommendations as to what was in the Best 
Interests of the Children, Thus the Court erred and were led astray 
and misrepresented to the facts and intentions of the Petitioner 
(Appellee). The Appellant was also caused to act differently 
because the Appellee had failed to disclose all the parenting plan 
facts as needed to determine without assumption the Best Interests of 
the Children. Thus, the Due Process aspect was also denied by the 
court failing to uphold a requirement of a Parenting Plan. Also, the 
Appellant, the children, and the Court were all denied anything as to 
hold the Appellee (petitioner) accountable or what any party could 
expect as to how the Petitioner was going to go about parenting the 
parties children. By failing to comply with the Parenting Plan 
requirements, the Appellee has been afforded great advantage and 
has not been accountable for any parenting action or issue, or 
problem. The Children, and the Appellant have been caused to 
suffer the harm of the court not upholding the Parenting Plan 
requirement. 
f) PARAGRAPH #6 Mediation had not occurred,- not an objection to a 
Scheduling Conference. This paragraph attempts to have mediation to 
continue despite the Petitioner's many attempts and actions to stop it from 
happening. This also attempts to set determination of what party was to 
pay for the mediation, since the Appellee (Petitioner) had continuously 
stopped mediation from happening saying that the Appellant had to pay for 
it all despite the many thousands of dollars the Petitioner owed to the 
Respondent (Appellant). (Later, in the year of 2005, after another filing, 
the court did direct mediation to occur prior to trial, but that resulted from 
another requested motion from the Appellant to the court.) The Court 
ignored this request for mediation. Thus, it is requested of this Court, that 
an order that prevents mediation, should also therefore be struck and 
reversed to the District Court. Ignorance of the Mediation request, is the 
same as ordering such that prevents it from happening. This error of the 
court and request for relief, is also supported by Case # . 
i) This paragraph also attempts to show the court that the Appellee has 
several funds available for her use, that could be used by the 
Petitioner (Appellee) and not take away from the financial resources 
the children are entitled to receive as their support from either the 
Petitioner or Respondent. This also draws attention for the court to 
be aware of the joint funds issue that the court had previously ruled 
the Petitioner was not to use joint funds without the permission of 
the court. The Appellee did in fact end up using joint funds for her 
personal use, and for payments that the court had not given their 
permission for her to use them for such. The Court's error not to 
address this issue caused the Appellant to suffer other financial loss 
and harm, and also caused his actions to be different than would 
have been if the court had been apprised of the facts, the truth, and 
the court found the Appellee in contempt for another violation of 
prior court orders. Additionally, the Custody Evaluator would have 
viewed the Petitioner (Appellee) differently as one that was not 
willing to be bound by the court, and would have also found 
credibility in the claims of the Appellee, and thus viewed him in a 
more favorable light. Thus, by the court refusing to address the 
March 2005 appeal again on this issue of mediation of issues denied 
Due Process of the issues and denied the Appellant from defending 
his reputation among the Mediator, the Custody Evaluator, the 
children's Counselors, the State, and the Court, and ultimately in the 
eyes of the children. Additionally, the children would not have been 
caused to suffer financial loss because the Appellee would have been 
ordered to use her funds she maintained for her own use and at her 
disposal. 
PARAGRAPH #7 Make-up visitation never happened, - not an objection 
to a Scheduling Conference. This paragraph expresses a need for the court 
to uphold what is in the best interests of the children and allow the Father to 
tend the children when they are out of school, as State Statute directs that 
parental care of the children is preferred over surrogate care. This was a 
request for the court to uphold their prior orders allowing visitation with the 
children and their Father, that had not happened because of the actions of 
the Petitioner. Without me being allowed to defend against the dangerous 
reputation the Petitioner presented against me, the court was inappropriately 
led to believe what she had presented, without any facts allowed to be 
presented for my defense. The court failed to uphold my right to Due 
Process in this aspect as well as allowed the children to continue to be led 
away with the false information they were being given about their Father. 
This in it's simple form is a form of alienation, and by the court failing to 
allow such to be stopped, the court engaged in their contributory negligence 
and error. 
PARAGRAPH #8 Family Counseling that had been ordered had not been 
happening because of the actions of the Petitioner, - not an objection to the 
Scheduling Conference. This paragraph specifically attempts to motivate 
the court to uphold it's many prior orders for counseling to occur involving 
the children and the Appellant, in hopes to repair the fractured relationship 
that had been caused to happen because of the actions and false 
representations of the Petitioner (Appellee) made to the children's 
therapists about the Appellant. (See Exhibit # & & ). The 
Appellee was allowed to benefit because the Appellee caused delay from 
dealing with the counseling issues. Many of the issues were allowed to 
fester and worsen, and destroy the previously positive relationship the 
children enjoyed with their Father. The children were told many 
falsehoods, that were never allowed to be corrected, thus in their young 
minds, as they explained to the Custody Evaluator, that they said how 
".. .Heavenly Father would not let a Mother lie, and Fathers lie all the 
time". Additionally, the children reported that they were told that if they 
"did not say something bad about their Father, that their pets would be 
killed". Eventually, the children attempted to correct their false statement 
to the Psychologist, but the Appellee, had told the Psychologist not to 
".. .deal with the issues any more,.. .because he was not needed any 
longer". 
i) The action was also brought to appeal in this paragraph, because 
some of the children's counselors / therapists expressed that "they 
were not bound by the prior Orders of the Court, because they were 
not named parties to abide with the court order to involve the Father 
with the issues they were treating the children for". Thus, the 
Appellant sought to have the counselors bound to abide with the 
prior orders and interest of the court, and that of the Custody 
Evaluator, to help the strained relationships between the children and 
their Father to begin to be healed, and remedied, rather than the 
children taken away from their Father. Commissioner Casey was a 
party to the October 8, 2004 meeting with the Custody Evaluator, 
and the Appellant and Appellee, and was well aware of the 
comments and directions, and recommendations of the Custody 
Evaluator in that Pre-trial conference. Commissioner Casey had not 
allowed that hearing to be recorded, thus there is no official 
transcript to present to this court, but the Minute Entry and 
subsequent Order prepared following that Pre-Trial Conference with 
the Custody Evaluator, support, the court's understanding of what 
was in the Best Interests of the Children. See Exhi bit # , & 
, & respectfully. When the Appellate Court hears an 
Appeal, numerous times, the Appellate Court sides with the action 
that is most in line with the lower court's action, because the 
Appellate Court recognizes that the Lower Court was more aptly 
prepared to have an understanding of the issues and supporting their 
action. The same principal is true in this paragraph of the March 
2005 Appeal of the Appellant. How would the higher Court, (Judge 
Medley) be apprised of the reasons and interests of the Lower Court 
(Commissioner Casey's Court) if the higher court (Judge Medley) 
had not been closely involved with the parties for such length of time 
as Commissioner Casey had, and with Commissioner Casey as being 
the only independent party in attendance to the Pre-trial conference 
with the Custody Evaluator, when there was no recorded record of 
the proceedings for Judge Medley to rely on. The Appellant was 
without available facts or Testimony to defend his claim for Custody 
of the children, or even equal parent time with the children, or the 
impetus for Family counseling to begin, continue, or happen at all. 
See the three previously issued Orders of Commissioner Casey, and 
the several docketed Minute Entries of the court, where the Lower 
Court (Commissioner Casey) had ordered that the children were to 
be placed with their Father in the event that the Appellee move 
away. Exhibit # , , , , . See 
corresponding Minute Entries and Orders of Commissioner Casey 
(Exhibit # , , , ) directing that Counseling 
with the children should involve the Appellant, and that because of 
the concessions made by the Appellant, the Appellant should not be 
faced with any additional expense because the Appellant allowed the 
children to continue being seen and treated by their then existing 
counselors. Later, even with those orders and Minute Entries of the 
Court, the Appellee, and the Guardian ad Litem failed to represent 
that fact to the children's counselors, and the Appellant was caused 
to pay $300.00 to the counselor for one daughters hour session. See 
Exhibit # . Such magnitude of the compounding errors of 
the court, and misrepresentations of facts by the Appellee, have 
caused insurmountable irreparable harm to the Appellant and to the 
children and their relationship with each other, and other significant 
family members that were equally involved with the children, and 
had a relationship with them, that the Appellee sought to undermine 
or destroy, 
i) PARAGRAPH #9 Dealing with issues surrounding the payment of the 
previously ordered Custody Evaluation, and questions applicability of what 
statute applies, the old Statute, or the new Statute in affect at that time - not 
an objection to a Scheduling Conference. This paragraph, of the March 
2005 Appeal, attempts to get the Court to determine on Appeal: 1). What 
rules or Statutes apply for the Custody Evaluation that was ordered by the 
court in July 2001. 2). What party is responsible for payment of amounts 
due for completion of the Custody Evaluation, since the rules had changed 
without any retroactive provision. 3). Is the Custody Evaluation considered 
complete with, or without a final written report, and what party was to pay 
for such based on the rules in effect at the time the Custody Evaluation was 
ordered. 4). The Appellant sought to have the Appellate Court define the 
word "initial retainer". Additionally, IF the court had processed the March 
2005 Appeal properly, there would have been afforded the opportunity for 
the Appellant to have discovered that the Appellee had not complied with 
the prior order of the court to specifically pay her portion of the parties 
Income Tax Refund ($1,750.00) to the Custody Evaluator, rather than those 
funds being absconded by counsel for personal use, of the counsel or 
Petitioner, and other "protected joint funds" would not have been used for 
the personal use and advantage for the Appellee (Petitioner), as had 
previously been ordered not to be used. The error of the court not to 
address this Appeal at the time it was filed with the District Court, it can 
not be determined that there would not have been a more favorable 
outcome, or consideration for the Appellant because the Appellee 
(Petitioner) failed to disclose the facts, and mislead the court and Appellant, 
and Custody Evaluator. The Appellant was unable to defend his reputation 
and actions to the Custody Evaluator, because the facts were not made 
known to the Custody Evaluator. Additionally, if the court had properly 
forwarded the March 2005 Appeal to the Appellate Court, or even heard it 
themselves, the Appellant would not have had to pay the Custody Evaluator 
for the Pre-Trial conference, or at least in the alternative, the Appellant 
would have been afforded a credit for such overpayment, that could have 
been applied to payment to assist Appellant in preparation of the best 
parenting plan for the children at some later juncture after the Custody 
Evaluation was completed. This is applicable and relevant, and holds merit, 
because the prior rules of law were an issue of question and could qualify 
for Interlocutory Appeal consideration to determine what rules or Statutes 
applied to require the Appellant to pay additional funds than was previously 
agreed to, and paid to the Custody Evaluator by the Appellant. As a result, 
the Appellant has been left financially without any funds to conduct a 
proper Appeal as supported with case # . Because the 
Trial Court failed to resolve the payment of Custody Evaluation fees 
properly, the Appellant was caused to suffer a negative opinion by the 
Custody Evaluator, even though as time has passed, the Appellee's willful 
disobedience to tin I Jitlcii* ul (lit u>uii, .«inl ilu iM« mpi In ai n «l (In iiyai 
•» nnal unjust enrichment have proved 
to be historically accurate and proven, the Custody Evaluator at that time 
was unaware of in problems caused by the Appch^ ^ imiuK *. ;.e 
flexible, and accommodating . . . 
u. 
i) Because tlie District Court failed to address the Custody Evaluation 
fees and pavments proper!, mv. * -*.. - . ...valuation Report thus is 
emed inappropriate evidence, and 
inadmissible at subsequent hearing considerations. Because the 
Trial Court failed to adjudicate the Maieli JOlto Appeal properly 
complete . \npellee, by the mere 
passage of time, and the long delav Petitioner's counsel has caused 
to occur, arid the sidestepping of Justice i - • ommissioner Casey' s 
conn, ulte Appellee, has k m mnnsll " uiiiclial, and benefited and 
preferred by the court. Additionally, the Appellee has been able to 
improperly strengthen her defense as not to upset the custody the 
children iiie cumuli', uniii i um in ilranpi I lit ijiildinii\ ii^ideiicy 
until (ml" stah The fractured relationships between 'the children and 
their Father have only been allowed to be further troubled, and 
underminui by the action* oi (III lnal ( uui(,, ,iml lm lulvi 
representations to the court by the Appellee. Irreparable harm has 
been committed by the Trial Court. Additionally, the Appellee has 
been successful in preventing, and blocking the Appellant from 
bringing the issues to trial for resolution. Appellant had attempted to 
motion the Third District Court to so strike this inappropriate 
evidence from the file, and also to correct many of the Trial Court's 
oversights and errors, and yet the Third District Court just 
sanctioned the Appellant for his efforts to correct the prior court 
proceedings. The Appellant therefore requests the sanctions leveled 
against him by the Third District court be reversed, and the harm 
caused the Appellant of denial of court hearing until such fee was 
paid also be reversed and properly placed upon the court to pay the 
Appellant, such that the Appellant be appointed counsel of choice or 
afforded funds to obtain counsel on Appeal or remand. One of the 
most important issues that Paragraph #9 attempts to resolve, is the 
fact that Commissioner Casey had ordered on (Exhibit 
# ) that "Joint Custody was not to be precluded". With 
all the issues that the court failed to properly address by ignoring 
Paragraph #9, the ruling of Commissioner Casey, that Joint Custody 
was not to be precluded, never was able to be a part of the 
proceedings, actions of the court, or instructions to the Custody 
Evali mtoi , :»r consideration by Judge Medley' s court, who would 
have had little interaction with the parties, and in a less informed 
position than Commissioner Casey was having dealt with 'the parties 
foi Ilk1 pievious years <uul Ilk1 Appellee's Jiilns and 'i11 ill mil In In" 
*iunniiiiat)lc for her actions or attitudes. Rather than holding an 
attitude most favorable to the non moving party, the Appellant asks 
the court to view the issues and facts presented in me ugm most 
f» • '*- • mild h a v e b e e n e n j o y e d 
by the children and 'their Father had the court upheld its prior orders, 
and the parties were treated equally accountable foi their actions or 
inaction tc the soi u I: i: ulings, cii rections, and such si nc s th s Appellate 
. Court has often held that a party should not be afforded benefit for • 
disobeying the orders of the court, 01 failing to abuk with Statute, or 
,:
' violating a legal conliacl, In (ins ease, anil many others, two wrongs 
(or m a l ly more) do not make it or something else right or just, when 
the compounding effect of the errors or wrongs lasts a lifetime or 
more upon 
PARAGRAPH #10 This paragraph, if any does object to the advancing to 
trial the issues that had not yet been afforded the chan.ee to be properly 
resolveu . **.* paragraph shows theie aic nuii) issues >el l<i In o suits il. 
1
 d" |no«|)Lily II ,soh t1 thvtv f\wr p r e c l u d e s "the J a n u a r y 9, 
2006 order from being a Final Order, when compared to the transcript of 
such, and see what the Petitioner's counsel added to the order he prepared 
in hopes to favor his client. Paragraph #10 supports the aspect that Due 
Process was denied from happening by the Trial Court. This Paragraph 
further supports that there were substantial funds still owing to be paid to 
the Appellant by the Appellee, and needing further adjudication. This 
paragraph also tries to bring to the Court*s attention the need to resolve the 
Income Tax advantages of the parties dependants, joint debts, for both the 
past years, the Tax year 2004 just having ended, and Income Taxes needing 
to be determined prior to the court hearing, the future Tax years issues. 
Additionally, the Appellee (Petitioner) had been ordered by the court to 
amend her prior years Income Taxes she had filed, and also had failed to 
claim all the Taxable Income she had received. Failure to review this issue 
in a timely manner allowed the Petitioner not to amend her Income Taxes 
until such a late date now, the Statute of Limitations for amending Income 
Tax Returns filed has passed, thus further unjustly enriching the Petitioner 
(Appellee) because of her lack of having to amend her returns and pay 
additional Income Taxes, penalties, and interest that would have been 
assessed to her for her failure to provide accurate Taxable Income 
information to the LR.S. The Appellee continues to receive benefit by the 
Court failing to act timely in these proceedings. Paragraph #10 also 
attempts to resolve what communication between the Children and their 
Father was allowed in both therapy situations and regular communication 
between Father and child, without being subject . .. .
 f pl0ceecjjLllgS 
again I 1111 I'lifht'i lAppdluiil i ll< lli ill liiiii iiii llir pioceedings, the 
children were making wild and unfounded assumptions, accusations, and 
had many questions they wanted, and needed answers *~ o paragraph 
again attempts to cause H» W \ hiilinf <f»» "^ -"", <»PIM 
t the Father for the actions of the Mother. Even, the 
Statute of Frauds allows a party who received property in good faith not to 
be accountable u;;cairn the property, 1 i ilie nlleihlri I 
a ** i ^representation to both parties, or the loss to the 
aggrieved party, (the Father had received the child's property in good faith 
of the representations ol the Mothei, despik I lie .IMI inpts MI li c Mnlhn ID 
deceive ni 4he ch ild of property that had not been determined to 
be the property of the child). Additionally, the Trial Court, with respect to 
this paragraph, in the least part of consideration of the Custody Evaluation 
fees iii'iiil, in III In (liiitiiti, i.i mini li.i ' ill In aiif ciMisideredestabhshingacredit 
given to the Appellant for money Appellee owed the Appellant and ruled 
the Appellee to pay all remaining fees since prior statutes in ell eel 
previously * flowed to 
portray to be the party without any funds, when ui fact the Appellee was 
using joint funds for payment of her personal bills all the while 
accumulating nearly $25,000,00 of her own savings available to her for her 
own needs. See Exhibit # DMBA STMNTS AND Withdrawal 
forms ). Paragraph #10 also attempts to present to the court while 
the Appellant was unemployed and without substantial income to adjust the 
amount of Alimony and or Child Support, because of the permanency of the 
decreased wages of the Appellant. Failure to address this issue, just served 
to benefit the Appellee by having arrearages continue to mount up 
inappropriately to serve as intimidation, or further threat against the 
Appellant for the favor of the Appellee. Item #9 in this paragraph, supports 
my claim of how Commissioner Casey had refused to hear, rule on, or deal 
with my many previously filed statements of Impecuniosity, thus denying 
me the Equal Protection of the Law, and further deny me Due Process 
considerations of the issues. Item #10 in this paragraph support how the 
Trial Court had failed to abide with the charge of State Statute that all the 
court actions are to be in the Best Interests of the Children. Additionally, 
the Court failed previously to show that it was in the Children's Best 
Interest NOT to have their own, separate, or additional co-counsel for the 
children, or the conflict held between the children to each other themselves. 
The Guardian ad Litem had failed to present the children's differing 
interests to the court when directed by Statute - when the 
p a i c i i l s s u k ' i 'III mi in i11 t i n 1 ( ' i i i L i l n n h - *'•' -• f 
becomes a subject of the Trial Court directives Ui v/OiiUui. l i die f rial Court 
originally ruled for a Custody Evaluation, and placed faith and confidence 
in the Custody Lvciiuator as tii^ . (ink! i's>diwlw}iK.n |uwiv^iviiai thai the 
Tiiiii'il I iiiiiiiiiiit ilsell hu.ks lu'iiij1, lln ill nil", ilm " lln i mirl h lu In el I li in! ill i 
the professional and directs the Custody Evaluator how to conduct his 
"follow up" Evaluation. This appears to conflict with the doctrine of Stare 
_ _ tlli.il cJcptiils liiiiii (In pi mi pu'cnlriia: scl li'i lln I  i iii,il 
Court. It was at this "follow up" visit with the children, when they were in 
the company of (taken and delivered by) the Appellee, that the younger 
bad about their Dad to Matt (the Custody Evaluator) then tlieir pets would 
be killed". It had previously been presented i n coi lit proceedings that the 
Guardian ad Litem felt that child Psychologists, I herapists, Counselor s, 
Visitation observers, and such, establish a rapport with tlie parent that 
brings the child to their office. Therefore, it is important that each parent 
be allowed the same opportunity to establish llien Kappoil with such child 
professional. That was not allowed to happen with tlie Custody Evaluator's 
"follow up" visit with the children that the Court had allowed the Guardian 
ad litem to order, or witli the cliildi en's many counseling sessions with their 
tliei apists, counselors etc See Exhibit # Itei n #12, of paragraph 
attempts to draw to the court's attention that mediation that is required to 
occur, had not occurred between the parties. It was not this filing with the 
court that the court recognized the parties had not mediated, it was a later 
filing of this same lack of mediation that Judge Medley then ordered the 
parties to mediate their matter prior to their court appearance. By that point 
in time, there was so much lost, and so little equity of equal consideration 
or leverage between the parties, that mediation was ineffective. On the 
other hand, if the court had properly dealt with the Appellant's March 2005 
Appeal in a timely fashion, then there would have been a much more equal 
footing to negotiate on the part of the Appellant. The Appellee experienced 
a mediation advantage or benefit, by the court not addressing the March 
2005 Appeal properly and timely. Just like an order that prevents mediation 
is found to be an error of the court, so is the action of silence or refusal to 
address mediation an error of the court. Thus, the Trial Court's silence or 
lack of mediation component at the time of the March 2005 Appeal and 
since until much later and upon a separate additional request) are the 
actions of the court in that interim period of time also an error of the court, 
since Mediation was not allowed for that whole period as a result of the 
actions of the court. Item #13 of paragraph 10, attempts to bring to light to 
the court a request to review the attorney fees assessed to the Appellant, 
when it was the actions ot UK A p j ^ ; ^ .,. «•. ,1^ i 
back to court foi an ai i. 
i) It was because 'the Trial Court failed to review" 'these many 
previoiisly presented matters above, that the Appellant was caused to 
approach the trial .*, 
xvt ; . - : inlian «id litem to use to influence, 
intimidate the Appellant, and ultimately cause the Appellant that all 
was lost, .'rid there \va? no ch.tM-,v. i-* anv equal r , jonsideration 
by the < : nt the Appellant 
had previously attempted to seek fairness, equity, and justice and 
accountability for the actions of the Appc n- *. ...; Appellant was 
BFAI h l " \ h l il I ' ^v^ ' i 'hM In* u'.r, l»-, MM -in-ti h nf reality, a 
DEAD BEAT DAD, *• •*:.••
 ?h tlie court presumed him to be, and 
ultimately prejudged him u < be, and viewed hiiii in such disfavor. 
Thus, because tlic Appellant HJIS IK »ii I tin" system, he w is 
practically speechless, and had lost any sense that the Judicial 
system would be any different at a full trial. Thus the AppeUant was 
more influenced to settle the fieuiing, Ih.ui h» IIIIYC il liraH then, 
siiuc lint nuiul li,id IIII I allowed Appellant's counsel proper time to 
remedy all the errors of the court up to that poi nt i n ti me. Later, on 
Decemhu 12, 20PC i~ a heai in^ >>aid counsel stated on tl i,e i ecoi d. 
that her actions had prejudiced the court against me, thus she should 
be allowed to withdraw as counsel. (See Transcript.) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L STONE, 
Respondent, 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: 014903655 DA 
C o mm i s s ioner: 
Date: 
T PATRICK CASEY 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
susanp 
Petitioner's Attorney: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Petitioner(s): JOANNE L STONE 
Other Parties: ROBERT L STEELE 
Attorney for the Respondent: DELANO S FINDLAY 
Respondent(s): TODD L STONE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 13-04 Tape Count: 9:47-10:53 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for a hearing regarding the 
petitioner's motion for permission to sell the marital residence 
and move the minor children. The parties and counsel were present 
as listed above. 
A stipulation was reached and read into the record and approved by 
the court; 
1. If the petitioner decides to move to California, the minor 
child Brittany is allowed to move with her on the understanding 
there will be no interruption in her process with Ms. Deholo and a 
new therapist gotten when in California. The two younger 
children should not be moved at this time and should continue to 
reside here with the respondent for extended parent time. j 
2. Counsel are to schedule a 4-904 custody evaluation conference 6Cf 
with the Commissioner at least week prior to the school year 
commencing in California, notify Dr. Davias in the hopes he can be 
'MAG ED 
Brent R. Chipman #0626 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
215 South State Street, 12in Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
10 [o> [* -> 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JOANNE L. STONE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
TODD L. STONE, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No 014903655 DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
-ooOoo-
Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Preowned Property came on for hearing 
on September 12, 2003 before Commissioner T. Patrick Casey. Petitioner was not 
present in court, but was represented by counsel Brent R. Chipman of Fabian & 
Clendenin, P.C. Respondent was present and represented himself pro se. 
Having found Respondent's Motion to be inappropriate, the 
Commissioner made his recommendations following argument. Pending further hearing 
on any Objections filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration, and good cause 
2 8 8 7 0 3 1 
appearing, now therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Preowned Property is denied. 
2. Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent in the sum of $250.00. 
The remaining requested fees of $230.00 are reserved for future consideration by the 
court. 
APPROVED and RECOMMENDED this £/£_ day of_^^_l 2003. 
DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED: 
Tyron£ jE. Medley 
Third/District Court Judge 
Todd L. Stone 
Respondent 
APPROVED: 
Robert L. Steele 
Office of Guardian ad Litem 
Attorneys for Minor Children 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ^ 7 
I certify that originals of the foregoing Order were mailed on the / ts day of 
September 2003 to Todd L. Stone, Respondent, 3747 Hillside Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84109 and to Robert L. Steele, Office of Guardian ad Litem, Attorneys for minor 
children, 450 South State Street, Suite W22, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0403 pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Joanne Stone 
Petitioner 
vs. 
Todd L. Stone 
Respondent 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 014903655 DA 
This matter previously came before the Commissioner for a hearing on A u g u s t ^ , 2004 . 
on petitioner's Motion for Permission to Sell Marital Home and Move the Children. At the time, 
the Commissioner reserved for ruling petitioner's request to move the two younger children 
pending an opportunity to hear from the custody evaluator, Dr. Davies, with respect to this issue. 
On October 7, 2004, the Commissioner met with the parties, counsel (including the guardian ad 
litem), and Dr. Davies pursuant to Rule 4-904. Dr. Davies discussed in great detail, in part with 
the Commissioner absent, vanous issues and concerns pertaining to the parties and their children. 
In summary, Dr. Davies believes that the children have been exposed to the parties' conflict, 
which in this case has been extremely protracted (this matter has been pending for three years), to 
a far greater degree than necessary and that, in different way with respect to each child, this has 
had a negative impact on the children's emotional state and, at least in the case of the two older 
girls, their relationship with their father. Dr. Davies did not believe this is a result of a deliberate 
effort by the petitioner to alienate the children from their father, notwithstanding the respondent's 
STONE V. STONE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
firm belief that that has occurred. Dr. Davies also noted that the petitioner has historically been 
the primary care giver of the children and that she is well suited to meet the children's physical 
needs. He expressed doubt that the respondent would be able to fully meet the children's needs a 
majority of the time. 
The issue involving petitioner's request to move is in many ways emblematic of the 
dynamic of the parties' relationship. Petitioner frames her request to move in terms of a superior 
job offer with opportunities for career advancements and education and, as well, an opportunity 
for the children to become better familiar with her extended family. However, particularly based 
upon comments by petitioner's counsel, it would appear that one motivation for the move is an 
attempt to withdraw from the need for frequent interaction with the respondent. Respondent,.on. 
the other hand, views petitioner's desire to move as part of a plan to further alienate the children 
from him. Petitioner insists that she is not attempting to alienate the children from respondent 
and that she in fact has been actively encouraging Brittany, the parties' oldest daughter, to 
communicate and visit with her father. (At this point, Brittany's relationship with the respondent 
has deteriorated to the point that she will not see her father.) Respondent, on the other hand, 
points to several instances in which petitioner has instructed professionals dealing with the 
children not to communicate with him. This conflict appears to represent an extreme example of 
the tendency many people have, when in conflict, to perceive the facts in a light which best suits 
their own emotional needs and their purposes generally. There appears to be very little empathy 
on either party's part for the other party. 
STONE V. STONE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
Dr. Davies ultimately concluded that the children would be best served remaining in the 
care and custody of the petitioner, but that their interests would be undermined if petitioner were 
to relocate to the State of California. One factor in Dr. Davies thinking was his view that 
petitioner's intended move would not, at least in the immediate future, produce a financial 
benefit because any increase in salary would be offset by presumed travel costs and increases in 
costs of living. He further opined that the difficulties in maintaining frequent contact between 
the children and Mr. Stone would result in a further deterioration of the relationship between the 
children and their father. 
This leaves the Commissioner, and ultimately the court, in a position of having to choose 
between two unacceptable alternatives. If the petitioner is permitted to relocate with ajjjbree 
children, at least according to Dr. Davies, this will be directly contrary to the children's interests 
and have the effect of further damaging their relationship with their father. On the other hand, if 
petitioner is not allowed to move at this time, the career opportunities which she has identified 
may no longer be available once the matter has been permanently resolved. The courts of this 
state do not, in this Commissioner's experience, restrict a party's ability to relocate once a 
permanent order of custody has been entered, and Dr. Davies' clear inclination is to recommend 
that the children continue to reside in the petitioner's care. Therefore, restricting petitioner's 
ability to move may only forestall the inevitable once the court has made a final custody 
determination. Weighing these alternatives, it would appear to the Commissioner that 
the benefit of allowing the petitioner to relocate prior to final resolution of this matter would 
primarily be of personal benefit to her, although ultimately a career advancement would likely be 
to the children's benefit as well. On the other hand, the likely detriment is one to the children 
STONE V. STONE PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
(incidentally to the respondent as well). It is also of concern that, while the parties' conflict 
remains unresolved, the children would be expected to adjust to a new living environment, living 
temporarily with petitioner's grandparents, and attending new schools, churches, etc. While the 
Commissioner does not doubt the petitioner's ability to assist the children in making these 
transitions, the timing of making those changes before the parties' matter is resolved may further 
weigh against a move at this time. Balancing all of these factors together, the Commissioner is 
not persuaded that the court's prior restraint against moving the two younger children from the 
state should be modified. 
The Commissioner is of the opinion that the best alternative would be for the petitioner to 
continue to reside with all three children in Utah until the matter can reach a final conclusion and 
the court can enter full and extensive orders regarding therapy, parent time, etc. However, it 
would be inappropriate to restrain her from relocating herself, and given the present dynamic 
with Brittany there is no alternative to allowing her to move with her mother if that occurred. 
In the event petitioner nevertheless decides to relocate and leave the two younger children 
with the respondent in Utah, the household furnishings should not be removed from the marital 
residence, absent a specific agreement or order dividing those items. Obviously, petitioner's 
personal effects and those of Bnttany would be excluded from this prohibition. 
Counsel for respondent is requested to prepare and submit to the court an order consistent 
herewith. 
STONE V. STONE PAGE 5 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Minute Entry to the following, this ^ day of October 2004: 
Brent R. Chipman 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Delano S. Findlay 
684 East Vine Street, Ste 3 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Robert L. Steele 
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem 
450 South State Street 
2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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FINDLAW, LLC 
Attorney for Respondent 
6713 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 ^ururY CiERJf 
Telephone No. (801) 733-7727 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L.STONE, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND IN RE CONTEMPT 
Case No. 014903655 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Commissioner: T. PATRICK CASEY 
Upon motion of the respondent and good cause appearing therefor, 
It is hereby Ordered that the petitioner appear before the Honorable Commissioner, T. 
Patrick Casey, in courtroom W36 of eh Scott Matheson Courthouse, 450 south State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah on the 15th day of September. 2004 at 9:00 o'clock a. m. 
then and there show cause why the Court should not: 
1. Hold the petitioner in contempt of this Court" Order to which she stipulated in 
open Court that she would cooperate with a motion to the Court in the Criminal case that 
the terms of probation be modified to allow the respondent to communicate with the 
petitioner once a week by email regarding parenting time and any changes in the 
schedules of the children for the coming week? 
2. In the event the petitioner moves to California as planned in September, award 
the respondent temporary custody of the minor children, Brittney Stone, Brooklynn Stone 
and Brylee Stone or in the alternative award respondent temporary custody of Brooklynn 
Stone and Brylee Stone and require petitioner to pay child support in accordance with the 
child support guidelines? 
3. In the event the petitioner moves to California as planned in September, award 
temporary use and possession of the marital home on Melony Drive in Salt Lake City to 
the respondent? 
4. So long as the petitioner has custody of the minor children or any one or more 
of them, order her to advise and keep the respondent informed as to all medical 
information including emergency medical procedures relating to the children as soon as 
possible after she learns of the pendency of such procedures, and keep respondent 
informed as to any impending important social, school, literary, religious and recreational 
events in the lives of each of the children as soon as practical after learning of them? 
5. Why the petitioner should not make arrangements for the respondent to inspect 
the home and the personal property in the home before the petitioner removes the 
property in order to identify property belonging to him or to which he should make a 
claim before it is finally removed from this jurisdiction and beyond examination and 
recovery? 
6. Why the Court should not order that the maternal grandmother of the two 
minor children, Brooklynn and Bryllee Stone provide care and supervision for the portion 
of the days after school that their mother is working? 
7. Why the petitioner should not repay respondent for his attorney's fees in 
bringing this motion? 
8. Such other and further relief as the Court determines is wsran 
premises. -J 
Dated this _0day of September, 2004. 
BYTHECPURT: 
itable in the 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. 
^^jgammow 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L STONE, 
Respondent. 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: -014903655 DA 
Commissioner: T PATRICK CASEY 
Date: August 25, 2004 
Clerk: susanp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Petitioner(s): JOANNE L STONE 
Other Parties: ROBERT L STEELE 
Attorney for the Respondent: DELANO S FINDLAY 
Respondent(s): TODD L STONE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 13-04 Tape Count: 9:47-10:53 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court 
petitioner's motion for permissio 
and move the minor children. The 
as listed above. 
A stipulation was reached and re 
the court; 
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child Brittany is allowed to move 
there will be no interruption in 
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Todd Stone 0?Br---_ 
3747 Hillside Lane ^LBSiT 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 * 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah ~ Third District Court 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Motion to Vacate Attorney Fee Assessment 
-v-
Todd Stone (Respondent) Court Case #: 014903655 
In 2003, the Respondent asked the court to separate the parties' property issue from the parties 
custody issue. Two separate hearings were held, and the court ruled such request was without 
merit and assessed the Respondent $650.00 Attorney Fees in total. 
Because of the court's rulings in 2003 of not separating the property from the custody issues, 
many specific costs were incurred by the Respondent, that the Petitioner escaped having to face 
or incur at that time, all based on the court's 2003 rulings. Many other different plans and actions 
were made based on the court's ruling, and issues were negotiated based on that ruling. 
Additionally, the Petitioner escaped having to face foreclosure of the properties at that time. 
Then on August 3, 2005, the Guardian ad litem asks the court to separate the parties property 
issues from the custody issue, and Judge Medley flip flopped his position and stated "...I'm 
struggling with the concept of why these issues consistent with Ms. Bloomquists request are 
not seyarable. They seems to make all the sense in the world to me that they are separable". 
See August 3, 2005 hearing transcript page 26, line # 19-22. 
As the transcript shows, the Respondent did not agree with that stipulation. Thus the court tries 
to re-write the stipulations by separating the property from the custody issue that was not agreed 
to in the August 3, 2005 hearing. It is improper conduct for the court to re-write a stipulation 
that was not agreed to by the Respondent, and incorporate their re-writing into the court's actions 
or later rulings, when the re-written stipulation was not agreed to. 
Based upon the court's ruling that "it makes all the sense in the world to separate the issues", 
the Respondent's request of 2003 to separate the parties' property from the custody issues did 
hold merit, and as such the assessment of attorney fees against the Respondent should be vacated. 
1 
This issue is not moot, because, when the Appellate Court states the January 9, 2006 order is not 
a binding Final Order, that released the Respondent from such attorney fee assessment, the 
Respondent should not face such unjust assessment of attorney fee against him for something the 
court has come to later recognized held merit, merely because the Guardian ad litem asked for it 
instead of the Respondent. 
Dated this T^ day of r ^ j , 2007. 
Signed: 
Todd Stone Pro Se 
Certificate of Delivery 
I certify that on *jWt-j , 2007 I caused a copy of this document to be mailed or delivered to: 
Brent Chipman 215 South State Street, suite #1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Guardian Ad Litem Office 250 South State Street 2nd floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
2 
Todd Stone 
2783 Melony Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah - Third District Court 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Notice of Appeal. 
v. 
Case#: 014903655 
Todd Stone (Respondent) 
Because of the demonstrated unwilling nature and ineffective assistance of counsel for the minor children, 
and for the Respondent, and in an effort to preserve the appellate date statute, Respondent submits this 
Appeal. 
Respondent comes now before the Court to appeal in its entirety, rather than only on the insufficient 
notice aspect of the actions of the District Court from a hearing held October 6, 2005. 
If the Court considers the ruling of October 6, 2005 as the final ruling of the matter before it on October 
6, 2005, then, Permission to appeal, and an Interlocutory appeal, are not thus needed for this appeal to 
advance, since the Court finds the ruling of October 6, 2005 is a final ruling of the matter before it on 
October 6, 2005. If however, the Court fails to find the Court's ruling was a final ruling, then this is an 
appeal to clarify that the parties do not have the requirement to abide with State Statute, and anything is 
viable, and allowed by the parties, thus the Respondent's previously submitted matters also need to be 
heard with, designated counsel as standby counsel or not. The Trial Court has thus established the 
precedence that compliance by BOTH parties to Rules, and Statutes is not required. 
Because of the Trial Court's refusal to uphold State Statute on the Petitioner's Relocation, along with 
other Rules, or requirements, and the Trial Court's unwillingness to hear other matters presented to it by 
Respondent, the Respondent is left with a totally unworkable, unenforceable, and invalid Order for 
visitation, and the minor children are left to suffer the anguish of never knowing when they will be able to 
see their Father again. The children are left to suffer and be further harmed at the hands of the Petitioner. 
The Trial Court has created a improper, and unethical "Double Jeopardy", "Catch 22" type of ruling(s), 
that place undo litigation and stress upon the children, and the Respondent. Additionally, because the 
Petitioner now has been able to get what she wanted all along, the Petitioner is even MORE 
UNWILLING to be bound by the Court, or cooperate with Parent Time or other matters needing to be 
resolved. Thus causing further delay in the other pending matters needing resolution and adjudication. 
The minor children are ultimately suffering more than need be because of the inaction of the Court. 
The current standing Order of the Court allows the children and the Respondent to enjoy Parent time 
together as directed by Statute 30-3-35. This allows Respondent alternating weekends, and one day 
through the week, with a specificity of what holidays are to be shared with what parent. The State 
relocation Statute 30-3-37 directs that the Petitioner SHALL PROVIDE detailed information as to the 
Parent Time the minor children and the Respondent are allowed to enjoy. The Court in its hostility and 
demonstrated contempt of the Respondent, failed to enforce the State Statute for any notice of Parent 
time. 
Consequently, the parties are left to interpret the law in the silence or lack of the court's proper 
adjudication of the issues, and the Court's selective enforcement of State Statute. Because of the Court's 
negligence in requiring proper and complete notice to conform to the Relocation Statute, the Petitioner is 
in violation of the Utah Criminal Code section 76 that specifically addresses a parent's willful restriction, 
and interference of the other parent's parent time or visitation. 
The Trial Court acted so negligent toward the rights of the minor children, and the rights of the 
Respondent, as to award custody to one parent in order to punish the other parent. This in itself is 
contrary to Judicial practice or purpose. Judge Medley has failed to act in an impartial manner in this 
case. It is because of the conflicting Orders issued by the Trial Court, that leaves so much confiission, 
and harm to the minor children, and to the Respondent. The reason the State Legislature adopted the 
Relocation Statute was to allow considerable time for the Courts, and the parties to work out the many 
involved matters when it comes to the relocation of children that BOTH parents are closely involved 
with. 
IF Respondent was to vacation to California, there is no ruling by the Court or provision provided by the 
Petitioner what Parent time Respondent and the minor children could enjoy. 
IF Respondent were to relocate to the same location that the minor children were taken to, there is no 
ruling by the Court, or provision allowed by the Petitioner as to what Parent Time the Respondent 
and minor children could enjoy. 
IF the Respondent remains in Utah, there is no ruling by the Court, or provision provided by the 
Petitioner as to when the minor children and the Respondent would ever see each other again, and 
enjoy Parent Time together. 
The current standing Order of the Court allows Respondent to enjoy Christmas, and a few selected 
holidays this year (Odd # year). The Relocation Statute allows the Respondent to enjoy the 
children's fall Break from school, and Thanksgiving, (Odd # year). Since Respondent has been 
denied the Parent Time provision of the Fall Break, and NO plans have been put forward for the 
Respondent to enjoy Thanksgiving this year, the Court has ultimately created a DISASTER OF 
JUSTICE by failing to require strict compliance with the State's relocation Statute, and failing to 
hear evidence and facts on what is in the Best Interests of the children. 
With the children taken away unjustly, it is also hampering the minor children's rights. The children have 
been denied unrestricted mail or phone, or E-mail privileges, and have to speak on a speaker 
phone, for ALL of the family and extended family to hear. E-mail is only allowed if the Petitioner, 
or another older child wants to grant that privilege of reading it or writing it to the minor children, 
because of not letting the minor children know their own password. D.C.F.S. has not been able 
to investigate the reports of child abuse because the children are now outside of the State's 
D.C.F.S. domain, and the California Child Protective Services refuse to investigate child abuse 
that happened outside of the State of California. The minor children are not able to meet with, or 
confidentially communicate with their counsel, or the counsel they have selected to represent 
them. The minor children are not afforded proper representation by them being improperly taken 
from the State. The minor children that enjoy, anticipate, and want to be with the Respondent 
have nothing to plan on, or know when they will be able to see their Father again. The minor 
children also have a right to be with, and associate with their Grandmother that they desire to be 
with, and has been greatly involved in their growth and development. A Grandparent Visitation 
claim was also filed with the Court in this matter, at the request of the minor children, and the 
Court's ruling allowing the children to be taken away so abruptly and so improperly has also 
impinged on the right, and subsequent ruling for the Grandparent, and the minor children to enjoy 
their right and desired visitation with their Grandmother. The minor children have not been 
allowed to continue with their music, sports, counseling, therapy, schooling, or medical care they 
need since the Court failed to hear what was best for the children and ruled in such a penalization 
manner against the children, and against the Respondent, and against the minor children* s 
Grandmother. The children's inappropriate abduction also caused the minor children to suffer the 
loss of their ability to earn their funds that they have to provide for their own representation, and 
thus they would not have to rely on the State Appointed Guardian ad Litem that represented 
would remove herself from this case in a month or so anyway. The minor children wish to retain 
their own counsel, that will better represent their needs, and interests, and can not do so having 
been taken from the State of Utah, since many of the attorneys they would have access to in 
California, are not licensed to represent them in a Utah court matter. 
The Trial Court Previously ruled that it refused to separate the parties property concerns from the parties 
Custody concerns. Again, in August 2005, the same Judge stated that he would NOT separate the parties 
Custody matter from the parties property matters. With the suspect ruling of the Court of October 6, 
2005, it ultimately has gone against it's several prior rulings again, and ultimately separated the parties 
Property matters from the parties Custody matters. This Flip Flop of Judicial rulings is also evident, 
when in August 2004, and again in October of the same year, the Court ruled that the minor children 
were NOT to be moved away, and IF the Petitioner desired to move away, she was free to do so while 
leaving the children with the Respondent and also granting the minor children the right to enjoy their own 
home, and not be taken to a residence or environment, that was not in the Best Interests of the Children. 
The Court's error, and constant delay, and avoidance of the pertinent issues can not be used or viewed as 
a reason to leave the minor children in the situation or• environment that the Court inflicted upon them, or 
prevent action or hearing of what is in the Best Interests of the children. 
The Petitioner failed to provide anytime prior to the Court's ruling, and has STILL NOT PROVIDED 
even after all this time has passed, the Respondent with any PARENT TIME - VISITATION Notice or 
allowance or provision as afforded and directed by State Statute in 30-3-37. Additionally, the Parent 
Time provisions mandated by State Statute 30-3-35 is also now invalid and subsequently unenforceable 
because of the failure of the Court to properly adjudicate this matter at hand. Therefore, the court 
initiated an unenforceable, and unworkable, or voidable Order, and also thus violated Parent Time and 
other rights of the Respondent. Additionally, the in-action or improper action of the Court has placed 
further unbearable financial hardship upon the Respondent. 
The Respondent seeks the relief of the Court to grant the Respondent immediate Parent Visitation -
Parent Time with, and for the minor children, and provide an enforceable Order for Parent Time and 
visitation for the Respondent with the children in Utah and elsewhere. Failure of the Petitioner and by the 
Court has denied Respondent ANY Visitation or Parent Time with the minor children. 
The Respondent seeks the immediate relief of the Court to require the minor children be returned to the 
State of Utah until such time as ALL of the matters are able to properly be adjudicated and impartially 
resolved. The Respondent also seeks the Court's ruling of enforceable Parent Time - Visitation 
provisions to be enjoyed by the minor children with their Father, along with make up Parent time that has 
been denied the Respondent for the improper adjudication of the Court in this matter. Respondent also 
seeks further relief or assistance of Law enforcement, and financial relief of the Court as later specified or 
deemed appropriate for the immediate return of the children to the State of Utah. 
The longstanding refusal of the Court to properly adjudicate or correct their actions, Should Not and 
can not be used as a defense by Petitioner, or viewed by the Court in defense of their action, that since so 
much time has passed, the minor children will be upset further if correction of this matter requires the 
return of the children to Utah. Such premise based on false and inaccurate rulings of the Court further 
denies Due Process, or what is fair or just, and denies the minor children from what they want, and that is 
to be allowed to live in Utah, and to have BOTH of their Parents involved in their lives. State Statute 
that this Appeal seeks review of allows an expedited hearing of this matter, and therefore is requested to 
avoid any preconceived notion by the Court, that leaving the children out of State, is best for the children. 
Other State agencies have refused to assist in protecting the children, or insuring their safety, because the 
children are no longer living in Utah. The children remain at risk of abuse by the Petitioner, or others 
Petitioner directs, or by the Court and the Judicial process, or Judicial system. 
The Court's action has denied the Respondent to equal, and impartial consideration of a proper custody 
arrangement or Order. Thus Respondent is unable to abide with any of the previous visitation, or Parent 
time provision's of any of the previous Orders of the Court. Such Legal Fiction is an abomination of 
Justice and affords the Respondent with NO legal enforceable, binding right, and allows the Petitioner 
Carte Blanch to not abide by any Order, or to be accountable to any Court Order. 
The Court previously found that frequent, regular, and meaningful Parent Time was in the Best Interests 
for Both parents and the children. Previously when the Petitioner wanted to move out of State, and leave 
the children behind, the Court found that the Respondent was to assist, and avail his resources, and time 
to accommodate monthly if not even more frequently, the visits of the Petitioner with the children, Now 
the Court fails to afford the same right to Parent Time with the children by the Respondent, or require 
such assistance for the Respondent. This blatant gender discrimination by the Court is contrary to equal 
application, or equal protection of the law. 
The Court erred in not requiring Petitioner's full compliance with State Statute. 
The Court erred in not allowing Respondent Due Process, and thus violated Respondent's rights. 
The Court erred in not properly addressing the Best Interests of the Children. 
The Court erred in not allowing the minor children proper and non conflicting representation. 
The Court erred in violating the rights of the minor children, and the children's right to Due Process. 
The Court erred in allowing two conflicting Orders to counter validate either or BOTH Orders. 
The Court erred in it's hostility toward Respondent, thus denying Justice. 
The Court erred in it's failure to uphold strict compliance to State Statute. 
The Court erred in NOT holding a hearing on the relocation of the children was in their Best Interest. 
The Court erred in allowing the minor children's move out of State without a formal Custody agreement. 
The Court erred in it's consideration and being influenced by improperly submitted evidence. 
The Court erred in failing to find Petitioner in contempt as is required by State Statute. 
The Court failed to uphold it's prior signed Orders, thus allowing Petitioner to violate it's own Order. 
The Court erred in NOT allowing all of the minor children's concerns, fears of abuse, and wishes from 
being heard, or Petitioner's prior embracing or capitulation of the minor children's sexual abuse to 
be heard, or considered in their ruling. 
The Court erred in it's continual one sided view of the facts, thus demonstrating its prejudice against the 
Respondent. 
The Court erred in it's failure to uphold the other aspects of it's own order, such selective enforcement is 
detrimental to Justice and equality. 
The Court erred without any good cause in not allowing Respondent ANY Visitation of, or Parent time 
with the parties' minor children 
The Court erred in allowing the parties' minor children to be taken from the State of Utah prior to any 
resolution of the current issues before the Court thus causing the children's safety to be 
jeopardized. 
The Court erred in basing its action on a non existent, fallacious, invalid, and thus unenforceable Order 
that the Court is under a false sense exists, yet has failed to sign, or uphold, and cannot produce 
as an Order for Judicial Review. 
The Court erred in allowing information and evidence not allowed to be presented equally by all parties 
to be presented by one party. 
The Court acted unethically, in its conduct of said hearing to prejudice the court against proper 
adjudication of the matters at hand, by inquiry or direction of uninvolved parties, unrepresented 
parties, and assignment of parties rights by persons unable to, or without any legal right to, assign 
those rights or obligations. 
The Court erred in not allowing professional testimony and evidence to be heard regarding the minor 
children. 
The Court erred in not requiring counsel to produce documentation that it falsely represented to the court 
as materially significant. 
The Court erred in allowing outside evidence to be improperly presented to the Court, and in violation of 
Evidence rules. 
The Court erred in basing it's conclusion solely on improperly solicited, and related unprofessional and 
biased testimony that was not allowed to be properly questioned or examined. 
The Court erred, having full knowledge of the ineffective assistance of counsel, and still not allowing 
Respondent proper representation or by himself, and thus counsel failed to perform duties of 
representing the interests of the Respondent, thus Respondent received ineffective assistance of 
counsel, with the Court's full knowledge of the fact. 
All of the Court's errors are extremely harmful to the Respondent and minor children. Individually on 
their own, the errors of the Court are Plain error of the Court. When the cumulative effect of the Court's 
error is viewed in their entirety, and the net effect upon the Respondent, and the minor children, such 
court error is Gross Negligence, and justify a mistrial and assignment to a different Judge, with the 
Court's almost twenty five errors, and subsequent violation of the children's and Respondent's rights. 
The multiple Court's errors has also dramatically and significantly served to impinge on the current and 
future rights or consideration of the Respondent and children, and have served to irreparably harm the 
Respondent, and most of all to harm the children. Previously, the Court; in foreseeing this very act of the 
Court, had ruled that such action of requiring the minor children to face two or more moves would be 
more harmful to the children than requiring the children to stay in Utah, and just allowing Petitioner to 
move out of State. 
The Court has the absolute duty and responsibility to assure that Court Rulings and the actions of the 
Court are free from error, or inappropriate action. The Court failed to uphold this duty and have thus 
caused this matter to come before the Court for proper and impartial adjudication and correction. 
The material facts of this Appeal, and need to be addressed on this Appeal are the following: 
1. The Trial Court amid knowing of the Respondent's ineffective assistance of counsel failed to allow 
Respondent to properly present the issues for consideration by the Court. 
2. The Trial Court failed to comply with the Strict Compliance to State Statute aspect of law. 
3. The Trial Court acted biased and with prejudice against the Respondent. 
4. The Trial Court failed to allow the Respondent Due Process. 
5. The Trial Court failed to allow Respondent Parent Time or Visitation in a manner that is reasonable, 
enforceable, or frequent, or meaningful or in harmony with the previously ordered visitation- Parent 
Time Orders previously ruled by the Trial Court. 
6. The Trial Court acted, or ruled on a previously unenforceable invalid notion of Order of the Court. 
7. The Trial Court failed to allow proper hearing of the Best Interests of the children. 
8. The Trial Court demonstrated gender bias, and hostility toward the Respondent. 
9. The Trial Court having failed to properly secure a correct and binding permanent Custody Order 
allowed the removal of the minor children from the State of Utah. 
10. The Trial Court failed to act and Order in the Best Interests of the children as presumed to overlay all 
rulings of the court in matters concerning children. 
11. The Trial Court violated the rights of the minor children. 
12. The Trial Court violated established a pre-disposition to a final Custody Order that would deny 
Respondent any right to Joint Custody because of the great geographical proximity now placed upon 
the children to the Respondent. 
13. The Trial Court refused to allow all of the facts pertaining to the matter at hand, and the children to 
be fully presented. 
14. The Trial Court erred in its narrowly defined purpose of the October 6, 2005 hearing and thus 
disallowed any evidence to be presented in the matter that the Court ultimately ruled on. 
15. The Trial Court has issued contradictory Orders thus causing confusion and denial of Respondent's 
rights. 
16. The Trial Court failed to address the issues in their entirety, thus leaving more issues unresolved, than 
were settled. 
17. The Trial Court failed to find the Petitioner in contempt as directed by State Statute. 
18. The Trial Court failed to allow all the minor children proper and non conflicting representation. 
Is the Trial Court's ruling on October 6, 2005 a final ruling to appeal or not. If not, then proper hearing 
of many of the issues raised needs to be heard and such, the Trial Court has refused to hear or accept 
argument on any of the more pertinent issues, thus denying Respondent proper, and unbiased Due 
Process. The Courts constant delay, and refusal to deal with the issues needing resolution causes more 
time to pass, and prejudice against the Respondent. 
Dated this day of Signed: 
Todd Stone 
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proper notice provided by Petitioner even more than sixty (60) days after the Court viewed 
Respondent comes now before the court to appeal the actions of the District Court from a hearing held 
October 6, 2005 before the honorable Tyrone Medley. This appeal is brought to appeal under Rule 5(c). 
A. The material facts of this Appeal are: 
A. 1. Appeal the action of Judge Medley that has disallowed Defendant from representing 
himself on the issues that present counsel has not been retained for, and thus refuses to 
represent Defendant on, or to compel Defendants present counsel to so represent 
Defendant in the pertinent aspects to be presented, since Counsel was compelled by the 
court to represent Defendant in this Trial Court issue from a telephone conference held by 
the court and counsel September 30, 2005. 
A. 2. Appeal the improper decision of Judge Medley that incorrectly ruled that proper notice as 
required and stated in to be provided to the Defendant in State Statute Section 30-3-37 in 
its entirety. 
B. The applicable standard of appellate review, and the two issues presented are: 
B. 1. Defendant's counsel has repeatedly stated in oral and written communication to Defendant 
(copies of which have previously been presented to this Court with Defendant's prior 
attempt to get this appeal properly presented to the court on October 13, 2005) that even 
though there are matters that need to be resolved prior to the final settlement of the noted 
court action, said counsel refuses to represent Defendant on matters counsel claims was 
not retained for. This matter was also presented to the District Trial Court, and was thus 
ignored, and thus matters needing to be presented before the court are thus forced to be 
ignored and the rights of the parties involved have thus been compromised. Additionally, 
because of the Trial Courts failure to recognize the matters presented by Defendant, the 
passage of time has allowed several other matters to unjustly influence the current court 
action against the Defendant. Defendant's counsel maintains her integrity to the court to 
not withdraw as counsel for the issue that is still being worked out and waiting for 
resolution before the Trial Court at this time, but has stalled until such other pertinent 
factors are hereby resolved (that specifically is the Order to be prepared from the parties 
August 3, 2005 Hearing). 
B.2. The purported reason as stated by the Judge in the October 6, 2005 hearing was ONLY to 
hear matters of the Notice given to the other parent, no other factors were to be presented 
in that hearing. Therefore, based on such admonition of the Trial Court Judge, there were 
no professionals, therapists, counselors, or witnesses, or other relevant information was 
even brought, or allowed to be requested to appear to the hearing to support what truly 
was in the Best Interests of the Children. After allowing only such narrow scope and 
strong words from the bench from the Judge, of information to be presented by 
Respondent, the Trial Court Judge then opened the comments of the Guardian at litem to 
opined with what she clearly expressed was not any where near a professional or qualified 
finding of the facts of what was best for the children, but merely her own opinion as to 
what was best for the children. The Judge then ruled as he did, thus preventing an equal 
consideration of facts, testimony, or evidence to what really is in the Best Interests of the 
children. All through the hearing, the Judge expressed his view, that Proper Notice had 
not been provided to the Respondent, and then out of his own dislike for the Respondent's 
attempt to get this matter properly heard because Respondent's counsel had failed to 
present the improper and incomplete notice to the court previously, The Judge 
prejudicially ruled contrary to State Statute against the Respondent, even though all the 
facts, and commentary from the Judge, point to a ruling otherwise. 
C. Petitioner failed to comply with SEVERAL DIFFERENT State Statutes, and should also be 
found in contempt of court as specifically directed by item (10) of this same Statute. 
C. 1. State Statute 30-3-37 requires that when EITHER parent is relocating 150 miles or more 
from the residence specified in the court's decree, that parent SHALL provide notice to 
the OTHER Parent, and that Notice is to include: 
C. 1 .a. 60 days advance notice of the proposed move 
C. 1 .b. and SHALL contain statements affirming: 
C. 1 .b.i.Parent time to be enjoyed by both parents. 
C. 1 .b.ii.the Other Parents Parental rights. 
C. 1 x. The Court SHALL consider 
C. 1 .c.i. the reason for the proposed move 
C.l.c.ii.the additional costs or difficulty to BOTH parents 
C.l.c.iii.the economic resources of BOTH parents 
C. 1 .civ.and other Necessary AND Relevant factors 
Additionally, the specific Statute continues with saying: 
in odd #'d years, the children SHALL spend: 
1. the Fall Break from school, AND 
2. Thanksgiving Holiday 
3. and so forth for Even #'d years. 
4. AND extended parent time of Vi of the student's Summer or Off track time. 
Proper, or complete notice as directed in this State Statute has not been provided to 
the Respondent by the Petitioner. — There has not been any representation of Petitioner 
as to the Parent Time Respondent is able to enjoy, or plan on, and such has been a 
constant delay by Petitioner in preparation of the court's Order from their August 3, 2005 
hearing, neither has any information been provided Respondent as to what expenses for 
such long distance visitation will be made available for the children to enjoy Parent Time 
with the Respondent of their Grandmother. THEREFORE, a ruling in this appealed 
matter would help facilitate such resolve to bring about a completed Order from the 
parties' August 3, 2005 hearing. 
C.2. Additionally, other State Statutes direct that the Custodial Parent is to provide the Non-
Custodial Parent the address of the children within 24hours of any change in their 
residence, daycare, school etc. 
C.2.a. Petitioner withdrew the children from school, and kept the children hidden from 
the Respondent for about 10 days prior to moving out of State with only a brief 
visit where Petitioner secretly delivered and picked up the children to and from the 
Respondent's house. Respondent was not even able to say good-bye to the 
children when they were taken away out of state. 
C.2.b. To date, the Petitioner has still failed to provide the Respondent the address where 
the children are residing at. 
C.2.c. Respondent's counsel also attempted to locate the children, 
C.2.d. as were the Police and Sheriff attempting to locate the children without any 
success or help from the Petitioner. 
C.2.e. To date, Respondent still does not know if, and even where the children might be 
attending school etc. 
C.3. Additional State Statute that orders advance Notice, is specific to allow other hearings to 
take place if needed for the Best Interests of the Children to be afforded. That has not 
been allowed to happen with the inappropriate and hasty manner the Petitioner moved the 
children away. 
C.4. Strict compliance to State Statute as required, and so often the rule, has not been 
practiced in this matter, for the mere fact that Petitioner has severely disregarded the law, 
and the Court has thus allowed it to happen, that will ultimately diminish equality, or 
justice from prevailing. 
C.5. The rights of proper representation of the children have been violated in this matter. 
C.6. The rights of Other parties, or Intervenors in this matter have also been compromised by 
the action of the District Court. 
D. Immediate action of the Court of appeals is necessary because Petitioner has moved out of state 
taking the parties children with her without proper or complete notice as required by State 
Statute. Such a move has devastating effects upon the parties children, and their rights, and the 
rights of the Defendant are thus compromised, and the children are faced to endure unnecessary 
trauma because of any further delay. Additionally, it has not been presented to the court, that 
such move was in the best interests of the children. The children have desired to have proper 
counsel represent them, and having been taken away from the opportunity to obtain and meet 
with their counsel, the children, and their rights have been violated. Many professionals serving 
the children, are well aware that the move of the parties children will have long lasting traumatic 
effects on the children. Additionally, the parties children have already been prevented by the 
actions of the Petitioner, from attending school for almost one whole month from their scheduled 
school days in Utah, and have been caused to miss V4 year of their school in the schools they have 
been taken to. The children have been forced to endure such neglect, and emotional trauma thus 
long, and who knows how much longer such will be inflicted upon the children until the court 
hears this matter, and the error of the court is corrected, or proper notice is provided by the 
Petitioner, and the appropriate hearings or findings of facts for the Best Interests of the children. 
Additionally, the Public school, in the district the children have been taken to, refuses to allow the 
children to attend because of over populated status, and lack of California residency. Utah State 
Code allows a presumable assumption that all decisions of the court are to consider the Best 
Interests of the children in all the court proceedings. A hearing, and facts were never presented to 
or by the court, that allowing such move of the children out of state, and without proper notice 
was ever in the best interests of the children Only the contrary was ever presented to the court, 
that such a move out of state for the children would NOT be in the Best Interests of the Children. 
E The children have also expressed their strong desire not to be moved out of state, and away form 
the parents, and life they currently enjoy This appeal may also materially advance the termination 
of the litigation, because there are so many other factors that remain unresolved pertaining to the 
parties Parent time, financial aspects, property issues, and the counseling or therapy concerns the 
children are facing. There has been many issues of emotional and sexual abuse inflicted upon the 
party's three minor children of which the children's counselors and therapists are just now finding 
a bit of progress, and comfort zone felt by the children where they can begin to open up, and 
resolve the problems that were placed upon them by others. If the children are forced to endure 
the time consuming event of gaining confidence and comfort with other counselors and therapists 
along with enduring the emotional strain of having to move away from their family, friends, 
schools and such that mean so much to the children at this vulnerable time in their life, 
emotionally the children can face further setbacks, and emotional trauma that might not be able to 
be overcome with months or years of future counseling. The move the children have been forced 
to endure, is only temporary at best, because the Petitioner does not have employment or housing 
available to her without public or private assistance, and thus will have to once again uproot the 
children and their lives only to move again and possibly face all the trauma again. Therefore, once 
again violating the Best Interests of the Children presumption that needs to garner each court 
action. A Parenting Plan, as also required by State Statute has not been prepared, or filed by the 
Petitioner, thus leaving so much about the children's future unresolved, for all of the concerned 
parties; the children and the parents and Grandparents, and their counsel(s), and thus an 
agreement has not been able to be worked out from the party's prior court action of August 3, 
2005. The prior and current standing (baring this Appealed ruling) Order of the District Trial 
Court is that the children were NOT to be moved away and in the event that the Petitioner wishes 
to move on her own out of state, then the Respondent is to move into the party's marital home 
with the children. The Respondent has thus taken occupancy of such, but has not been allowed to 
do so with the children. Since there is a dire need to have the party's financial matters resolved, 
as to what party is to pay for the Mortgage, and such urgent repairs on the home, such appeal 
would also assist in that determination as well. Both party's were under extreme financial 
hardship prior to the Petitioner voluntarily terminating her employment and moving out of state 
without any gainful or comparable employment. Thus, the Petitioner faces the possibility of 
becoming homeless and destitute except for the kindness of others she may gain assistance from. 
To have such living conditions to be placed upon the children will thus cause further hardship and 
economic loss for the children. The Respondent, on the other hand has an enjoyable and proper 
home for the children to reside in that they previously strongly wanted to stay in. Such living 
conditions would avail themselves to each child having her own bedroom, privacy, and such. 
With the current living conditions that the Petitioner is living in, on or two of the people are 
forced to sleeping on the floor in the living room, and other such inappropriate existence. 
THEREFORE, the court's expeditious treatment of this appeal would further the Best Interests of 
the Children and facilitate the termination of further litigation. 
F. The Utah as well as U.S. Supreme Courts both have ruled that where a Specific Statute grants 
one right to an individual over another individual, that strict compliance with that Statute must be 
adhered to. Additionally, it has been ruled that when notice is required as in the case of the words 
"SHALL", there leave very little room for deviation from that directive in its entirety. Utah 
Higher Courts have historically ruled that if required notice is not proper, complete, and specific 
to the Statute it was predicated to abide with, then such notice is invalid, therefore such must be 
perfected before it can be considered valid notice. For this reason, the Notice provided the 
Respondent by the Petitioner in not valid, and thus the children should be returned to the State of 
Utah until such time that Proper, complete Notice is provided to the Respondent as directed by 
State Statute, and the applicable hearings and facts can be presented for the Best Interests of the 
Children, and the children can once again return to the comfort, peace, and rights they enjoyed, 
and are entitled to, and that their schooling and counseling or therapy can continue as well. 
Petitioner should also thus be found in contempt, as well as in violation of restricting and 
preventing the children's school attendance or access to their counsel for such lengthy period of 
time. The children should be returned post haste to the State of Utah, so that they are not 
defaulted to endure the emotional and physical trauma they are embroiled in while the Court takes 
it's time to process, and hear this appeal, and the subsequently related Trial Court matters. 
Additionally, based upon the direction of the Administrative Office of the Court, this Request to Appeal 
is also filed in order to appeal a ruling of the court within the stipulated time allowed to appeal such court 
action, so that later an appeal is NOT dis-allowed because of the deadline for such had passed. 
Therefore, Respondent asks the court to allow an Interlocutory Appeal to proceed immediately either 
presented by Respondent, or compel Respondent's Counsel hence continue what she was compelled to 
represent by the Trial Court Judge in the September 30, 2005 telephone conference of the court, and 
subsequent October 6, 2005 hearing, so that Justice might be allowed to happen, and the appropriate 
matters are heard properly. 
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Time is of the essence. 
The children need the court's prompt intervention for their welfare, and well being, and preservation of 
their rights. 
Further delay of correcting this error of the court further impinges upon the rights of the children, as well 
as impinges or violates the rights of the Respondent, and thus opens this case up to unjust influence or 
biased because of the amount of time that may pass before its resolution. 
Respondent asks the court to either require the immediate return to the State of Utah, the affected 
children in this matter until such time as this appeal is properly presented to the court. 
It is further important to Require the children to be returned to the State of Utah to guarantee the proper 
treatment and safety of the children involved. 
Additionally, the court is asked to expedite this appeal so that the children's welfare, and rights can be 
assured, and so that the lengthy time for the Court to correct the error of the court can not be used as a 
defense against the correcting of the egregious Court error. So often it has been expressed by others in 
the court, that "since the children have been removed from their comfort zone and familiar surroundings, 
that they should not be disturbed". This line of thought is serves as a catalyst to violate the rights of both 
the Children, and the rights of the Respondent. This is true, in either case of the court committing error; 
either plain, or harmless. 
The children continue to express disdain for having to be inflicted on being taken away, and forced to 
endure that which they should not have to endure, while the court fits their matter into a time line. 
The children have been forcibly taken out of their school as of September 27, 2005, and have NOT yet 
been re-enrolled in school, and have NOT been attending school all this time, even though the school 
district of which they have been taken to is currently in session. The children have been caused to miss an 
entire V4 of a year of school thus far because of the error of the court. State DCFS investigators have 
refused to engage themselves in any investigation of the abuse the children were forced to endure prior to 
being taken from the State, because in their words, " the children are in California now, and we do not 
investigate in California". California CPS (Child Protective Services) are not willing to investigate any 
abuse of the children for events that happened prior to the children being taken to California. The longer 
this matter is delayed, the more distant any of the facts get taken away from the time they occurred, thus 
preventing any serious investigation by any State's agencies. Being kept out of school this long in itself 
does not serve the Best Interests of the Children. 
The Respondent has also not been afforded any type of visitation schedule or otherwise, thus further 
violating State Statute, and denying the children, and Respondent of such valuable visitation time 
together. 
Additionally, until the children are returned to the state of Utah, the children are unable to obtain proper 
representation on their interests or important matters while they are in California, and unable to seek, or 
communicate with Counsel in Utah. The children also report they are not able to enjoy unrestricted E-
mail or telephone privileges now they are living out of State, thus further limiting their ability to 
communicate with counsel and maintain confidentiality needed. 
With the volumes of previously decided issues, and the overlying requirement that all matters are to be 
decided in the best interests of the children, there should not be any further delay in this matter. Trial 
Court has not held a hearing on, or even allowed evidence to be presented as to what is in the Best 
Interests of the Children. Additionally, the standing Order of the Trial Court is that the children were to 
be retained here in Salt Lake City, Utah in the event that Petitioner wanted to move herself out of State. 
With that Order in place, and the neglect or abuse, and lack of professional services rendered to and in 
behalf of the children, it is hereby requested that the Court require the children to be returned to the State 
of Utah immediately, until such time that this appeal, and all relevant hearings and facts may be properly 
heard, and in the time line of the Court. Thus, the rights of the children, and the Respondent may thus be 
preserved for an equal opportunity to Justice, without the passage of time, and delay on the part of the 
Petitioner's responses, thus serving to improperly influence this matter. 
A Writ of Assistance in obtaining the children's return to the State of Utah, and re-enrolment into their 
respective schools is hereby requested most expeditiously of the Court by Respondent. 
See attached copy of the Order requiring the children to be retained here in Utah as noted above. 
Dated this day of Signed: 
Todd Stone 
Because of the numerous false and mis-leading statements presented by Petitioner or its counsel, in the 
submitted "PETITIONER'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL" that are drastically in need of correction, Respondent submits the following: 
1. The previous submission from Respondent was not an entire appeal, merely a request to appeal 
Respondent was directed to submit. Respondent has not been advised that Respondent's appeal was 
to be submitted until such time as Petitioners response to the request for permission to appeal was 
submitted or November 4, 2005 as stated by Court of Appeals Clerk on October 27, 2005. 
2. Respondent is fully prepared to present substantial support for the position of the Respondent thus 
appealing the matter currently before the Court of Appeals, and is just waiting to be advised that 
permission to appeal is granted. 
3. There are numerous cases involving both the Utah Courts, as well as the United States Supreme 
Court also justifying why this appeal is pertinent and valid. If a Request For Permission to Appeal, is 
to be where Respondent presents the entire case, then Respondent respectfully asks what is left to 
present when the Court grants permission for the Respondent to appeal?. 
4. Respondent respectfully asks for notification that the Appeal can advance to the next step of 
presenting the appeal itself. 
5. Petitioner states that Respondent failed to present clearly what the Statutes says applicable to the 
determinative issue, yet the word "SHALL" is used eleven (11) times and leaves little room for any 
other directive in the mere 10 short verses of Statute as included. If Petitioner is objecting to full 
disclosure of the specific Statute, it seems to be contrary to the Petitioner's original argument, and 
that is strict compliance to State Statute is not necessary for the court to act upon. This double 
standard the Petitioner wishes to invoke seems contrary to Justice, and just serves to favor the 
Petitioner as they desire for their own motives. 
6. If the Appeals Court needs a copy of the specific Statute related to this appeal just for consideration 
of granting permission to appeal, such is included as Exhibit A. 
7. Contrary to Petitioners submission, the Order of the lower court DOES materially affect the 
substantial rights of the Respondent, and violates the "Best Interest of the Child" presumption, and 
violates the rights of the children involved, and also the act of inappropriate relocation alone allows 
great distance to be placed between the parties (Geographical proximity), that itself would not allow 
Respondent's rights in consideration of Statute 30-3-10.2.1, 2(a-j), 3, 5. included as Exhibit B. 
8. CONTRARY TO Petitioners comments, the matter HAS NOT been resolved in the Lower Court. 
The August 3, 2005 hearing referred to did not resolve ".. .al but ministerial acts..." as Petitioner 
suggests. Petitioner's Counsel himself entered into an invalid, unenforceable agreement, and no 
Order has been signed or agreed to by either of the parties. The Petitioner's Counsel himself 
invalidated any agreement specifically by involving outside parties to be questioned by the Court 
without their representation, and agreed that there was no agreement "if he did not get his money...", 
but that had specifically been stated on the record that he was not to have "his money". Therefore 
what was agreed to in any stretch of the imagination was that there was NO AGREEMENT. 
9. Additionally, in the August 3, 2005 hearing Petitioner refers to there was no Visitation determination, 
or any other aspect required of the Relocation Statute in question in this appeal. 
10. Petitioner's Statement of facts is flawed in that: 
a. Parent time was neither presented nor agreed to by either party. 
b. According to Petitioners correspondence to the Court in objection to the August 3, 2005 
hearing that such correspondence dated September 7, 2005 the Question of the 
Petitioner's relocation was still not formally indicated when in the Petitioners 
correspondence to the Court, the Petitioner still maintains the association of "...If the 
Petitioner moves..." Therefore still not having provided notice of the move in question. 
c. Additionally, in the October 6, 2005 hearing, the Honorable Judge Medley stated on the 
record that the "if possible" aspect of the statute was still applicable, because it WAS 
possible for the Petitioner to know and give ample notice of the pending relocation, thus 
Petitioner now attempts to flip the same point back for their ill contrived presentation of 
the facts in Petitioner's "emphasis added" statement. 
d. With respect to the Petitioner's comment about ".. .two days prior to the anticipated 
move...", The court previously refused to allow my objection and voice to be heard by the 
Court requesting a hearing on the facts and issues, because of the ineffective assistance or 
lack of involvement of Respondent's counsel as had Respondent previously requested and 
asked the Court to review. That is the other matter for this appeal, that of allowing it to 
advance Pro se, since Respondent's Counsel has not yet withdrawn, and yet refuses to 
perform needed service, 
e. Respondent received notice of the proposed relocation only on September 12, 2005, and 
the children were taken September 27, 2005, thus only 15 days between for Respondent to 
1. Ask Counsel to object and file the required papers with the court, and then wait for 
counsel's lack of response or action, then ask the court himself. There was no other way 
than "TWO days prior to the anticipated move" to get the honorable Judge Medley to 
review the facts of concern in this matter. 
f. The honorable Judge medley HAS NOT allowed or even conducted a hearing on the harm 
such move would inflict on the minor children, or IF the move was in the Best Interests of 
the Children. That explains why the Honorable Judge Medley did not see irreparable harm 
to the children, because he did not hear that. That same notion is like sweeping dirt under 
the rug so you do not have to look at it or clean it up. Such was the action of the 
Honorable judge Medley when he refused to even hear the matters on the Best Interests of 
the Children. 
g. In the Petitioner's "Statement of Facts", the Petitioner fails to point out that there were 
many letters both from the children and other concerned parties, that the children 
themselves pleaded for the Court or Judge to listen to their desires not to be moved away, 
or taken from their Father. Additionally, others communicated that moving the children 
away was not in the children's Best Interests, and yet the Honorable Judge Medley would 
not allow any of that to be presented, since his NARROW scope of the hearing was to 
address the notice of relocation. However when the Guardian ad litem addressed the 
court, the Honorable Judge Medley allowed them to spout off endlessly as to the Best 
Interests of the Children in her own personal view, and not the view of any of the 
professionals concerned for the children. Additionally, since Respondent's counsel was 
"not retained to represent Respondent on this matter", Respondent's counsel abstained 
from objecting to anything in the October 6, hearing. The Honorable Judge Medley issued 
a warning for the Respondent to not speak to the court unless through his counsel. 
Consequently, Respondent's right to object or preserve anything at trial was violated. 
h. Contrary to Petitioner's claim, Respondent DID object later that same day as allowed by 
the Honorable Judge Medley, but because Respondent was in court well throughout that 
day, and said Counsels demonstrated in action for the Respondent, the Respondent's 
objections might not have been communicated until such time as the Court grants 
Respondent to speak and represent himself amid the Counsel's withdrawal of 
representation. 
i. The Petition for Grandparent Visitation Petitioner refers to was filed AFTER the minor 
children, when informed they were moving, pleaded with their Grandmother *.. .isn't there 
anything you can do, or anyone that can help us since our Attorney (Guardian ad litem) 
has not done anything to help us... Mom said it was O.K when we told her we wanted to 
stay with Dad". The Grandmother wants to be involved with the children and help them in 
any way she can, and will do what she can to help the children and improve their 
environment, lave, and care, and safety. The children want their Grandmother involved in 
their life as well. When the children returned from visitation around September 26, 2005, 
they found their belongings and furniture had been packed and was on its way to 
California. The children are devastated, and have been pleading for help. 
j . Petitioner failed to recognize that the children's Guardian ad litem that was more familiar 
with the case, and was well aware of the findings of the Custody Evaluator in the Pre-Trial 
conference that recommended the children NOT be moved away was also strongly 
opposed to any move. In the short time since, the children have been pushed off onto 
three (3) other Guardians ad litem. The current Guardian ad Litem was not fully apprised 
of the desires, or needs of the children, nor had the guardian ad litem considered ALL of 
the children in her "support" of the move as Petitioner claims was the case. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that the permission for this appeal to be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 2005. 
Signed: 
Todd Stone - Respondent 
Exhibit A. 
30-3-37. Relocation. 
(1) When either parent decides to move from 
the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the 
residence specified in the court's decree, that parent 
shall provide if possible 60 days advance written 
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. 
The written notice of relocation shall contain 
statements affirming the following: 
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection 
(5) or a schedule approved by both parties will be 
followed; and 
(b) neither parent will interfere with the 
other's parental rights pursuant to court ordered 
parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by 
both parties. 
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or 
upon the court's own motion, schedule a hearing with 
notice to review the notice of relocation and 
parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 
and make appropriate orders regarding the parent-time 
and costs for parent-time transportation. 
(3) In determining the parent-time schedule 
and allocating the transportation costs, the court 
shall consider: 
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both 
parents in exercising parent-time; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; 
and 
(d) other factors the court considers 
necessary and relevant. 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court 
may order the parent intending to move to pay the 
costs of transportation for: 
(a) at least one visit per year with the other 
parent; and 
(b) any number of additional visits as 
determined equitable by the court. 
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, 
upon the relocation of one of the parties the 
following schedule shall be the minimum requirements 
for parent-time with a school-age child: 
(a) in years ending in an odd number, the 
child shall spend the following holidays with the 
noncustodial parent: 
(i) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
until Sunday; and 
(ii) the fall school break, if applicable, 
beginning the last day of school before the holiday 
until the day before school resumes; 
(b) in years ending in an even number, the 
child shall spend the following holidays with the 
noncustodial parent: 
(i) the entire winter school break period; and 
(ii) Spring break beginning the last day of 
school before the holiday until the day before school 
resumes; and 
(c) extended parent-time equal to 1/2 of the 
summer or off-track time for consecutive weeks. The 
week before school begins may not be counted as part 
of the summer period. 
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court 
may order uninterrupted parent-time with the 
noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during 
extended parent-time, unless the court finds it is not 
in the best interests of the child. If the court 
orders uninterrupted parent-time during a period not 
covered by this section, it shall specify in its order 
which parent is responsible for the child's travel 
expenses. 
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the 
relocating party shall be responsible for all the 
child's travel expenses relating to Subsections (5) (a) 
and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel expenses 
relating to Subsection (5) (c) , provided the 
noncustodial party is current on all support 
obligations. If the noncustodial party has been found 
in contempt for not being current on all support 
obligations, he shall be responsible for all of the 
child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless 
the court rules otherwise. Reimbursement by either 
responsible party to the other for the child's travel 
expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of 
documents detailing those expenses. 
(8) The court may apply this provision to any 
preexisting decree of divorce. 
(9) Any action under this section may be set 
for an expedited hearing. 
(10) A parent who fails to comply with the 
notice of relocation in Subsection (1) shall be in 
contempt of the court's order. 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2003 General Session 
Exhibit B 
30-3-10.2. Joint custody order — Factors for 
court determination — Public assistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or 
joint physical custody or both if one or both parents 
have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 
30-3-10.8 and it determines that joint legal custody 
or joint physical custody or both is in the best 
interest of the child. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest 
of a child will be served by ordering joint legal or 
physical custody, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child will 
benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first 
priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of 
encouraging and accepting a positive relationship 
between the child and the other parent, including the 
sharing of love, affection, and contact between the 
child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in 
raising the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of 
the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child 
is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to 
form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or 
physical custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their 
willingness and ability to protect the child from 
conflict that may arise between the parents; 
(h) the past and present ability of the 
parents to cooperate with each other and make 
decisions jointly; 
(i) any history of, or potential for, child 
abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and 
(j) any other factors the court finds 
relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of 
the child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that 
an order for joint physical custody may preclude 
eligibility for cash assistance provided under Title 
35A, Chapter 3, Employment Support Act. 
(5) The court may order that where possible 
the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a 
dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement 
or modification of the terms and conditions of the 
order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody 
through litigation, except in emergency situations 
requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
Amended by Chapter 142, 2005 General Session 
Certificate of Delivery 
I certify that on October , 2005 I caused a copy of this document to be delivered to the following: 
Third District Court's applicable Clerk as well as other involved parties: 
Mary Corporon 
Paul J. Morken 
Brent Chipman 
Sharon Kishner 
405 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6925 Union Park Center, suite #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
215 South State Street, suite #1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this day of Signed: 
Todd Stone 
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ADDENDUM f*2-
-following-
Good cause appearing, now therelore, the court makes and enters the 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were bona fide and actual residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action on June 21, 
2001. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married on June 12, 1987 in 
Oakland, Alameda County, California. 
3. During the marriage the parties maintained a matrimonial domicile in the state of 
Utah. 
4. During the marriage irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties 
making it impossible to continue in the marriage relationship. 
5. The parties have been separated since June 2001. 
6. Thej^have been three children born^s issue of the marriage, Bnttney, born, 
February 3, 1^90; Brooklynn, born November 22f, 1993; and Brylee, born March 19,1996. The 
Recommendation and Order on Temporary Matters from October 5, 2001 aw^raed Petitioner the 
Zorary primary legal and physical custody of the minor childrep^ubject to Respondent's 5 of visitation as agreed/tfy the parties, and at a mimmup^visitation pursuant to §30-3-35 
and §30-3-35.5, U^an Code Annotated, excppt as the parties otherwise agree. 
2 
7. The provisions of the Temporary Orders entered herein should remain in 
"effecr 
8. Re^bndent shouldnav Petitioner/the sum of $789(00 per month /as 
temporary bast child support. 
9. Respondent/should pay Petitioner the sum/6f $200.00 per/fionth as 
temporary alimony. 
10. All other issues in the pending litigation should be reserved. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the marriage and personal 
jurisdiction over the parties in this matter. 
2. During the courts of the marriage irreconcilable differences arose making 
the continuation of the marriage impossible. 
3. Petitioner is entitled to a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and absolute upon signing and entry 
in the register of actions. 
4. The Judgment and Bifurcated Decree of Divorce should be entered in 
accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
286556J 
APPROVED this SL^yofJjfkt 2003. 
T. Patrick Castep: 
Domestic Relations Comijiissioiier J 
DATED this / / day of 
BY THE COURT: 
2003. 
[t^YQWt E. Medley ^ 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Todd L. Stone 
Respondent 
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Tab 18 
Brent R. Chipman #0626 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
215 South State Street, 12lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
JOANNE L. STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L. STONE, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Civil No. 014903317 CA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
-ooOoo-
Pursuant to the Minute Entry of the Commissioner dated March 7, 2006, Brent R. 
Chipman, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am counsel for the Petitioner. 
304282 1 
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ADDENDUM 
ise No: 014903655 
ite: Dec 06, 2004 
valuator to evaluate that particular issue is denied. Respondent 
3 entitled to hire an expert if that is what he chooses to do. If 
Bspondent intends to spend money on another expert 
Defore paying the custody evaluator. he runs the risk of having 
le Judge disregard what the expert has to say; 
5. The Commissioner will not change the order with respect to 
aycare as long as respondent is not being required to pay for the 
aycare; 
7. The parties should handle the property issue as read into the 
ecord; 
8. The petitioner's request for attorney!s fees is denied; 
Mr. Findlay is to prepare and submit the appropriate order. 
Page 2 (last) 
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ADDENDUM 
^ 
Simula; f I 
C / S E R V I C E S \m——m—am—J 
September 29, 2003 
Mr. Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Dear Mr. Stone, 
I am responding to your request of September 24, 2003 to meet with LDS Family Services 
therapist(s) and discuss issues pertaining to assistance provided your children. Your ex-spouse 
has written the agency and denied access to sharing any information. 
We are unable to meet your request at this time. 
Sincerely, 
Mark H. Glade 
Director 
MHG/je 
cc: David Hardy 
U T A H S A N D Y A G E N C Y 
! 
S E R V I C E S 
3 February 2004 
Mr. Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Dear Mr. Stone, 
I am responding to your request of February 2, 2004. Your estranged spouse has re-
iterated her request that you not be involved in the children's counseling process. 
We are unable to assist you further at this time. 
Sincerely, 
Mark H Glade 
Agency Director 
Cc- David Hardy 
U T A H S A N D Y A G E N C Y 
625 EAST 8400 SOUTH SANDY UTAH RAmn o n e 
Dear Mr. Hardy, 
I am writing to you in an effort to express my desires to be involved in the 
counseling of our children and in our children's lives as any caring, loving, 
compassionate, interested, and involved Father would want to be. I do deeply love 
our children, and have never wanted to or attempted to shirk the responsibility I 
have to them. I am afraid there is a mis-understanding as to my motives. I am not 
attempting to be involved in the counseling of our children for anything but to help 
them heal properly, and to help mend any ill feelings (if any) they may have toward 
me, and to strengthen our relationship we share and to empower or strengthen them as 
individuals as well. I am also writing to ask for your written response on this 
matter, and the children's counselor's feelings on this same matter. 
I know the children are experiencing difficult times in their life and I also know 
what it is like to grow up without a Dad actively involved in your life. I am well 
of the emotions that both My Wife, and myself are both feeling as we are dealing with 
a divorce. I want to try and prevent the children's Father from being taken out of 
the children's lives. 
I feel I am a tender, kind, loving Father, and I do deeply loves all three of our 
children. I am torn in my heart and mind to be forced to observe from a distance our 
children in trauma and are hurting; and I am not able to do everything in my power to 
soften or remove that confusion, hurt, trouble, and worry in the lives of our 
children. 
I do not think my desires and request to be actively involved in the children's 
counseling is out of line given our previous court hearings and discussions along 
with the enclosed copy of a minute entry from a recent hearing that was held 
involving this very matter. 
I draw your attention to the Minute Entry from the June 23, 2003 Hearing held before 
Commissioner Casey of the Third District Court. (A reproduction of such is provided 
here and noted as Exhibit A) In that hearing, Commissioner Casey ruled as noted in 
item # 5 of that Minute Entry, that: All of the children are to be in counseling - -
- {it is} the Therapist (who) will determine when either parent is to be involved {in 
the counseling of the children). (Emphasis and bracketed text added) 
I felt this was important to bring to your attention whereas, it was the 
understanding of Mark Glade, of L.D.S. Family Services that it was the Children's 
Mother that dictated that I was not to be allowed to participate in the children's 
counseling even though I am their Father. I do not think that Mr.Glade's 
understanding complies with this court ruling. I do greatly appreciate Mr. Glades 
compassion and understanding he extended to me in regards to my plight, and my desire 
to be there in love and support of and for our children when he last spoke to me. 
I want you to know, that I feel very bad about the fact that our oldest Daughter is 
not currently joining the other two Daughters in visitation with me, and she 
belittles them for caring as they do for me. I do not know why, when we used to be 
such good friends as we once were, that there has developed such a chasm between us 
in the relationship she holds of me (or outwardly portrays such). I have tried to 
work with both my Bishop, and the Bishop of our children's Ward, in an attempt to 
mend the broken relationship that has developed between our Daughter and I. Both 
Bishops know me personally, as an individual, and as a Father. I think also they 
both know the intent of my spirit, and the hurt of my heart, and the desire to 
improve everything that I can with her. I know that there is some aspect 
contributing to this "drifting apart" of our relationship called "being thirteen" 
However, I suspect there is a lot more contributing to this than that alone. I 
suspect that my Wife has a strong influence upon her, and the ill feelings my Wife 
holds for me as she does seem to radiate through to our Daughter. It is my hope that 
the scales may be balanced as far as the truth and influence goes by way of 
counseling and therapy involvement. 
At the present time, it is my understanding that our oldest Daughter is not involved 
in any form of counseling as was ordered, and has not been for some long time now. 
In many ways this Daughter seems to be in charge and spinning out of control. In a 
recent class I attended with my Wife, I learned from her how our Daughter is also 
acting in such a way as causing problems with my Wife and our other two Daughters. I 
am very sad that I can not "be there in support" and stand as a united front in the 
ways of what is best for our Daughter by way of influence or direction upon our 
Daughter, through this turbulent period in each one's life. In many things I am 
sure, my Wife and I have the same goals and aspirations, and share the same 
frustrations, and want the same direction for our children. 
Additionally, if there are issues with me that the therapist wishes to work on with 
me and the children, I am more than happy to attempt to improve myself as a Father, 
as an individual, and as a ex-Husband, and as a single Dad with three kids in his 
life, and strengthening my relationship or association with. I do not want to be 
some clouded relationship from some distant time in a child's life. With this same 
thought, I do not want you to think that I present myself as without any problems. I 
am the first to admit if there is something I can improve upon for a better 
relationship with our children, then I will do so. I have, and will continue to seek 
training and direction on improved parenting. 
Additionally, if I am placing my future in the hands of a Custody Evaluator, I should 
be allowed to have the best relationship with our children to exist, rather than one 
that is tarnished with incidents of unresolved, or mis-informed, issues held by the 
children toward me, all because my Wife did not want such to be addressed in a proper 
therapy or counseling situation. 
I present to you also, that it is the teachings of the L.D.S. Church, that the Father 
is, (or should be) a central figure in the lives of his children, and I deeply wish 
to be there for our children. I have never wanted to avoid that responsibility, or 
position. I have always tried, and will continue to do my best, to be there for the 
children in any capacity I can, or am allowed. I have never been like some Fathers, 
and wanted to walk away from what all the title of Father carries with it. The 
Church also presents the Father is to be involved in the children's welfare, growth, 
development, and life, as well as to direct them in righteousness. In addition to the 
relationship with, and the role of, the Father; the teachings of the Church also 
include such individual traits, or character building blocks, as forgiveness, 
accountability and responsibility, humility, appreciation for and love toward 
another, and to foster good relationships with family, and an appreciation of your 
heritage, and a respect for your elders, and to honor one's parents, along with many 
other things that I feel are not allowed to take place if you do not know, trust, or 
understand the others involved in your life. I feel that much of that is either 
being overlooked, or not allowed to happen, and could be dealt with in a positive and 
constructive manner through involvement in or with the children's counseling or 
therapy. If L.D.S. Family Services purports to subscribe to the teachings of the 
L.D.S. Church, then they would also support it's teachings and Doctrine as to the 
important role or position the children's Father, or Grandparents in the lives of 
these children, and would not withhold them, or any of the children, from that role 
or involvement in either one's life. 
In this I do greatly apologize if I sound "preachy", as much as it is what I feel in 
ny heart any family relationship should be, or strive to be, if you love each other. 
[ want you to know most importantly of all, that I do love our children, and want to 
ielp them feel loved, and accepted, and cared for by both of their parents and each 
}f their family members, and their siblings. I am very sorry that much of what I 
speak about "should or could be" has been missing from our family for so long. My 
mly goal is to improve myself, and our children, and our family, however fractured 
)r unified it ends up to be. 
: ask again of L.D.S. Family Services via your representation of them, that I, the 
:hildren's Father be allowed to be involved with the counseling and therapy of the 
children. Additionally, I ask that the wishes of the Mother to exclude me from such 
:ounseling, therapy, and child development, be set aside by L.D.S Family Services in 
•rder to act in the best interest of the children, and to provide compliance with the 
>rder of the Court from the June 23, 2003 hearing on this and other matters. 
additionally, I present to you, that Amy Olsen, (the D.C.F.S. Case Manager involved 
n the case of the sexual abuse of these children that was committed over an 18 month 
eriod of time by Gordon Neeley, the baby tender); reported the children that do the 
best with healing from such trauma in their life are the children that have a wide 
spectrum of family (parents, siblings, extended family members, and others that the 
children feel comfortable and safe with) involved, and available to them, and that 
are aware of the difficulties the children face emotionally, and physically, and can 
support the children through this difficult and challenging time. Furthermore, Amy 
reported that there was no inappropriate conduct by the children's Father from the 
Mother's many allegations that Amy had investigated on behalf of the children. Each 
of those cases were "closed without merit", "unsubstantiated", "un-founded", and so 
forth. 
Additionally, Commissioner Casey admonished from the bench in a separate hearing, 
that there is no reason why the children's Father should be barred from being an 
integral part of the children's lives. Commissioner Casey also admonished liberal 
visitation afforded me as their Father since there was not any inappropriate conduct 
of the Father found by the Court. Commissioner Casey further recognized the need of 
a Father in the lives of the children. 
Additionally, the Protective Order spoke about in this Minute Entry (if it were still 
in effect), had a specific provision to allow both parents to be involved in family 
counseling. However, the Protective Order was dismissed in a hearing on the matter 
in Third District Court by Commissioner Casey. A minute entry of such is included as 
Exhibit B item # 1. Commissioner Casey also found as it related to the Protective 
Order being issued "...originally there was no need for the protection of the children, 
or their Mother from Mr. Stone;... that it {the obtaining of the Protective Order) was 
an attempt to gain personal advantage in the couple's Divorce action, and not for 
personal protection" (Bracketed Text added). 
I ask for your expeditious recommendation to Mark Glade with a copy to me promoting, 
and allowing my involvement with, and with all three Daughters either in individual 
and or collective counseling at L.D.S. Family Services, in order to work in resolving 
the issues at hand and that all three daughters should be in counseling of one form 
or another as per the Court's Order. 
Respectfully, 
Todd Stone 
(801) 651-1700 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Cc: Bishop Rick Glauser My Bishop 
Bishop Scott Buie via my Bishop if he thinks it appropriate 
Exhib i t A 
CASE NUMBER 014903655 Divorce/Annulment 
06-23-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion susanp 
Commissioner: T PATRICK CASEY 
Clerk: susanp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Petitioner(s): JOANNE L STONE 
Other Parties: ROBERT L STEELE 
Respondent(s): TODD L STONE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5-03 Tape Count: 9:07-10:27 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for a hearing regarding the 
respondent's motion for certification of emergency actions for the 
safety, well being and emotional stability for the children. The 
parties and counsel were present as listed above. 
After hearing argument, COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS (TPC) -
1. The present issue regarding daycare is moot; 
2. The children are NOT to have any contact with the Neeley's; 
3. The request with regard to DCFS. The parties and Guardian Ad 
Litem will need to address that issue with DCFS; 
A. The request to change custody is denied; 
5. All the children are to be in counseling. The Guardian Ad 
Litem is to sign-off and confirm whether the counselor is 
appropriate. The therapist will determine when either parent is to 
be involved; 
6. The claim with respect to the daycare providers should be 
addressed in a separate lawsuit; 
7. Petitioner can retrieve the children's items from the 
Neeley's; 
8. The request with respect to the protective order is not 
appropriately before the court in this case, it needs to be dealt 
with in the protective order case; 
9. The personal property issues have been addressed in earlier orders; 
10. With respect to the request for transcripts. Respondent will 
need to file an affidavit of impecuniosity and then the 
Commissioner will determine if he is impecunious; 
11. The question of who provides the daycare will need to be 
addressed when the petitioner addresses reimbursement for daycare; 
Mr. Stone is to prepare and submit the appropriate order. 
Exhibit B 
CASE NUMBER 014903317 Cohabitant Abuse 
07-21-03 Case Disposition is Dismissed susanp 
Disposition Commissioner is T PATRICK CASEY susanp 
07-21-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Protective Order susanp 
Commissioner: T PATRICK CASEY 
Clerk: susanp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Attorney for the minor: ROBERT L STEELE 
Respondent(s): TODD STONE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 7-03 Tape Count: See m/e 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for a hearing regarding the 
respondent's motion to vacate the protective order. The respondent 
was present representing himself. Mr. Chipman was present 
representing the petitioner, who was not present and Mr. Steele was 
present representing the minor children. 
After hearing argument, COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS (TPC) -
Argument tape count 9:15-9:57 Ruling tape count 10:42-11:21 
1. The protective order is dismissed without prejudice; 
2. A restraining order will enter in the divorce case, 014903655 
DA as follows: 
A) The parties are to limit their contact to telephone contact, 
written or third-party. They should not have face-to-face contact; 
B) The pick up and drop off provisions will remain; 
C) The parties are mutually restrained from bothering, annoying, 
or harassing each other; 
D) The parties are mutually restrained from entering the other 
party's residence or place of employment except any prearranged 
agreed upon entering into the residence to remove property. Each 
party should have a witness with them; 
E) Respondent's mother is allowed to pick up the children in lieu 
of the respondent. He should be doing the visiting not the 
grandma; 
F) If the parties accidentally encounter each other at a public 
place, they are to avoid each other as read into the record; 
Mr. Chipman 
exposed to domestic violence. 
Q. By the father? 
A. I informed them that the children had been 
exposed to domestic violence. I did not go into any 
specifics at all. 
Q. But you said that you're the mother and 
you're the custodian --
A." Yes. 
Q. — and they've been exposed to domestic 
violence? 
A. I did not say that the father had done 
anything. 
MR. RICHMAN: Off the record just a minute. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
Q. (BY MR. RICHMAN) We were given some 
documents to show what happened to $635 and $1,000 
after we were in court the first time. But I want to 
hear -- do you agree that you took $635? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell me how that came about so this 
record is clear on it and Ifm clear. 
A. We had received a check for $635 for rent on 
the condominium. 
Q. That's the one on Promenade? 
A. No, that is the one on Pintail. 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 106 
Depomax Reporting Services, Inr 
Tab 21 
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2. My father has in his possession the items belonging to me listed on Exhibit A 
attached hereto. 
3. I have made attempts to retrieve the listed personal property from my father, but 
my father has consistently refused to allow me to do so. 
DATED and signed this M l day of November, 2003. 
ITTNEYS#ONE ~" ' ~ BI 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this «r day of November, 2003. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
C JEFFREY THOMPSON 
^4(XH SOUTH 700 WEST # 500 
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84107 
JSj MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JUNE 13TH,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires* 
o 
z. 
fl COPY 
• ' » ' l 
ROBERT L. STEELE (#5546) 
Guardian ad Litem 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem 
450 South State Street, #W22 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 578-3962 
Facsimile: (801) 578-3965 
TltHOEY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
TODD STONE 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRITTNEY STONE 
Case No. 014903655 DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRITTNEY STONE, being first duly sworn, and upon her oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a minor child of the parties to this action. I have prepared this affidavit 
based upon personal knowledge. If called to testify in this matter I would testify 
as set forth herein. 
PROPERTY LIST OF BRTTTNEY STONE 
Clothing, &WJ*>U:v^-t>^ ( <- ^ 9 K £ P 
Games for the Gameboy [including Harry Potter, Stitch, and Stuart Little], 
Things made at Home Depot [mostly wood crafts], e , cj , 5kzfUn<3 £ d^iutwu1-. 
Movies [including Annie, Lion King(^ggie Taks^Little Mermaid, and the 
Little Toaster aeries, except for LittleToasfer Goestoltfar&l^^ r # 
Any toys or books still at the home, UI^UA\CwAt^ * pw-A r^r^ 
Metal sewing scissors with name engraved on, and ^ H > A A#>r~f 
Green sewing machine. < ^ j ^ ^ _ w ^ ^ l . ^ A^1^-» A-^^7 <SM/v\ ^y^i\i u^V 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GO CO 2003-l3^#(OPEN/ACTIVE) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Related text page(s) 
Document: INITIAL R/O 
Author: B92 - ROMERO, DANIELLE C 
Todd Stone requested telephone contact to report his soon-to-be ex-wife, 
Joanne stone came to his mother's home and had a verbal confrontation with 
him. 
Todd said Joanne was demanding property from him, and she was telling 
him that he was a horrible father to his daughter. Todd said, his two other 
children were present and heard their mother yelling. 
Todd said nothing physical had occurred but requested documentation due 
to a civil restraining order Joanne still has in place. 
Todd said his mother, ^ H B H H f l B H H M h a d witnessed the verbal 
altercation. 
Case Status:Closed Report Concluded 
** END OF HARDCOPY ** 
For B7635 Wednesday February 4, 2004 Page 3 of 3 
SALT L AKE tlttNTY SHERIFF 
m. CO ^^l^^-^mt^^^B. 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
General Offense Information 
Operational status: OPEN/ACTIVE 
Reported on Nov-22-2003 (Sat.) 2149 
Occurred on Nov-22-2003 (Sat.) 2100 
Report submitted by B92 - ROMERO, DANIELLE C 
Org unit: EAST PATROL DIVISION 
Located at 3747 S HILLSIDE LN 
Municipality : Salt Lake County Sheriffs Jurisdiction 
District: A Beat: 04 
Offenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense : #1 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES - COMPLETED 
Location: Residence/Home 
Suspect used : Not Applicable 
General Offense Information (cont'd) 
Bias : None (no bias) 
Gang involvement: None/Unknown 
Family violence: NO 
IBR Clearance status : Not Applicable 
Related Event(s) 
CP CO2003-135313 
COMPLAINT INFORMATION 
Incident Location 
Address : 3747 S HILLSIDE LN 
District: A Beat: 04 
General Information 
Case type : FAMILY FIGHT/DOMESTIC VIO 1075 DV50JPP90 Priority : 6 
TIME - Disp : 21:35:07 Enroute : 21:35:07 Clrd : 22:04:24 
How call received : TELEPHONE 
Complainant Information 
Name : DONE TODD 
Home Telephone : 801 277-9955 
Remarks : 
C STATES THAT HIS MOM EX WIFE AND HIMSELF GOT IN A VERBAL 
ALTERCATION...STATES THAT THE SUS HAS LEFT NOW BUT THAT HE 
WANTS TO REPORT IT...BY PHONE ON CELL 6511700 
Clearance Information 
Final Case type : PUB ORDER - CIVIL CASES 
Report expected : YES Founded : YES 
Cleared by : FIRST REPORT(COUNTY) 
Reporting Officer 1 : B92 - ROMERO, DANIELLE C 
For: B7635 Wednesday February 4, 2004 Page: 1 of 3 
Todd Stone Defendant Pro Se 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 277-9955 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Joanne Stone 
Plaintiff 
-V-
Todd Stone 
Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S TWO 
MOTIONS 
Civil Case #014903655 DA 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey Lewis 
Guardian ad Litem Robert Steel has requested the issue of Brittney Stone's property be heard at trial, 
after it was Mr. Steele himself that facilitated the return of the property when it was given to his office 
directly, (four boxes brought in directly to his waiting room on or around early 2004). Bob Steele also 
commented that Brittney Stone's face lit up as she was told of the stuff that was there for her to pick up. 
So if the stuff I provided Mr. Steel, is now not having been given to Brittney by Mr. Steel, then it should 
be returned by him. 
More importantly, however, it is important to note that Brittney Stone has been allowed to have the 
assistance of her own counsel, however, the other minor children attempted to obtain their own counsel 
because of Bob Steele's own inaction or lack of concern for them, and Bob Steel was able to get such 
assistance and representation for the children squashed, because it would reveal that Bob Steele was not 
acting in the best interest of the children, or was not representing them and their needs or wishes, only the 
wishes of Brittney Stone. 
The outside counsel that has assisted Brittney Stone in this matter against Respondent Todd Stone, and 
his Mother Annabelle Stone, Brittney's Grandmother was also previously representing both Annabelle 
Stone, and assisted Respondent Todd Stone on other matters related to this case. Therefore, a definite 
disparity exists between ethical treatment of one's clients, and acting in the best interests of all the 
children. 
Additionally, this abuse of the legal system goes hand in hand together with the many other acts of trench 
warfare and abuse of the legal system for personal gain that has been noted as the Petitioners mode of 
operandi throughout this entire mess in the courts. 
It is interesting, that this matter was considered resolved for so long by all parties, until last week when I 
called Bob Steele a Feminist, as well as recognizing it in court, that he had not performed his duty of care 
and responsibility to serving the other children in this case, when they had made multiple requests for 
some things in their life far more important than an out grown item of clothing, or such that is so 
temporal, that is asked for in this related motion against Respondent. 
It is ironic, that when the children state they have been parties to, and witnesses of Domestic violence and 
bloody altercations of the children's Mother, as well as have made multiple requests of both their 
"Guardian ad Litem", the courts, and their ecleciastical authorities, to have someone intervene on their 
behalf to help to bring them some relief that they seek, and allow them to be with their Father more. That 
issue is somehow, neglected by the court appointed person given the charge to represent them, and their 
Best interests, and wishes. Failing to do so promulgates blocking anyone else who is interested in serving 
the children. 
Specific cases in point: 
1. Brooklynn, and Brylee Stone, both clients of the Guardian ad Litem's office had stated that 
they had wanted to be with their Father more frequently, and more. Bob Steele has not done 
anything in the courts to bring that about. The children have felt betrayed and let down not 
only by Bob Steele, but by the legal system that said they would help the kids, and that they 
have been taught stood for something right. Instead, Bob Steele expends countless amount of 
time and energy to facilitate and "bring to justice" the opportunity to reward the child Brittney 
Stone for steeling items not belonging to her, and also reinforcing the misconceived notion 
that Brittney thinks she is in charge of everyone else, and can run the show so to speak. 
2. When . the two minor giasbecause of his protection and one sided representation of the 
children and the issues, and now he orchastrates an opportunity to once again drag something 
like this back into and through the court system. Respondent has been chastized on 
occaisionmanso . re 
This was further noticed by the court appointed Child custody Evaluator ththe the ., and Bob S 's.An 
expedited hearing of this matter is requested in order to facilitate the health related needs of the children, 
and because of the novel new approach to the children's therapist is embarking on family counseling, a 
breech of such confidentiality of counseling issues might be occurring, and because of the lack of 
available funds in the future, and since there has not been the arena of mediation to resolve some aspects 
that are here presented, and to inform the parties in order to help avoid future financial devastation from 
occurring, and to circumvent current as well as future acts of trench warfare from being committed by the 
Petitioner against the Respondent, as has been so recognized in the past. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of February, 2005. 
Todd Stone Defendant Pro Se 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
appeared before me on the day of 
, with satisfactory evidence to prove to me his/her identity and signed this 
document in my presence and affirmed that he/she had read this document and understood its contents 
and that the contents were true to his/her personal knowledge. 
DATED this day of , . 
Notary Public /Deputy Clerk Signature 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF 
GO CO 2003-135313 (OPEN/ACTIVE) 7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIVIL CASES 
Related Person(s) 
Case Specific : Subject - 01 STONE, JOANNE 
Unknown FEMALE 
Ethnicity: Unknown 
Residing at, SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 
Reference Master Name Index 
STONE, JOANNE 
Unknown FEMALE 
Ethnicity: Unknown 
Linkage factors 
Resident status: Resident 
Case Specific : Complainant - 01 STONE, TODD 
Caucasian/White MALE 
Ethnicity : Unknown 
Born on Sep-02-1964 
Residing at 3747 S HILLSIDE LN , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84109-
Phone Numbers 
Home : (801)277-9955 
Reference Master Name Index 
STONE, TODD LUND 
Caucasian/White MALE 
Ethnicity : Unknown 
Born on Sep-02-1961 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Reference Master Name Index 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
For: B7635 Wednesday February 4, 2004 Page 2 of 3 
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Todd Stone 
2783 Melony Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah - Third District Court 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Motion for 4-903 (4) conference & 
Affidavit 
V. 
Todd Stone (Respondent) Case #: 014903655 
Commissioner: Casey 
Judge: Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Respondent attests to and Motions the Court the following: 
According to protocol regarding Custody Evaluations, the parties are to engage in a 4-903 settlement 
conference after the Custody Evaluator completes the Custody evaluation. 
Since the Custody Evaluator was required to re-interview the parties, and because of the passage of such 
great amount of time, and the recent revelation that the Petitioner obtained the Custody Evaluation and 
report under fraudulent circumstances, and since so many new people are now involved in these issues, 
the Respondent contends that the Custody Evaluation had been compromised, and the facts have not 
been made known to the Evaluator. 
The Custody Evaluator also recommended or directed in the parties pre-trial conference that Brittney and 
the Respondent should engage in, and be involved in ongoing or continuing family counseling to repair 
the troubled relationship Brittney expressed about the Respondent. The Custody Evaluator understood 
the importance of, and a need for a child and Father relationship. 
The Respondent has not been allowed to be involved in the ongoing counseling of the children. The 
Petitioner has prevented that from happening. 
Additionally, the Custody Evaluator also advised the court that other activities regarding the children's 
counseling and mending the troubled child's relationship was needing to be allowed the opportunity to 
mend prior to the finalization of these proceedings. Such information that such counseling and 
communication was not allowed to happen, or that the Petitioner had prevented such from happening. 
The Custody Evaluator was misled to believe such had occurred, and the relationship was beyond further 
attention. 
Additionally, the Custody Evaluator was not afforded the opportunity to re-interview the minor children 
while under the Respondent's care. Such an equal treatment is standard practice to be apprised of both 
parents relationship with the children. 
Additionally, the Custody Evaluator reported little credibility on the Respondent's claim of the Petitioners 
immoral or inappropriate tendencies, yet, the perceived actions have happened, thus supporting, rather 
than downplaying the Respondent's claims. The Respondent should not be penalized in the report, for 
the truth that has come to be revealed in the court. 
Additionally, the Custody Evaluator was never provided a Parenting plan as required by State Statute, 
and the Parenting representations made by the Petitioner were an act to mislead the Evaluator, rather than 
a full disclosure of the intentions of failing to act in the Best Interests of the children by the Petitioner. 
Additionally, the Custody Evaluator was uninformed as to the Petitioner's requirement in court that the 
Respondent loose his rights to one of the party's children. 
It has just been revealed that the minor children's counselor was not properly informed as to what 
counseling was to take place with the minor children prior to the finalization of these matters as the 
Custody Evaluator saw the importance of happening. 
Lonnie Taholo informed the Respondent that Brittney had told her that there was only to be one 
counseling session so that Brittney could tell her Father how much she disliked him. this was not the 
case, there was to be ongoing counseling to solve the problems and deal with them properly and develop 
workable solutions or plan for repair of the relationship. 
Respondent feels that termination of the Respondent's right to be a Father to Brittney, as has been 
required by the Petitioner, and not wanted nor presented by the Respondent, should not be considered by 
the court, without the proper hearing to find such would be is in the Best Interests of the children (all of 
the children are thus affected or influenced by such denial of the Respondents rights). The Custody 
Evaluator was also not apprised of the Petitioner's requirement that the Respondent loose his rights as a 
Father to Brittney. 
The Petitioner has required that the Respondent be denied his rights to be a Father to Brittney as part of 
the "settlement". However, without proper family counseling and proper communication, it is 
undetermined how much of that requirement comes from the Petitioner, compared to how much of that 
stipulation is really in the Best interests of the child and other children, and how much of that requirement 
is from Brittney herself in her emotionally charged, adolescent, unaware of the consequences, mentality 
or state, or her merely hurt or disappointed in her own life feeling. 
Additional information just recently revealed about the children's sexual abuse actually admitted to 
having happened, have significant bearing on the Custody Evaluators information that might have been 
provided to him prior to the preparation of his report. The Respondent had expressed his concern over 
>uch harmful events on the children Yet, the Custody Evaluator failed to investigate such happening. 
Once it was admitted by one of the minor children, and the Guardian ad litem failed to present the 
evidence to the court or the Custody Evaluator, it causes suspicion as to the independence or 
completeness of the information provided to the Custody Evaluator. 
This additionally supports reason to have greater communication and directive from the Custody 
Evaluator and court rather than the one incomplete report of the Custody Evaluator. This also causes 
concern that since it is proven that the Petitioner refused to properly deal with the prior sexual abuse or 
molestation of the children by the Petitioner's friend, or admit that it happened, and failed to protect the 
minor children from such traumatic offense against them, it is suspect that the Petitioner will disclose all 
of the facts to the children's counselor, that might not be favorable to the Petitioner. Additionally, since 
the Guardian ad litem has failed to act on the child's admission to the Guardian and counselor, that such 
abuse did actually occur, or was inflicted upon her by the Petitioner's friend. 
Additionally, the Respondent suspects the troubled child that has made false threats against the 
Respondent, will not be allowed to be properly dealt with. This is additionally supported by the troubled 
child's statement in hostility to ward her mother, ".. I will tell them things to get you in trouble like I did 
with Dad". Neither does the Respondent feel that without the Respondent being able to either discuss 
with the troubled child, and with the children's counselors, the threat of death upon the Respondent by 
the troubled child will not be properly dealt with either, and the Petitioner can continue to benefit from 
the Respondent not being involved in settling the troubling issues the child is facing, or demonstrates. 
Additionally, the Respondent feels that the threat to kill the other children's pets if they did not say or tell 
what they were told to say", will also not be properly presented to the children's counselor(s) or 
therapists. 
Additionally, the Respondent feels the effects the poster on the children, as well as the poster itself, that 
Petitioner allowed to be displayed in the marital home with derogatory comments, and threats against the 
Respondent, and written on by the Petitioner and other family members of the household. Such facts will 
not be presented for the counselor to appropriately deal with. 
The Custody Evaluator as indicated in the attached letter, has refused to meet with the Respondent 
without an order from the court. 
The Custody Evaluator was improperly informed that the custody Evaluation was to be closed, or 
discontinued, and the funds paid to the Evaluator were returned only to the Petitioner, not to the 
Respondent. 
The Custody Evaluator was ill informed as to what party was to pay what amount, and who was to pay 
for the report when in fact this Custody Evaluation was ordered prior to the change, or retroactive 
effective date of the new requirement regarding Custody Evaluations. 
Parent time issues were ordered to be mediated, yet the Guardian ad litem has caused the mediation of 
the parent time issues to be blocked or canceled. 
With the recent revelation of the fact that the minor children were intimidated, and threatened as to what 
to tell the Custody Evaluator on his Re-interview, supports a new Evaluation of the children under these 
new circumstances and free from the person intimidating or threatening them. 
When the Custody Evaluator was informed of the children's threats, the Custody Evaluator requested the 
court or counsel to request and organize a proper meeting to address the issue. Such meeting or order or 
directive has not happened, instead, the Petitioner advises the Custody Evaluator that his services were 
no longer needed. This manipulation of the investigative process by the Petitioner itself invalidates the 
independence, or completeness of the Custody Report. 
The Custody Evaluator also was willing to learn from the findings of other professionals engaged by the 
parties in this matter, yet the court refused such other professionals involvement because of the poverty 
level of the Respondent. 
With the children taken out of state, the Department of Family Services is unable to investigate the 
children's abuse, nor able to report the facts to the Custody Evaluator. 
Recent revelations of facts also show the years of abuse the children were subject to by the Petitioner, yet 
the Custody Evaluator was not allowed to be provided that information. 
In the parties pre trial conference with the Custody Evaluator, Dr. Davies stated that he was well aware 
of the influence the Petitioner had forced onto Brittney. Dr. Davies went on to say that his speaking with 
Brittney was ".. .more like speaking with (the Petitioner), instead of the normal issues a 13 or 14 year old 
girl would discuss about their dad". Dr. Davies went on to use the word how Brittney was rote reciting 
the issues presented by the Petitioner. Dr. Davies also reported how he noted a distinct difference in the 
children's personalities, and behavior when with their Father, compared to when the children were with 
their Mother. With such noted difference, it shows that the Custody Evaluator realized the importance to 
interview the children twice once while with the Father, and once while with the Mother. 
The custody evaluator never was allowed to re-interview the children while they were with their Father. 
Such lack of equity poses the opportunity for the Custody Evaluator not to be fully informed as to the 
benefits of the children remaining involved with their Father, and thus the report is not free from bias 
since it was prepared without the Re-interview of the children while they were with their Father. The 
children had reported they feel safe with their Father. The possible reason they felt safe, and more open 
to speak the truth, was that the one who threatened them was not with them, or accompanying them 
when they were with their Father, since Brittney did not visit their Father with them, but did accompany 
the minor children when their Mother took them to their re-interview. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent motions the Court for the needed and proper relief, to ensure the 
Custody Evaluator is properly informed and order after a equally impartial re-interview with the children, 
and the Respondent, a per-trial conference (4-904 or 4-903 conference as referred to in court records). 
THEREFORE, the Respondent motions the Court to so Order that after the Custody Evaluator has 
afforded the minor children and Respondent an updated re-interview, and settlement conference or pre-
trial conference, the Report be corrected and then resubmitted. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent motions the Court for the costs of all the appropriate expenses for the 
above order to be implemented be paid by the Petitioner, along with applicable attorney fees. 
Dated this day of December, 2005. Signed: 
Todd Stone Pro Se 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) appeared before me on the 
day of , with satisfactory evidence to prove to me his/her identity and signed this document 
in my presence and affirmed that he/she had read this document and understood its contents and that the contents were true 
to his/her personal knowledge. 
DATED this day of , . 
Notary Public /Deputy Clerk Signature 
Certificate of Delivery 
I certify that on December , 2005 I caused a copy of this document to be delivered to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 6925 Union Park Center, suite #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Brent Chipman 215 South State Street, suite # 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sharon Kishner 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Yahoo! My Yahoo! Mai! 
M A I I Welcome, joansybonesy 
M A I L [Sign Out, My Account] 
Search 
the web 
Mail Home - Help 
Mai l v Addresses ^ I Calendar ^ Notepad ^ joansybonesy@yahoo.com [Sign Out] 
g|S^k^ii|i ' Hit:! *„****»#&**#* ***** l iS Mail Upgrades - Mail Options 
Choose from 10 
Free Cell Phones 
Previous | Next | Back to Messages Print 
Folder [Add - Edit] I 
Inbox (37) 
Draft 
Sent 
Bulk (3) 
Trash 
My Folder 
I gary 
save 
[Empty] 
[Empty] 
[Hide] 
Your Credit Report, 
for Free. 
Free checking 
from Citibank 
Bad Credit? 
Refinance at 2.9% 
No Credit? Get 
a MasterCard 
This message is not f lagged. [ Flag Message - Mark as Unread ] 
From: "U-Pack Moving" <quotes@upack.com> f | | A d d to Address Book 
To: joansybonesy@yahoo.com 
CC: 
Subject: Moving ID RVJ1492724-A From U-Pack 
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2004 16:20:45 -0500 
Bill of Lading 
www.upack.com 
DRI 
PRO 
ABF U-Pack Moving Price Quote No. RVJ1492 
Shipper: 
Address: 
Phone: 
Origin 
JOANNE STONE 
2783 MELONY DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
801-913-4984 
Consignee: 
Address: 
Phone: 
Destina 
JOANNE 
24680 S 
HAYWAR 
510-783 
Trailer Spot Date: 10/07/2004 
ABF Origin Terminal # : 801-355-2030 
ABF Dest. Terminal # : 510-533-8575 
Estimated Transit Time: 2 
Pay Terms: COLLECT-CRED 
Estimated Weight: 8,512 
Pricing Summary for: 
PERSONAL EFFECTS 
Actual Linear 
Feet 
Price (based on 19 linear feet trailer space): 
Price per Additional Foot: $40 
28' Trailer Rate (not including optional services): 
Absolute Minimum Charge: 
* Optional services listed below not included in above price: 
Tab 24 
ADDENDUM V 
WELLS HOME 
FARGO MORTGAGE 
Weils Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. 
7495 New Horizon Way 
Frederick, MD 21703 
YourWellsFargoMortgage.com 
CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ACTIVITY STATEMENT 
2 BY 40F 
DATE 10/15/03 
PAGE 2 
DD L STONE 
\N NUMBER: 0013527452 
ACTIVITY FOR PERIOD 01/01/01 - 10/14/03 
DCESS DUE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION 
ATE DATE CODE DESCRIPTION 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF TRANSACTION 
TRANSACTION PRIN. PAID/ ESCROW PAID/ OTHER 
AMOUNT BALANCE INTEREST BALANCE AMOUNT CODE/DESCRIPTION 
-17-03 
1,102 
-14-03 
1, 096 
-13-03 
1,096. 
-06-03 
98. 
1-16-02 
1,096. 
.-13-02 
1,096. 
L-07-02 
1,792. 
3-15-02 
1,096. 
3-03-02 
632. 
9-16-02 
1,096. 
8-13-02 
1,096. 
7-15-02 
1,096. 
03-03 171 
12 235 
122,421 
02-03 171 
01 234 
122,656 
01-03 171 
01 233 
122,891 
00-00 307 
27- 0. 
12-02 171 
01 231 
123,124 
11-02 171 
01 230. 
123,356. 
11-02 312 
56- 0. 
10-02 171 
01 229. 
123,586. 
10-02 351 
00- 0. 
09-02 171 
01 228. 
123,816. 
08-02 171 
01 226. 
124,044. 
07-02 171 
01 225. 
124,271. 
PAYMENT 
68 664.39 
01 
PAYMENT 
41 665.66 
69 
PAYMENT 
15 666.92 
10 
ESCROW REFUND 
00 0.00 
202.05 
1010.21 
195.94 
808.16 
195.94 
612.22 
98.27-
416.28 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
PAYMENT 
89 668.18 195.94 
25 514.55 
PAYMENT 
64 669.43 195.94 
14 318.61 
COUNTY TAX DISBURSEMENT 
00 0.00 1792.56-
122.67 
PAYMENT 
40 670.67 195.94 
78 1915.23 
HAZARD INSURANCE DISBURSEMENT 
00 0.00 632.00-
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
1719.2 9 NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
PAYMENT 
16 671.91 
18 
PAYMENT 
93 673.14 
34 
PAYMENT 
71 674.36 
27 
195.94 
2351.29 
195.94 
2155.35 
195.94 
1959.41 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
WELLS MSiffiBf^^V. 
FARGO M ^ G A G E 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.' 
7495 New Horizon Way 
Frederick, MD 21703 
YourWellsFargoMortgage.com 
CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ACTIVITY STATEMENT 
EQ BY 4OF 
DATE 10/15/03 
PAGE 3 
ODD L STONE 
DAN NUMBER: 0013527452 
ACTIVITY FOR PERIOD 01/01/01 - 10/14/03 
JOCESS DUE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION 
DATE DATE CODE DESCRIPTION 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF TRANSACTION 
TRANSACTION PRIN. PAID/ ESCROW PAID/ OTHER 
AMOUNT BALANCE INTEREST BALANCE AMOUNT CODE/DESCRIPTION 
5-14-02 
1,096 
i-13-02 
1,096 
-15-02 
1,096 
-14-02 
1,096 
-13-02 
1, 151 
-15-02 
1,151 
-14-02 
61. 
-17-01 
1,151. 
-15-01 
1,151. 
•05-01 
1,771. 
16-01 
1,151, 
03-01 
580. 
06-02 171 
.01 224 
124,496 
05-02 171 
,01 223 
124,721 
04-02 171 
.01 222 
124,944 
03-02 171 
.01 220 
125,166 
02-02 171 
.91 219 
125,387 
01-02 171 
91 218 
125,607 
00-00 307 
82- 0 
12-01 172 
91 217 
125,825 
11-01 171 
91 216 
126,043 
11-01 312 
29- 0 
10-01 171 
91 215 
126,259 
10-01 351 
00- 0. 
PAYMENT 
.50 675.57 
.98 
PAYMENT 
.29 676.78 
.48 
PAYMENT 
.08 677.99 
.77 
PAYMENT 
.89 679.18 
.85 
PAYMENT 
.70 680.37 
.74 
PAYMENT 
.51 681.56 
.44 
ESCROW REFUND 
.00 0.00 
PAYMENT 
.34 682.73 
.95 
PAYMENT 
.16 683 
.29 
91 
195.94 
1763.47 
195 
1567 
94 
53 
195.94 
1371.59 
195 
1175 
251 
979 
94 
65 
84 
71 
251.84 
727.87 
61 
476 
251 
537 
82-
03 
84 
85 
251.84 
286.01 
COUNTY TAX DISBURSEMENT 
.00 0.00 
PAYMENT 
00 685.07 
45 
1771.29-
34 .17 
251.84 
1805.46 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
HAZARD INSURANCE DISBURSEMENT 
00 0.00 580.00-
1553.62 NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
WS1.LS HOME 
FARGO MORTGAGE 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. 
7495 New Horizon Way 
Frederick, MD 21703 
YourWellsFargoMortgage.com 
CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ACTIVITY STATEMENT 
2 BY 40F 
DATE 10/15/03 
PAGE 4 
DD L STONE 
AN NUMBER: 0013527452 
ACTIVITY FOR PERIOD 01/01/01 - 10/14/03 
OCESS DUE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION 
ATE DATE CODE DESCRIPTION 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF TRANSACTION 
TRANSACTION PRIN. PAID/ ESCROW PAID/ OTHER 
AMOUNT BALANCE INTEREST BALANCE AMOUNT CODE/DESCRIPTION 
-17-01 09-01 171 PAYMENT 
1,151.91 213.84 686.23 251.84 
126,474.45 2133.62 
1-15-01 08-01 171 PAYMENT 
1,151.91 212.69 687.38 251.84 
126,688.29 1881.78 
'-16-01 07-01 171 PAYMENT 
1,151.91 211.54 688.53 251.84 
126,900.98 1629.94 
5-30-01 06-01 170 
6,941.83 1,266.54 4,155.00 1520.29 
127,112.52 1378.10 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
NEW PRINCIPAL/ESCROW BALANCES 
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ADDENDUM j f ^ 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state The 
attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State 
Bar number A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state the 
party's address and telephone number Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, 
or other papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other paper, that to the best of his or her knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as 
defined in Rule 33 If a motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party If a motion, brief, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties The court may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to 
show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or person 
who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person 
allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court Any action to suspend 
or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and 
statutory contempt powers 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice An attorney who is licensed to practice before the bar of another state or a 
foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this state, may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant 
to the Code of Judicial Administration A separate motion is not required in the appellate court if the attorney has 
previously been admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall file in the appellate court a notice of 
appearance pro hac vice to that effect 
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ADDENDUM ff' 
VJ>Vl» I I I M I I I W M M I i . . w ^ , . . _ 
For the year Jan. 1-Oec. 31,2001, or other tax year beginning ,2001, ending ,20 0MB. No. 1545-0074 
Your first name and Initial 
JOANNE 
Last name 
STONE 
Your social security number 
561-71 -2760 
If a joint return, spouse's first name and initial Last name Spouse's social security number 
BtRS 
tee, H 
print E 
R 
E 
identia! 
ion Campaign 
page 19.) 
Home address 
2783 MELANY DRIVE 
City, town or post office, state, and ZIP code, ft you have a foreign address, see page 19. 
SALT LAKE CITY .. UT 84124 
Important! A 
You must enter 
your SSN(s) above. 
• 
Note. Checking "Yes" will not change your tax or reduce your refund. You Spouse 
Do you, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to go to this fund? • [ |Yes[x[No | |Yes[~]No 
ig Status 
;k only 
X)X. X 
Single 
Married filing joint return (even if only one had income) 
Married filing separate return. Enter spouse's SSN above, full name here. 
Head of household (with qualifying person). (See page 19.) 
enter this child's name here. • 
tf the qualifying person is a child but not your dependent, 
Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (year spouse died ). (See page 19.) 
mptions 6a Yourself, if your parent (or someone else) can claim you as a dependent on his or her 
tax return, do not check box 6a 
Spouse 
(1) Rrst name 
Dependents: 
Last name 
e than six 
idents, 
age 20. 
BRITTNEY STONE 
BROOKLYNN STONE 
BRYLEE STONE 
(2) Dependent's 
social security number 
529-99-1031PAUGHTER 
1647-18 -7824DAUGHTER 
647-3 0-2413DAUGHTER 
ome 
ich 
ms W-2 and 
ZG here. 
o attach 
m(s) 1099-R 
ix was 
hheld. 
DU did not 
a W-2, 
> page 21. 
Dlose, but do 
: attach, any 
^ment. Also, 
ase use 
rm 1040-V. 
P I Add numbers 
" entered on 
d Total number of exemptions claimed
 x Knesabove • 
$) Dependent's 
relationship to 
you 
(4) Check if 
IquaJtfyina child 
for child tax _ 
Icredit (see pg20j 
® 
m 
D 
D 
No. of boxes 
checked on 
6a and 6b 
No. of your 
children on 6c 
who: 
• fived with you 
• dki not five with 
you due to divorce 
or separation 
(see page 20) 
Dependents on 6c 
not entered above 
Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attach Forrn(s) W-2 
8a Taxable interest. Attach Schedule B if required 
b Tax-exempt interest Do not include on line 8a | 8b | 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15a 
16a 
17 
18 
19 
20a 
21 
Ordinary dividends. Attach Schedule B if required 
Taxable refunds, credits, or offsets of state and local income taxes (see page 22) . 
Alimony received 
Business income or (loss). Attach Schedule C or C-EZ 
Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule D If required. If not required, check here • 
Other gains or (losses). Attach Form 4797 
• 
Total IRA distributions 
Total pensions and annuities 
15a 
16a 
b Taxab le amount (see page 23) 
b Taxable amount (see page 23) 
Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc. Attach Schedule E . 
Farm income or (loss). Attach Schedule F 
Unemployment compensation 
Social security benefits | 20a | _ J b Taxable amount (see page 25) 
Other income. 
22 Add the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21. This is your total income 
djusted 
ross 
icome 
23 IRA deduction (see page 27) 
24 Student loan interest deduction (see page 28) . . . . 
25 Archer MSAjJeductton. Attach Form 8853 
26 Moving expenses. Attach Form 3903 
27 One-half of self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE 
28 Self-employed health insurance deduction (see page 30) 
29 Self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, and qualified plans . . . 
30 Penalty on early withdrawal of savings 
31a Alimony paid b Recipients SSN • 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31a 
32 Add lines 23 through 31a . . . 
oo o,,Kfr^f vtna io ir^m iinp oo This is vour adjusted qross income 
8a 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15b 
16b 
17 
18 
19 
20b 
21 
22 
32 
33 
2 o , 3 3 6 
2 6 , 3 3 6 
2 6 , 3 3 6 
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Fabian 
& 
endenin 
'rofessional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 -0210 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile- (801)531-1716 
bchipman@fabianlaw.com 
November 9, 2006 
HAND DELIVERED 
Todd L. Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
RE: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone Civil No. 014903655 
Dear Mr. Stone: 
Brittney has seen a doctor about amenorrhea. She saw a physician for 
the same problem in Salt Lake before the move last fall. They have run some lab tests 
and the doctor has spoken with an endocrinologist at Children's Hospital in Oakland. 
The doctor thinks Brittney may have an overactive adrenal gland. They have run some 
more tests and Brittney was scheduled to meet with the endocrinologist last week. 
They are going to take an ultrasound of her ovaries and then meet with the doctor again 
in December. Joanne was told that one possible treatment might be a low dose of a 
birth control medication. 
it it rS-n t I 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
& RESEARCH CENTER OAKLAND 
12/19/06 
To Whom ft May Concern; 
I am writing on behalf of ray patient Britmey Stone (DOB 2/3/90) and her 
mother Joanne. Brittney is a 16 year old was diagnosed with metastatic 
Sertoli Leydig, a life threatening ovarian cancer on 12/7/06, She is currently 
hospitalized, as she is receiving her first round of chemotherapy. In the next 
several months, Brittney will require multiple courses of chemotherapy. She 
may also receive a stem cell transplant For the next six to eight months she 
will be hospitalized regularly for one to three weeks at a time. During her 
admission for transplantation, it is likely she will remain in the hospital for 
four to six weeks. There will also be unscheduled admissions for fevers and 
other complications of therapy. 
Throughout her treatment, Brittney will be inununocon^romised, Leaving her 
very vulnerable to infection. Since she Is immimocompromised, Brittney 
cannot attend schooL She will need to return to the hospital immediately 
whenever she has a fever. She will also require transfusions of platelets and 
red blood cells. The timing of when these transfusions will be needed cannot 
be predicted, but do need to be given promptly after we recognize the need 
for them 
Brlttney's mother cannot leave the state of California to attend a January 
court date in Utah. She is needed to care for her daughter, bring Brittney to 
the hospital and clinic at a moment's notice, and to meet with Britmey*s 
doctors, 
Brittney's diagnosis is clearly very new and devastating for the entire family. 
Brittney and her mother are just learning new oncology teaching. This 
includes learning Brittney1 s medication schedule, how to care for her central 
venous catheter (an indwelling access line), tb& necessary precautions they 
must take to avoid infectious exposures, and signs and symptoms of concern 
for illness to watch for when out of die hospital 
I appreciate the court's postponing this hearing until Brittney's condition is 
more stable and predictable. I can be reached at 510-428-3324 If you have 
any questions with regard to this request Thankyoufa 
consideration of this matter. 
Sincere] 
Department tfHcmatologj/OncoUg}/ 
Elliots Vichiruky, MX). 
Dirtctor J Division Qu*f 
James Feusner, MX). 
Director, Oncology 
Maxk Walten, MX). 
Dirrctor, BAfT Program 
Caroline Hasringi, M.D. 
Dircaor, Fellowship Pngrm 
Barbara Beach, M.D. 
Caria Golden, MX). 
Carolyn Hoppe, M.D. 
Admtoch Lai, MJX 
AlUon Micsunaga, M.D. 
Naveen Qureshi, MX). 
Keith Quirolo, MX), 
Sylvia Singer, MJD, 
Sanh Strandjord, M.D. 
Lori Styles, M.D. 
Joseph Torkildion, M.D. 
Adult Hematology 
Ward Hagar, MX). 
Eugene McMillan, MX). 
atTa^olden.MX). 
Asspclale Oncologist 
747 fifty Second Street • OaUaad, CA 946W-1809 
5KW28-3000 
wwwxhildrxroshoiphaloakhnd.org 
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b.S\ l 11 LSI I 
Brent R. Chipman 
Aliorncy at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile; (801)531-1716 
kehrpiiuinti&fahhmlmv.com 
October 17, 2005 
SENT BY TELEFAX AND 
BY FIRST CLASS MAIL 
Mary C. Corporon 
Corporon, Williams & Bradford 
405 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax No. 328-9565 
Re: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone 
Dear Mary: 
This letter will respond to your letter of October 12th received by fax at the 
close of business last Wednesday. As I told you at court, I had Joanne sign the deed 
for the cemetery lots before she left town. However, I am not authorized to release the 
original to you at this time. I can find no reference to burial lots In the divorce settlement 
or in the documents you have prepared. I find nothing that indicates that your client 
owned lots or that he would be awarded all four lots as part of the divorce settlement. 
I believe my client may be willing to authorize my delivery of the signed 
deed as part of a final settlement in the divorce proceeding. I say this notwithstanding 
some very questionable actions by Mr. Stone over the last several weeks. 
Fabian 
Ilendenin 
A Profciwonul Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
P.O. Box 510210 
Sail Ukc City. UT 84151-0210 
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ADDENDUM 
THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
EAST MILL CREEK NINTH WARD 
SALT LAKE EAST MILL CREEK STAKE 
January 31,2006 
Sorn Coldewyn 
LDS Family Services 
6980 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 140 
San Jose, CA 95119 
Re: Brittany, Brooke and Brileigh Stone 
Dear Mr. Coldewyn: 
Please allow me to introduce myself. My name is Rick Glauser and I am currently serving 
as the Bishop of Todd Stone. I had the pleasure of getting to know Brooke and Brileigh Stone as 
they regularly attended our ward primary and I have found them to be delightful girls. I did not get 
much of an opportunity to meet Brittany because of her estranged relationship with her father. 1 had 
the opportunity to observe Todd interact with his younger daughters on numerous occasions and 
found him to be a very involved and loving father. 
I have been counseling with Todd on various issues. He is frustrated and feels that his 
relationship with his daughters has been compromised. I assured him that church policy favors 
having fathers involved with their children on an ongoing basis. Todd has informed me that you are 
counseling with the children and we appreciate any help you can give them. This letter is written 
to see if there is a way to allow Todd to be involved in the counseling process with the children. 
Would you be kind enough to give me a call to discuss the situation. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours, 
Richard K. Glauser 
RKG:rk 
cc: Todd Stone 
ADDENDUM f T ^ 
Tab 30 
utan L.oae section J U - J - J O 
30-3-38. Pilot Program for Expedited Parent-time Enforcement. 
(1) There is established an Expedited Parent-time Enforcement Pilot Program in the third judicial district to be administered by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts from July I. 2003, to July 1, 2007. 
(2) As used in this section: 
(a) "Mediator" means a person who: 
(i) is qualified to mediate parent-time disputes under criteria established by the Administrative Office of the Courts; and 
(ii) agrees to follow billing guidelines established by the Administrative Office of the Courts and this section. 
(b) "Services to facilitate parent-time" or "services" means services designed to assist families in resolving parent-time problems 
through: 
(i) counseling; 
(ii) supervised parent-time; 
(iii) neutral drop-off and pick-up; 
(iv) educational classes; and 
(v) other related activities. 
(3) (a) Under this pilot program, if a parent files a motion in the third district court alleging that court-ordered parent-time rights are 
being violated, the clerk of the court, after assigning the case to a judge, shall refer the case to the administrator of this pilot program for 
assignment to a mediator. 
(b) Upon receipt of a case, the mediator shall: 
(i) meet with the parents to address parent-time issues within 15 days of the motion being filed; 
(ii) assess the situation; 
(iii) facilitate an agreement on parent-time between the parents; and 
(iv) determine whether a referral to a service provider under Subsection (3)(c) is warranted. 
(c) While a case is in mediation, a mediator may refer the parents to a service provider designated by the Department of Human Services 
for services to facilitate parent-time if: 
(i) the services may be of significant benefit to the parents; or 
(ii) (A) a mediated agreement between the parents is unlikely; and 
(B) the services may facilitate an agreement. 
(d) At any time during mediation, a mediator shall terminate mediation and transfer the case to the administrator of the pilot program for 
referral to the judge or court commissioner to whom the case was assigned under Subsection (3)(a) if: 
(i) a written agreement between the parents is reached; or 
(ii) the parents are unable to reach an agreement through mediation and: 
(A) the parents have received services to facilitate parent-time; 
(B) both parents object to receiving services to facilitate parent-time; or 
(C) the parents are unlikely to benefit from receiving services to facilitate parent-time. 
(e) Upon receiving a case from the administrator of the pilot program, a judge or court commissioner may: 
(i) review the agreement of the parents and, if acceptable, sign it as an order; 
(ii) order the parents to receive services to facilitate parent-time; 
(iii) proceed with the case; or 
(iv) take other appropriate action. 
(4) (a) If a parent makes a particularized allegation of physical or sexual abuse of a child who is the subject of a parent-time order 
against the other parent or a member of the other parent's household to a mediator or service provider the mediator or service provider shall 
immediately report that information to: 
(i) the judge assigned to the case who may immediately issue orders and take other appropriate action to resolve the allegation and 
protect the child; and 
(ii) the Division of Child and Family Services within the Department of Human Services in the manner required by Title 62A, Chapter 
4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Requirements. 
(b) If an allegation under Subsection (4)(a) is made against a parent with parent-time rights or a member of that parent's household, 
parent-time by that parent shall, pursuant to an order of the court, be supervised until: 
(i) the allegation has been resolved: or 
(ii) a court orders otherwise. 
(c) Notwithstanding an allegation under Subsection (4)(a), a mediator may continue to mediate parent-time problems and a service 
provider may continue to provide services to facilitate parent-time unless otherwise ordered by a court. 
(5) (a) The Department of Human Services may contract with one or more entities in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah 
Procurement Code, to provide: 
(i) services to facilitate parent-time: 
(ii) case management services; and 
(iii) administrative services. 
(b) An entity who contracts with the Department of Human Services under Subsection (5)(a) shall: 
(i) be qualified to provide one or more of the services listed in Subsection (5)(a); and 
(ii) agree to follow billing guidelines established by the Department of Human Services and this section. 
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), the cost of mediation shall be: 
(i) reduced to a sum certain; 
(ii) divided equally between the parents; and 
(iii) charged against each parent taking into account the ability of that parent to pay under billing guidelines adopted in accordance with 
this section. 
Page 2 of 2 
(b) A judge may order a parent to pay an amount in excess of that provided for in Subsection (6)(a) if the parent: 
(i) failed to participate in good faith in mediation or services to facilitate parent-time; or 
(ii) made an unfounded assertion or claim of physical or sexual abuse of a child. 
(c) (i) The cost of mediation and services to facilitate parent-time may be charged to parents at periodic intervals. 
(ii) Mediation and services to facilitate parent-time may only be terminated on the ground of nonpayment if both parents are delinquent. 
(7) If a parent fails to cooperate in good faith in mediation or services to facilitate parent-time, a court may order, in subsequent 
proceedings, a temporary change in custody or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The Judicial Council may make rules to implement and administer the provisions of this pilot program related to mediation, 
(b) The Department of Human Services may make rules to implement and administer the provisions of this pilot program related to 
services to facilitate parent-time. 
(9) (a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the mediation component 
of this pilot program. Progress reports shall be provided to the Judiciary Interim Committee as requested by the committee. At least once 
during this pilot program, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall present to the committee the results of a survey that measures the 
effectiveness of the program in terms of increased compliance with parent-time orders and the responses of interested persons. 
(b) The Department of Human Services shall adopt outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the services component of this 
pilot program. Progress reports shall be provided to the Judiciary Interim Committee as requested by the committee. 
(c) The Administrative Office of the Courts and the Department of Human Services may adopt joint outcome measures and file joint 
reports to satisfy the requirements of Subsections (8)(a) and (b). 
(10) (a) The Department of Human Services shall, by following the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38e, Federal 
Funds Procedures, apply for federal funds as available. 
(b) This pilot program shall be funded through funds received under Subsection (10)(a). 
Amended by Chapter 352, 2004 General Session 
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ADDENDUM b " 
Todd Stone 
2783 Melony Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah - Third District Juvenile Court 
Todd Stone (Petitioner) Motions for Outside Counsel 
V. 
Joanne Stone (Respondent) Case #: 425804 
Judge: Decker 
It is respectfully requested to be acknowledged by the Court, that minor children are entitled to proper 
representation to best serve their interests, needs, and safety. 
Petitioner has been informed that the Guardian ad Litem's office is no longer involved in representing the 
minor children in the parties divorce action. 
The minor children have retained their own outside counsel named Frances Palacios. Ms. Palaciaos has 
already filed a notice of appearance of counsel with the Third District Court to represent the minor 
children to best meet their needs and desires. Ms. Palacios continues to desire to represent the minor 
children in this action as well. 
Petitioner Motions the Court to allow the minor children their desired representation in this court 
proceeding rather than accepting the conflicting counsel of the Guardian ad Litem. The Guardian ad 
Litem has also failed to serve the needs of the minor children in not facilitating the needed counseling the 
children require. The Guardian is also not properly involved with the children since they are residing out 
of State. The minor children are prepared to pay the required amount for their desired representation, 
and to exercise their right to representation. The initial retainer has already been paid to Ms. Palaciaos to 
thus represent the minor children 
oee arCTWflPSra copy of Exhibits supporting that the Guardian ad litem is no longer representing the minor 
children, and the Order requiring the children to be retained here in Utah as previously noted as a 
problem. 
The minor children are also unable to obtain counsel in California that is licensed to practice in Utah, and 
thus having their counsel represent them, whom they feel comfortable with is also ija the Best Interests of 
the children. 
Dated this i l day of IW*- ZQP^ Signed: 
Todd Stone 
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ADDENDUM *7 
Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt lake City, I IT 84121 
(801)651-1700 
IN THE THIRD DISTg^CTrdlMT 
DEPUTY" t;L£?;H 
h aline .Stone • OBJEC I IOI I IX) GR \ I J I II IG 01 ; "!l> BIFI IRC ^ I ED DIV ORCE DECR EE 
Petitioner 
CASE# 01490355 
Judge: Tyrone Medley 
Todd Stone 
Respondent Pro Se 
Commissioner; I. Patrick Casey 
I know some of the issues presented belov ' ai e repetitive tc • that »- • hich vv as discusseel in tl le Com troom Some 1 bpic s 
however are not. 
I know that I may have a lot to develop before I can present my issues to the Court in such a manner to be heard, yet not to 
abuse or offend the right I have to present my side of the court matter. I pray for the Courts understanding that what is thus 
presented is presented with the emotion of a Father that earnestly wants what is best for the children, and as of yet, what is 
best for the children has not been proven. 
Additionally, I pray upon the Court to understand that what one may see as overdone, another may see t; ianmtons amount 
of information that applies to support the Objection to Granting of a Bifurcated Divorce Decree. 
Respondent also presents this Objection with the passion, and heartfelt emotion that is a part of each of the individual ,.K 
rather than through the sterile environment of an uninvolved, or inexperienced in the Harm and Hurt of Divorce. 
It is also asked of the Court that the issued presented here are not mere words on a page, but are the heartfelt feelings and 
understandings of a Father of Children that is wanting to be involved in his role as a Father in the hves of his children, rather 
than how some individuals merely want to fade out of their children's lives. 
Unlike the Petitioner that comes from a home environment that the Mother and Father were never divorced, they were not 
involved in their children's Hves by their own choice, not by a Court Ordered Bifurcation (the de-stabilization and the 
breaking apart) of the children's Hves. The Respondent, on the other hand experienced first hand the heartache and problems 
of not having a Father in the home while growing up, and knows all too well that childhood is a lot better with a real Dad 
consistently and continually in the children's Hves. This is offered to the Court for many reasons. The first such reason is that 
it comes before the Court as soHd, tangible proof and evidence that the Court erred in its decision to grant a Bifurcated 
divorce without first resolving the other major components affecting the children and the parties to this divorce action. 
Commissioner Casey and Mr. Chipman both said in open court that there is no proof that what a Bifurcated divorce would 
offer the parties or the children was best, or that it would bring resolution to the Court Action before the court. 
The concept that a person is innocent until proven guilty should carry through to matters of this magnitude and complexity, in 
that until the benefit of the award can be proven, it should not be considered or allowed by the Court. 
Respondent also asks the Court not to be a contributing agent to the ramifications of the Legaq of Divorce and to please 
overturn the granting of the Bifurcated Dnorce at least until all the eudence is thus before the Court and the Professionals 
involved in this matter are respected b\ the Court and their findings are thus presented 
If the Court was interested in bringing resolution to this case rather than granting a Bifurcated Decree, other long standing 
issues of contention should be addressed properly in the first place, in order to prevent an injustice from festering into 
further conflict and frustration of the parties involved, their counsels, and the children that are most often affected 
I am reluctant to present the following to the Court, oecause of the reputation it ma} instill and the anxiety it may arouse of 
the court toward me However since the children s desires have not been poled or them interviewed, and since I feel that 
my abilities as their Father are being stiffled, and bound, I feel that if I do not do everything I can as a Father of three 
children that are not here in the Court but are here in this mess, then that is a failure as a Father to his children 
I have been describes as being fanatical or as bringing so much to the light of the Court that 1 am shooting myself in the 
foot so to speak However, I think it is more important to have all the matters known rather than some matters overlooked 
that are pertinent I know that in every season there is a separation of the Wheat from the tares This is a matter that I hope 
the Court can sift the wheat (the actual children's and the divorcing parties lives and the stakes that are being played in this 
game from the image of victimization and the societal views of individual roles in this case I am a person tha 11 admit is 
more passionate than would counsel that might represent me would be I am also aware of much of the "Crap" that has 
gone on in this case as well When the counsel that represented me previously were asked to either "Poop or get off the Pot" 
so to speak, relating to some of these hard to resolve issues, they chose to discontinue representing me, rather than to see 
some of these hard to resolve issues pushed forward 
I ask the Court's understanding that the Petitioner in this case has done everything in her life to be the one in control of 
every situation She has effected Control of everything from the children, the Courts, the Law Enforcement officers, Curch 
Assistance toward her, and the Child Care Providers, and the financial issues of this case, as well as the development, 
associations, and emotions that the children are allowed to engage in, enjoy or express (Several letters attesting to this are 
available upon request) The Petitioner is holding true to her threat to me several years ago that she would " take the 
children and (I) would never get to see them again " She knew the power she had in the legal system, the community of 
church support, and the image to present She has always played the part of the victim in an effort to obtain the pity, 
respect, adoration, or favor of so many others The Petitioner has been described by counselors as Bi-polar in many of her 
actions 
I will continue to do what I can as someone who is deeply interested in facilitating the best for the children, and I most 
respectfully, and most heartfelt, ask the Court's patience and understanding of such as I here present as my Objection to, 
and Appeal of, the decision to Bifurcate the Divorce matter that is currently pending in the Court 
In this matter specifically 
1 Child Custody has been questioned and an evaluation has been ordered by the Court, and yet the Court seems to 
fail waiting for the Custod} E\ aluation to garner a finding It is like the Court has already concluded this case 
before the people involved in this matter are through with what the Court has ordered 
2 The same is true for the Psychological testing of the parties involved It has been ordered by the Court, yet the 
Court acts as though it is not relevant to the issues and or to the settlement of the case If that is the case, why 
would the Court order it to commence if the c al result or finding was not to be respected by the Court 
3 The need for Child Counseling has been discussed for a great length of time and yet very little action on that 
matter has been engaged in 
\- Determination of what property is to go to which party in the divorce early on, so that all other decisions revolving 
around those aspects can be understood and worked with, rather than being held in such a suspended state 
Commissioner Casey recognized in his recent finding or ruling related to the same parties of this case, but in a 
different case, that there was a high likelihood that a Protective Order was obtained by the Petitioner against the 
Respondent in an effort to seek personal advantage, rather than for personal protection This type of motivation 
could serve to dilute the importance or judicial intent or validity and thus turn the tools available in the Judicial 
System into tools for personal gain to get what an individual may want rather than a means to serve Justice, and 
the administration of order and fairness. 
.There has not been any publication of findings, recommendations, or oi the facts from any action the Court has 
ordered, yet no time is allowed for {lie counselors to weigh in or work to resolve the issue they have charge, are 
thus polled and have had a chane to enlighten the Court of their findings third part}' piles of 
Respondent objects to the bifurcated decree of divorce being granted as follows: 
1. The Bifurcated divorce decree being granted causes prejudicial actions and discrimination to be bestowed upon the 
Respondent 
2. Application of "Due Process" was not administered toward the Respondent 
3. A separation of Judicial Process should not over ride or circumvent the Constitutional Due Process. 
4. A Bifurcated decree carries one more date with it through the Court process as to 
a) Valuation of Property7. 
b) Disposition of assets, and the assignment of such liabilities. 
c) Financial liberties allowed Petitioner now, that were not available if "still married" 
d) Legal Custody issues vs. inherent right as a parent issues. 
e) Leining of real estate owned by either, or both parties. 
f) Designation of individual person status, rather than Husband & Wife status as related to famih bills, bills 
of children, and the ownership and title of property. 
g) Further financial problems lingering on to place a stranglehold on the financial stability of either party, 
h) The determination of Alimony and Child Support amounts. 
i) Reverting back to or the taking back of maiden name issue. 
j) Date to count the marriage dissolved or void in the event of any specific future event that would be 
applicable then, but unknown of at the present time. 
k) Attorney fees granted to victor or looser in future Court actions 
1) The determination of employed, underemployed status of Petitioner 
m) Financial resources from which to draw upon by Petitioner and or Respondent. 
n) The "its been this way for a long time notion and not to upset the way it has been" type of view people and 
the Courts may instill, 
o) The creation of "Legal Fiction" in the sence that the Court disolves the marriage, but does not recognize 
the parties divorced or separate until the issues are ALL resolved. 
5. Issuance of a Bifurcated Divorce decree while so much is left unresolved is not in the Best interest of the children. 
6. Commissioner Casey, and Petitioner's Counsel both admitted there is no proof that there decision is in the best 
interest of the children. 
7. Supreme Court Judge has stated in v that 
as a Judiciary there is a responsibility to uphold the law even if we (speaking of Judges) do not like what the law 
says. .. that it is in the public arena of the legislative powers that Laws are to be made, and it is not up to the 
Judges to make new laws on their own to accommodate their taste. 
8. Bifurcating this divorce action to rule a divorce is final will only serve to PROLONG THIS ongoing interdigitated 
and multifaceted case, not help to bring it to justice more quickly. A final decree of divorce will only allow the 
problems to continue indefinitely. 
9. Rule 42. Of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state qualifications for Bifurcation. 
I) Expedite Justice 
ii) Distinctly separate Issue 
lii) Involve 3ld Party 
Neither of these reasons have been supported or proven. 
IF YOU CHOOSE TO IGNORE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND ALLOW this BIFURCATION then please: 
a. See through the games that Mr. Chipman & Joanne are doing, and ORDER UTAH (Salt Lake County -
Third District Court specifically) Residency MUST be maintained for the children. 
b The provisions of the Protective OHer recognize the importance of remaining within 150 miles of 
Respondent so would the Court here now in this matter also recognize that same magnitude or remaining 
within 150 miles of Respondent or of the Court 
c To Date, some 21 months, and up to as recent as 10 months after the request was made, and the 
agreement to produce requested documents was stipulated to in either depositional form or letter form, 
Mr Chipman nor Joanne has provided the documents requested What makes the Court think that if the 
documents are provided by Petitioner in order to qualify the Bifurcated Decree, would be the right or 
complete documents that are needed, requested, ect And thus is why a large portion of this divorce has 
been stalled for so long not because it was the action of the Respondent In another incident in this case, 
Respondent provided Counsel in early October 2001 with forms needed for me to make the childcare 
payments I was required to make After numerous months of delay tactics, interference, and positioning I 
was still unable to obtain the forms I needed After almost 18 months, and a Court Subpoena, and 
involvement by Law Enforcement, I was finally able to obtain the forms needed, and requested for such 
Childcare payments to be made 
d. I feel this and many other "blunders of Ethical performance by Petitioner, or her counsel" in the past serve 
as a warning that nothing should be granted predicated on their proper performance or desires, until they 
are accountable for their contributing to the delay of this divorce matter 
e. In a matter of similar magnitude and issue, Mr Chipman is currently enjoying the company of Billy 
Walker and the Utah Slate Bar Investigators as they are embroiled in the matter of discipline for Mr 
Chipmans unethical practice of ironically, not providing or producing the needed or requested 
document(s) for his client and long time friend or acquaintance (See December 18, 2002 Case of the Billy 
Walker of the Utah State Bar v Brent Chipman) 
f. In Judge Burton's Court last year, he awarded Petitioner her requested Restitution in full, not because it 
was the actual cost of any "wrongful act" of me the Respondent, but because she said based on her feeling 
that I would act in such a manner based on her misconceived interpretation of the past Here it is not a 
misconceived interpretation of the past but a Court Docketed item of proof that mr Chipman's actions 
have been disingenuous and negligent in providing needed papers and yet the Court continues to grant 
he and his client what they want rather than the Respondents desire to keep Bifurcation of divorce decree 
from going through because it will only serve to prolong the Judication of this divorce matter rather than 
to expedite or streamline the Justice system and will impede economy of the Court system 
Additionally, there are further reasons that this bifurcated Divorce proceeding is hereby objected to by the Respondent 
1) Joanne is planning to move to California The children do not want to go Joanne has already been out socially Upon 
returning from a trip to California the two children commented how they only got to see their Mom Sunday and 
Monday because she was out with that individual all the other time The children are already feeling the devastation of 
the Courts ill conceived plan for their best interest 
I) , and on a recent trip to Calif with an individual that is a If Joanne moves away this will only serve to delay the 
custody evaluation, the District Attorney, the Mediation process, and the Gaurdian atleitem's Judges, or Commissioners 
opportunity to interview, and obsen e the children and their environment 
3) I his happened on the day of the Bifurcated Divorce hearing, that as Court ended, Joanne headed to California while 
there investigated the opportunities to move there on a permanent basis. (Job and Housing ETC. as well as her Social 
Calendar). This was even demonstrated the last time Joanne took 12 weeks off under the Family & Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) as she is doing now, that while off under the pretence of caring for our children that she ilsed that time off 
work to seek other employment from her then current employer. 
Joanne's own FMLA Paperwork from h^ employer stated that she had to have the time off work to care for her TWO 
(not just one as was reported, but two - 1 reported the first child was a year ago, and yet Joanne others put very little 
credence in that because it was me that was reporting it rather than the Mother of the children, as well as the kid's 
Mom did not agree with the charge, or support the investigation) "...children that are suffering from Depressive 
Anxiety7 symptoms..". With the current facts, and the ethically questionable actions of both the Petitioner and the 
Petitioners Counsel, along with all the other fragmented issues still left unresolved, and the strong possibility7 that the 
Petitioner out of town with the freedom of a final decree, would stall the divorce proceedings even that much longer 
With all that and more, can the Court truly say that they are qualified to make the determiniation that a Bifurcated 
Decree is definitely in the BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, or would EXPEDITE THE LEGAL PROCESS, or 
that THIS WAS A SEPARATE ENOUGH ISSUE, to garner the Courts blessing and order to BIFURCATE this matter 
at this time. 
THE COURT HAS COMMITTED MISJUSTICE AND ERROR IN THIS MATTER BEING BIFURCATED AS IT HAS 
without proof, evidence, logic or forethought of the future, or consideration of the past., and the Problems and Havoc the 
Court's Decision, and the Petitioner's desire will render upon the Children, the Respondent, The Court system, and the the 
embellishment on Justice being served. 
5) It is highly possible that Joanne sought this FMLA time not as time to watch her children, but to serve her own desire 
to obtain more vacation time from her job since she has used all of her vacation time up. 
6) Joanne may claim that her Mother whom it was said was sick may be in need oif Joanne's care, yet why is it allowed to 
have the children forced to go along and move from the life they are enjoying, and what limited association they are 
able to have with their Dad to be taken from them. The children say they want more time with their Dad, Why is the 
Court oblivious to their desires and makes rulings that can take away time from their association together, rather than 
to add too the amount of time they are able to have together. 
7) It may be hard for the Court to determine the genuineness of Joanne's actions and statements through her Counsel, vs 
what she claims is in the best interest of the children as she states that she needs to make the needed adjustments in her 
affidavit when the Court has as much insight to her, and her history. (See Commissioner Casey's remarks at the 
hearing to vacate the Protective order just one week after the Bifurcation of Divorce hearing. In that hearing 
Commissioner Casey recognized that the Petitioner's request for a Protective Order was "...for Personal advantage, and 
not for personal protection or..." from imminent harm. 
8) As was evidenced by the recent DCFS report, long before the separation happened, Joanne (Petitioner) was involved in 
the DCFS investigating me for child abuse, or inappropriate actions, and interviewing the children at school so I was 
not made aware of it. That is another blatent attempt by Petitioner to use any avenue available for her benefit to gain 
an advantage over me. 
9) Upon walking out of Court after the Protective Order was ordered to be vacated, or dismissed, Petitioners Counsel 
admitted it was he that Dared Joanne to get a divorce, and advised her to see if she could get a Protective Order against 
me if, and before they were going to file for divorce. 
10) Approximately nine months before Petitioner filed for divorce, all the wile never acting or inferring that a Divorce was 
in the works to the Respondent, Joanne sought counsel from her financial advisor as to how divorce will affect her 
pension, and what she needed to be aware of, or do related to a divorce. 
11) In the Court's prior attempts to do what is best for the children, the Court's actions have served to dis-serve the best 
interests of the children in the fact that the children were placed solely and only in the hands of Joanne. In so doing, 
the Court has ignored my multiple pleas to let my Mother be more involved with the children, in providing daycare, 
and in visitation, and in their well being. Without such action from the Court, 
a) The children have been placed in the hands of a Child Sexual Abuser, 
b) The children have been deprived of any of their previously enjoyed activities like Soccer, Dance, Music lessons, 
Gymnastics, Swimming, and other childhood sports and activities that they wanted to be engaged in and Joanne 
said no. Even though the money was paid in the amount you ruled was appropriate so as to not inflict an economic 
loss onto the children. This has not stopped Joanne from purchasing items she has wanted like new carpet, and 
hardwood floors, and other such luxuries that don't make the kids feel enjoyment or satisfaction, or positive 
reinforcement as they did while in their "Former Days activities. 
c) A real determination of what is in the best interests of the children is not something that historically can be dished 
out from the Court, but is from the Heart, and from first hand knowledge. 
d) The children say they want more time with me, yet get scolded or berated by their Mother or other individuals for 
such ideas, and their privilege to speak to me lias greatly been diminished by Joanne's actions of re-writing the 
Protective Order to meet her own dictates rather than those of the Courts, or those of Statute.. 
e) As a Father yourself, dealing with your child, you must realize the role that a Father plays in the life of a 
youngster, and the need to be involved in their life. 
f) I plead with you, your honor, do not fail the kids again, and please do not allow the continuation of me being 
locked out of their lives. In your Courtroom last year, 
i) Mr. Chipman representing the Petitioner said they do not make any claims of any inappropriate activity of me 
toward the children, 
ii) As a married couple about a year before the separation Joanne was planning this divorce, and she was involved 
in or aware of the interviews of the children by DCFS in order to find if there was anything she could use 
against me for personal advantage in the divorce rather than actual merits of her own selfish desires and 
disregard to the children's needs, or to maintain her commitment to the family, 
iii) Joanne's own friend and confidant whom has suffered far worse trauma and devastation in her own marriage 
to an adulterous husband was stronger in her commitment to the marriage and the needs of kids than Joanne is 
and her lack of sacrificing for the children. Joanne seems to have only one item on her agenda, and that is the 
absolute destruction of me, the children' Father, 
iv) That was even evidenced by you when in July 2001 hearing Joanne was asking for almost everything that was 
take home pay from me at my job. You commented that even I was entitled to some money to live on, and 
should not have to be forced to live with my Mother. 
v) Please recognize that State Statute does not automatically involve equalization of income between the parties, 
but the equalization of financial footing of each of the parties. Please see that Joanne appears to think that she 
has enough money so as not to have to work, and therefore please reduce to zero the amount of Alimony that I 
am required to pay, thus affording me a small amount more that I could put toward meeting the financial 
obligations that I have. 
vi) You acknowledged that there did not seem to be any cause for restricting any visitation because there was no 
bad actions from me, and therefore recognizing the need for the Father in the children's lives admonished 
liberal visitation and yet less than minimum is what has resulted at the hands of Joanne dictates and demands. 
vii) You additionally recognized that money was tight and did not see how we would get by, but still allowed 
Joanne to engage the services of a baby tender at 600.00 per month instead of allowing the children's 
Grandmother to tend them for free. Additionally, when Joanne has continued to maintain her need to keep the 
Protective Order and thus thwarting and delaying the 3-5 attempts I have made to retrieve my personal 
property and now she wants to enroll the expense of a storage garage and force one more financial burden 
upon me, and thus driving me further into a lack of ability to provide for my needs and financial obligations. 
viii) I ask you to realize this whole scheme is orchestrated not on the proper use of the legal process, but as a 
outcome of the adage that H hath no fury like a woman scorned. These antics by Joanne and Mr. Chipman 
are only brought by such pride and lack of commitment to the family and children's needs and only for spite 
and punitive in nature. 
ix) Please see that there is a need for the children's Father to be more involved in the lives of the children, and 
order that a greater amount of Parent time be allowed, since voluntarily it does not appear will happen by 
Joanne without a direct Order for such. 
x) Since I do hold an interest in the well being of the children as their Father and in an attempt to be equally and 
fairly presented in the Custody Evaluation, please order that if I am not allowed to participate and be an 
integral part of the counseling process, and to attempt to repair any damage that has been developed in our 
relationship, that I be afforded more time with the children so as to as Mr Chipman said in our last Court 
Appearance before you "do anything I want with the kids if its on my own time..." that I am able to take the 
children personally to a counselor, Therapist, Psychologist. Or even a skin or medical doctor if they need it." 
12) Joanne is further discredited in her truthfulness by way of the following: 
a) Deposition she claimed to not know of my Sears charge account. - here is her signature on the charge slip. 
b) Joanne said I did not own any property prior to getting married - here is paperwork that shows I did 
c) And she knew of it when we re-financed it as well. 
d) Joanne said that she needed a protective Order for the violence, vet it was her violence that has caused so much 
damage in our home and the lives of the children 
e) Joanne mis represented the facts in order to obtain \\w Protective Order only for PERSONAL GAIN, rather than 
the need for protection. At the present time she thinks she needs protection because of her many games, and antics 
she is doing in order to gain the courts favor. THIS TRIIMPED UP AFADAVIT for this Bifurcation request is just 
another game that she and Mr. Chipman are conspiring to. 
f) In Judge Burton's Court last year Joanne claimed that I had cut her phone lines. - subsequent subpoena 
information provided by the phone company show that there never was ANY CUT PHONE LINES at the residence 
she was praying on the court to have pity on her at Another use of the legal system to give Joanne what she 
wanted rather than what was right or fair The same thing bclds true for this desire for a Bifurcated Divorce 
Decree for Joanne It is a scheme to get what she wants if she says the right things etc rather than what is fair, 
just, or in the best interest of justice or accountability 
g) In MANY different Police reports that the Court reviewed last week reported b> Joanne, she claims I violated the 
Protective Order and >et the Sheriffs Officers report there was not a Protective Order \ lolation 
h) In Mediation the other da> Joanne claimed that I had not been denied visitation from the Minimum State Statute, 
yet the record before the Court Julv 30, 2003 shows that my MINIMUM by Statute allotted visitation time has been 
shortened by about 30 Days since this divorce issue began 25 months ago 
I) In mediation Joanne stated that Commissioner Casey did not admonish liberal visitation, and that he made an 
error in ruling on this case in the July 25 2001 hearing and yet the tape recorded dialog states that since there did 
not appear to be any inappropriate toward the children by me, that there should be no restriction of visitation with 
the children, and admonished liberal visitation 
j) According to Commissioner Casey's Order on Temporary Matters, from Julv 25 2001 Commissioner Casey 
stated that I " was entitled to items to set up his (my) own house and if you (we) had two pans (Respondent Todd) 
was allowed one etc ' and that we were noi to go out and go into debt When Mr Chipman prepared the 
order, there was no such provision and there were several similar conversations not included as part of the 
Temporary Orders 
k) Commissioner Casey ordered us to be flexible with regards to visitation time and other times of importance to the 
children and to work times }et Joanne has not allowed my Mom to pick up the children for designated Parent time 
allowed by statute, that being after school or such 
1) Additionally I do not have a great amount of vacation time and so when I have had time away from work, I have 
asked to be allowed my Parent time, and it has been denied Activities involving the family are planned and I have 
asked for the children to be allowed to attend, and seldom are they allowed to attend, and the two times such a 
request was granted, there was not enough time to either travel to the event and return, or to complete the activity 
Each time visitation is diminished like that, the children have been emotionally saddened and stressed 
m) The children have been advised by Joanne not to tell me of upcoming school activities "Because your Dad will 
want to come 
n) School has been instructed that 1 am not allowed to engage in activities with the children, nor that they should not 
be released to me, even when it has been previously agreed to 
o) Counselors have been presented w ith biased and mis guided information as to me and the children and thus have 
viewed me as a detriment rather than a resource for therap\ and mending a broken or strained relationship even 
when the kids want me invoked in their life 
13) Bifurcating this Divorce decree DOES NOT serve the BEST Interests of the children, and there is NO PROOF that it 
does, or will 
4) NO INFORMATION has been presented as to what OTHER " adjustments she and her children need to make " that 
this bifurcation is so desperately needed for so immediately at this time 
15) Joanne continues to own the children as items ciV-.vnership exclusively to herself, rather than heeding your admonition 
in the July 25, 2001 hearing that you said that children are both of yours (Joanne and 1 ) and tl icy are not owned,, they 
are people. 
16) IF THEY ARE PEPLE too thei i gi ai it tin: t n tto :ii CO! IS I I I I J 1 101 h \ I Rigl it tc > tlien life and then happinesi ;,; n id; isk 
them what they want to do. 
17) Joanne should not be free to date aiu. •. alow any new personal or intimate relationship with a WonIan oi a Ivlaii be 
allowed to enter into the lives of th Mren right now. That does not serve their best interest at all. 
18) The Games that Joanne plays 
a) Just yesterday our Daughter was crying when she talked to me because of the verbal tongn lasnim: u-aune u,n c 
her as she put the phone down to ask her about something 
b) The children say to Joanne they wish they could have more time with their Dad. and she exhibits dominance offer 
them as to make them sad for even talking about it with her 
c) Joanne fails to act in any way that would be supportive of the children building or strengthening their relationship 
with me. Choosing instead to promote discord and dishonesty and disrespect. 
d) This bifurcation would only allow Joanne to access the money she has in DMBA 
e) Promotes idea of now divorce is final, why settle anything else. 
19) In the June 23, 2003 hearing it was said that: 
a) It is a bad Idea to change the residence of the children until the Custody Evaluator has made 1. • ?: \ =• lings known, 
and what the court finds in relation to the best house for the children. 
20) Mr Chipman has failed to present evidence that any of those points would be met if this divorce determination was 
Bifurcated 
21) Evidence of Mr. Chipman's and Petitioner's Distractions and delays. 
a) Nov. 5, 2002 Mr. Olsen submits Interrogatories to Mr Chipman - still yet to receive them despite prior requests by 
Mr. Olsen. 
b) February 2002 Daycare Flex Account reimbursement forms were provided to Mr. Chipman to have daycare 
provider fill out dates, amounts, and sign. Received completed forms over 1 year later despite several attempts by 
me and Mr. Olsen. 
c) Income Tax documents for tax year 2000, 2001, 2002, and other such personal financial data was requested to be 
provided by Petitioner, may 2002 and prior and as of yet have not been provided some 15 months later. 
d) Filing a Protective Order in a civil Court and not in Criminal court and thus further delaying a scheduled move 
because the Law Enforcement officers would not respect the modified Protective order. 
e) When Commissioner Casey originally ordered that I was to have my stuff moved out by the 15th of August 2001, 
Mr. Chipman did not even have the paperwork prepared on the 15th of August to submit to the court therefore the 
Law Enforcement registry did not have verifiable proof that I was to move, and thus was again denied that right. 
f) Counseling for all 3 children as discussed in July 2001 hearing, October 2001 deposition, and several other 
subsequent attempts has not been properly initiated, or completed by Petitioner. 
g) Mr Chipman has been brought under direct discipline by the Billy Walker of the Utah State Bar - Professional 
Conduct Commission for unethical conduct towards his client of not providing the paperwork required of an 
Attorney Dec 18 2002 
h) Mr Chipman and the Petitioner had not informed me of an extended trip to California starting today 
1) Petitioner failed to comph with State Statute of requirement to inform me as to children s medical treatment and 
has continued to exclude me from the children s treatment of counseling e\ en after being found by prior counsel as 
to prejudicing the counselor she had attempted to take the children to It was determined by both Mr Chipman 
and my counsel that Petitioner s attempt was to gain and advantage in the di\ orce proceeding as far back as 
September 2001 
j) Petitioner failed to inform me of extended time away to California that was to impede my visitation time with the 
children for the weekend and the mid week visits 
22) Since Petitioner has voluntarily chosen to quit her employment and thus is without income, then it must be 
recognized that I must be the children s sole form of Financial support and therefore should rule that Respondent is to 
claim the children on his Income Tax this year, and also recognize the same Tax Advantage on all prior years since he 
was the one providing the larger share of children's support 
23) The same is true for respondent to claim the Income Tax advantage of the Mortgage interest deduction for the home the 
children reside in Anything other than that would be unjust enrichment of the Petitioner 
24) Issue a RESTRAINING ORDER preventing the Petitioner from taking the children away to California If Joanne 
wants to go, she has a right to go but does not need to take the children with her 
25) Joanne's Brother is a individual com icted of DRUG USE / DEALING, ARMED BANK ROBBERY< and other very 
bad actions 
26) Joanne's Sister has been married at least 3 times and I believe is currently single demonstrating low morals in which 
the children would see such activity is not wrong 
27) The children have said to me that their cousins they are forced to associate with in California is scary with their actions 
towards them because they are dow n s> ndrome kids and do not act in such a manner that the kids have liked or felt 
comfortable with 
28) Joanne shows little compassion towards other people in reality Just as recent as her last trip to California, she was 
very close to her Grandmother s house and did not even go see her Q\ en though she was very ill Her Grandmother 
died real soon after Joanne was there Joanne s action toward her Grandmother as witnessed through the >ears are 
evidence as to why she despises m\ Mother so and promotes the same bad relationship with their Grandmother, that 
she had with hers 
29) Mr Richman in the wisdom of his experience saw the need for Joanne to undergo ps) chological testing because of what 
he witnesses with Joanne, and therefore incorporated such psychological testing to be an integral part of the Custody 
Evaluation 
30) Joanne always boasted as to how she graduated High school earh in the middle of her senior year That is like what 
she is asking for here, and that is to get the final reward without doing all the work first 
Jl) If you want to expedite the finahzation of the Divorce deal specifically with the issues that are causing the delay, rather 
than issuing the classification before the completion of the class work and final exam Possibly that is how Joanne or 
Mr. Chipman views the world , but that is not the way it should be. Some of the issues needing your intei veiitiori are as 
follows: 
a) Ordei ....n I'MM... IS r^junea u , .\\ her sluu-< 1 \\u ; ustody Evaluation up front as •• .. .-» i Ji,r- ium .,> ^. a 
would deter her from dragging the Custody Evaluation out. We have already been told by the evaluate ' s,:i! M-
cost could actually be 6,000.00 to 10,000.00 before he is completed knowing what work he has to do. 
b) Rule on the actual ownership of specific Real Estate, rather than just letting the issue continue to fester amongst us. 
c) Order a significantly larger amount of time for visitation (Parent Time) as your initial order from July 25, 2001 • 
said "LIBERAL VISITATION, since you recognized the importance of the children's Father in their lives as they 
are growing and developing. 
d) Order Brittney to engage her Father in her life on a positive note atid that Joanne is to see to it, rather than her 
continual sweeping it under the rug approach as she has done so many times in the past. 
e) Review these almost 30 different police reports from incidents of visitation interference and actions that I consider 
constant harassment and attempts to gain an additional advantage against me. 
f) Interview each of us to see what you think of our character or manner since you only have heard from Mr. 
Chipman rather than Joanne The Mediator another issue between Joanne and I said he had never been greeted 
with so much hostility as did Joanne exhibit while meeting with her. 
10. 
11. Robert Steele the State Appointed Counsel for representing the children was not in attendance to be questioned or 
offer testimony as to interviews he has had with the children or as to what the feelings or emotional state of the 
children is on this matter. 
12. In a prior hearing Mr. Steele was ordered to sign off on the appropriateness of the counselor or therapist for the 
children. At the present time the children are not being counseled by a qualified counselor for Sexual Abuse and 
so how can the Court determine that the petitioners desire for a bifurcated divorce decree and subsequent Court's 
decision is in the best interest of the children when it was the Petitioner who chose to leave the children in the 
Sexually Abusing environment after she was aware of such for two (2) years or more. 
13. Petitioner and her Counsel have been instrumental in prolonging this whole divorce proceeding for the time it has 
extended. There is no proof that granting a bifurcated divorce to the Petitioner now will accommodate and 
facilitate speedy administration of Justice as was the stated rational for allowing a bifurcated Divorce decree. Rule 
42ofU.R.C.P. 
14. Issuing a Bifurcated Divorce Decree with so many unresolved and un substantiated issues is like making a closing 
statement at the beginning of a court case in an attempt to slander the parties or where you persuade the jury with 
unfounded, and un-pesented evidence that has not been qualified or allowed to even be presented in the court case. 
15. Bifurcated divorce decrees contradict rules of evidence matters. 
16. A Bifurcated Divorce Decree is no more than Legal Fiction, and can be used and presented to confound parties and 
matters outside of the Courtroom and also within the Courtroom. 
17. Tender Years Doctrine does not substantiate a bifurcated Divorce Decree in this case or others similar to it. 
18. Since the Respondent is an actively involved Father to the children, and also prior to separation was actively 
involved in the children's lives, as a Husband and Father, there is not reason to prematurely terminate that 
association the Children hold with a Bifurcated Divorce Decrees. To the Contrary, if the Court was interested in 
serving the needs of the children, and their best interest, the Court should not be in such a haste to dissolve the 
family unit with a whim of the Petitioner without an attempt to promote and foster accountability of the Parents to 
the children and to the Court and to society. IF the Respondent's history with the children and the relationship 
was such as to not be around or involved, then it might be conceivable to allow the Petitioner "... to make 
FURTHER NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS..." AS Petitioner states in item # 11 of her "Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Bifurcate". 
19. Petitioner's Adjustments referred to above are further attempts to contribute to the Alienation of emotion and 
affection the children hold for their Father. A Bifurcated Divorce Decree will further add to the Parental 
Alienation actions of the Petitioner directed toward the children's Father. 
20. Nothing in Petitioner's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Bifurcation substantiates the issuance of a Bifurcated 
Divorce Decree over not issuing a Divorce Decree until all other matters are resolved. 
In this specific case, a Motion For Bifurcation is still another attack against the Judicial system m that it is an 
attempt by the Petitioner to use the legal system for personal advantage rather than for Justice This was also a 
finding of Commissioner Case^ in another matter where he felt the Protectee Order sought by the Petitioner was 
and attempt to gain personal ad\ antage, rather than personal Protection as he stated from the Bench in our July 21 
2003 hearing to Vacate a Protective Order If Commissioner Case> was afforded that insight prior to this 
Bifurcated Divorce Motion was heard, he ma) have found other evidence presented as more convincing not to issue 
a Bifurcated Divorce Decree 
A recent D C F S Child Abuse Report (see Ex hibit ) stated that some of the female children s actions at their 
home were of the intimate Lesbian nature With the Petitioner being awarded the Bifurcated Divorce Decree, this 
allows the Petitioner to legalh and without trepidation enter into personal and or intimate relationships with other 
women and such would be harmful to the )oung children s personal and emotional development The old saying 
that "it doesn t do any good to close the door once the cows ha\ e escaped holds true here Until it is determined 
that the Petitioner and the environment she creates is most definitely the best for the children then The Court 
should not engage in granting such liberties to the Petitioner 
The Court erred in issuing the Bifurcated Divorce Decree in the following 
a) No proof of the requested and full discovery needed to expedite this case to completion is required only a 
certificate that discovery has been responded to In two prior items requested of Petitioner what was 
"provided" (responded) was totally irrelevant to the issues at hand, and not what was asked for 
b) None of the Thresholds directed in U R C P for support of Bifurcating an issue were shown to be 
applicable or relevant to the granting of the Bifurcated Divorce Decree immediately now after so much 
time has been wasted and prolonged on the part of the Petitioner and her Counsel 
c) The Bifurcated Decree was issued upon needed paperwork being provided yet the Court was already 
aware that Petitioner s Counsel has been disciplined b) the Utah State Bar for failure to produce or 
prepare the required documents in order to provide ethical and professional service to his client 
Additionally, Commissioner Casey stated that the the State Bar is set up as the governing entity to 
promote, ensure or regulate the Ethical Conduct of Attorneys (See In the Matter of Discipline, Billy 
Walker v Brent r Clupman, Utah btnte Bar, December 18 2002 case) 
d) The Court failed to interview the minor children of which State Statute allows that they may be 
interviewed as to their desires, and other such issues Guardian At Litem is aware of some of the 
children's personal desires, and they are in direct contrast to the actions of the Court of granting a 
Bifurcated Divorce Decree Additionally that specific Guardian at Litem was not in attendance at the 
Bifurcation hearing 
e) The Court failed to acknowledge the Petitioner s unwillingness to mediate on three (3) separate occasions, 
and that the Mediator had neve3r been greeted by so much hostility as was exhibited by Petitioner toward 
the Mediator 
f) The Court failed to recognize that Petitioner is obsessed with being in control of everything, and is thus 
controlling the legal S) stem as well as the children 
g) By thinking Respondent's inexperience, and his concerted efforts to bring some closure to some of the 
many fragmented issues that have been left to stagnate b> Counsel was a demonstration of animosity, 
rather than viewing it as a good effort to try and get some things resolved so this case may advance toward 
closure The passion of an mdn ldual living in the turmoil everyday is interpreted lots differently than the 
REPRESENTATION OF Counsel whom has the comforts of a home life of their own and is just working 
to be paid type of im oh ement 
h) The Court failed to recognize that e^  erything the Respondent has attempted to develop has been in the 
Best Interest Of the Children 
l) The Court failed to recognize the inconsistencies and untruths stated fr\ Petitioner or her counsel and 
relied on Petitioners claims as being true even as facts present otherwise 
j) The Court failed to recognize that Petitioners statements in one hearing before Commissioner Casey were 
contradicted, mis-represented ect In later hearings before Commissioner Casey 
k) Commissioner Case> failed to see how issuance of a Bifurcated Divorce Decree strategized a financial 
advantage for the Petitioner and placed a further financial burden and hardship on the Respondent 
1) The Court failed to recognize the religious implications a bifurcated divorce decree would contradict, and 
represent to the children as religion is a significant part of the children s life 
m) it is recognized that there are several points to express and consider on this matter of Bifurcation 
However, the Court opted to overlook man} of the issues presented and additionally did not allow all of 
the issues to be presented 
24. A bifurcated Divorce Decree allows influences and entities outside of the Court to treat Respondent and Petitioner 
far differently than allowed prior to the bifurcated Divorce decree being awarded, and thus Respondents personal 
civil rights, and the rights of the children are thus affected for the worse, and the same rights of the Petitioner are 
enhanced and thus further prejudice is bestowed upon the Respondent, and further advantage is afforded to the 
Petitioner in matters outside the Court, but still related to the Divorce and the family. 
25. The Respondents dedication to do anything he can for his children is mis interpreted by the Court as hostility and 
lack of working things out. Therefore, the Court is not acting in an impartial manner. 
26. Issuing a Bifurcated Divorce Decree at the time the Petitioner elects to be out of work is also a mis-justice in that 
the determination of Alimony and or Child support amounts could be based on the Decree Date, rather than the 
time the Petitioner was employed. 
27. Deciding to issue a Bifurcated Divorce Decree at this time rather than the time when all financial matters are 
resolved places an unfair date before the Court for valuation of property and other assets. 
28. None of the other accompanying aspects that are expressed in Statute to be an integral part of the Divorce Decree 
were included as part of this Bifurcated Decree. Thus adding to the confusion and further turmoil of this case, 
rather than aiding its quick resolve. 
29. There are so many other issues revolving around the actual determination of the best Interest of the Children 
Doctrine that has been left unresolved, and undetermined by the professionals or the Courts that it is inconceivable 
that the Court knows at this point in time what is in the best interest of the children. 
30. Respondents desire of his counsel to either bring about some resolution to this case, or to get out of the way so 
someone else could try is one of the reasons that there has been two separate Attorneys representing the 
Respondent. This along with the aspect that the Respondent has had to pay full price on a ongoing basis as 
opposed to Petitioner having the luxury of not having to pay large Attorney fees on a ongoing basis allows 
Petitioner the option of not having to mediate or negotiate, or settle anything, and the issues can continue to drag 
on. 
31. Bifurcating a divorce decree without proof that such would accommodate the issues presented in and leaving so 
many other issues un resolved in a divorce is contradictory to even the Rule that allows Bifurcation. 
32. Issuance of a Bifurcated Divorce Decree subsequently creates two (2) separate entities (individuals) in financial, 
legal, and other matters, and yet within the Court these two separate individuals are considered Husband and Wife 
and are therefore prejudiced against and are treated differently than their actual status in relation to family debts 
and other such items. This type of falsehood is like charging a bank robber a fine since he now has money to pay 
it, rather than other proper penalty or judgement for them to be accountable for their actions. 
The Petitioner thus having a decree of divorce is now able to obtain a personal indemnity from other marital issues that are 
to be determined in the divorce at some future, undetermined, irrelevant time. 
Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt lake City UT 84121 
(801)651-1700 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
REQUEST FOR HEARING and APPEAL ON RESPONDENTS 
OBJECTION TO GRANTING OF A BIFURCATED DIVORCE DECREE 
Joanne Stone 
Petitioner 
v CASE* 01490355 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Todd Stone 
Respondent Pro Se 
Commissioner T Patrick Casey 
Respondent requests this Objection be duly noted by the Court and a hearing to be held for appealing the Bifurcation of the 
divorce decree 
A hearing on this matter is requested to be scheduled and notify respondent so that Respondent can provide notice of such 
hearing to opposing counsel 
This matter is scheduled to be heard on Before the honorable Judge 
on , 2003 The hearing will commence at AM PM in room 
Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt lake City, UT 84121 
(801)651-1700 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Joanne Stone 
Petitioner 
Todd Stone 
Respondent Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CASE# 01490355 
Judge: Tyrone Medley 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
I CERTIFY THAT ON I CAUSED TO BE DELIVERED BY MEANS NOTED BELOW, A 
COMPLETE COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE PARTIES NOTED BELOW: 
ROBERT STEELE AUG 2 1 2003 
«— (h^ndians oUce 
Brent R. Chipman Q , n v 
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ADDENDUM ^ Hf 
Tab 33 
78-32-12.2. Definitions — Sanctions. 
(1) For purposes of this section 
(a) "Make up parent-time" means parent-time which is 
(i) of the same type and duration of paient-time as that which was denied, including parent-time 
during weekdays, weekends, holidays, and during extended parent-time periods, 
(ii) to be made up within one year after the court has entered its order of make up parent-time, and 
(iii) in the manner chosen by the aggrieved parent if it is in the best interest of the child 
(b) "Parent-time enforcement order" means an order to enforce compliance with an original parent-
time order through the use of sanctions 
(c) "Petition" means a petition brought by a parent, a grandparent as provided in Section 30-5-2, by 
other immediate family members, or upon the court's own motion alleging that a parent is not complying 
with a parent-time order in a decree of divorce or a subsequent parent-time enforcement order which 
may be brought at different stages in the alleged pattern of noncompliance 
(i) a first petition is a petition to enforce an original order of parent-time or a petition filed after 
three years from the last parent-time enforcement order, 
(ii) a second petition is a petition filed within three years following entry of the first parent-time 
enforcement order, and 
(iii) a third petition is a petition filed within three years following entry of the second parent-time 
enforcement order 
(d) "Substantial noncompliance" means conduct which 
(i) substantially interferes with a court-ordered parent-time schedule, or 
(ii) interferes with parent's right to frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child and 
which substantially impairs that parent-child relationship 
(2) Upon a first petition, the court shall order 
(a) if the first petition is uncontested, by default 
(i) a permanent injunction enjoining the noncompliance with the court's parent-time order; 
(ii) make up parent-time for the aggrieved parent and child, and 
(iii) participation in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the parent about the 
importance of complying with the court order and providing the child with a continuing relationship 
with both parents as provided in Subsection 78-32-12 l(l)(b), or 
(b) if the first petition is contested, the court shall hold a hearing to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether there has been a substantial noncompliance with the parent-time order 
(3) Upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the court shall order 
(a) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs to the prevailing party; 
(b) make up parent-time for the aggrieved parent and child, 
(c) a minimum often hours of compensatory service as provided in Subsection 78-32-12 1(1 )(a), 
and 
(d) a permanent injunction enjoining the noncompliance with the court's parent-time order 
(4) Upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the court may order 
(a) mediation with the requirement to report back to the court on the results of mediation within 30 
days, 
(b) participation in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the parent about the 
importance of complying with the court order and providing the child with a continuing relationship 
with both parents as provided in Subsection 78-32-12 l(l)(b), or 
(c) a fine or jail sentence or other appropriate sanctions as provided under contempt of court in 
Section 78-32-10 
(5) Upon a second petition, the court shall order 
(a) if the second petition is uncontested, by default 
(i) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs, 
ADDENDUM 0 
Brent R, Chipman 
From: Brent R. Chipman 
Sent: Tuesday, May 03,2005 3*39 ?M 
To: lkarlnshobbs@utahadr.org, 
Cc: 'michelleb@utcourts.gov' 
Subject: Stone Mediation 
Karin; 
I have attached a copy of the Scheduling Order and Trial Setting in the Stone divorce. It sets forth the issues that were 
identified by Judge Medley for trial. 
My client's preliminary positions on the Issues identified in the Order are as follows: 
1. Custody and Parent Time: Mrs. Stone to have physical and legal custody of the three girls subject to Mr. Stone's 
reasonable parent time as agreed by the parties or under the statute at a minimum. My client is willing to look at additional 
time with the younger girls such as allowing Mr, Stone to pick them up for sports activities, The oldest daughter, Brlttney, 
has not exercised much parent time with her father over the last 18 months or so. She is in counseling with Lonnie Taholo 
and my client is willing to let the counselor determine a time table and conditions for the rehabilitation of Brittne/s 
relationship with her father. 
Child Support: According to the guidelines. Currently Mr. Stone Is ordered to pay $775.00 per month under the first Order 
from the fall of 2001. Mr, Stone recently lost his employment with QWEST but may have obtained other employment. 
Alimony: Mr. Stone is ordered to pay $200 per month as alimony, My client is willing look at phasing out or eliminating 
alimony as part of a global settlement. 
Real Property: Mr. Stone's mother has paid an amount of about $160,000 to pay off mortgages on two parcels of real 
property that were owned by the parties. My client thinks the Promenade Property is worth about $155,000. The Pintail 
Condo is worth about $122,000 
The marital residence my client occupies is worth about $250,000 and has mortgage obligations of about $150,000, 
leaving equity of $100,000, 
The total equity is about $375,000-
My client would propose to pay her former mother in law about $160,000 In settlement of a lawsuit filed to collect on those 
funds. 
There would be about $27,500 in equity for Mr. Stone and half of the total, $187,500 for my client. 
She could be awarded the Melony Drive property and an interest in Pintail. Mr. Stone's mother could be awarded the 
Promenade property and a small interest in the Pintail Condo, and Mr. Stone would have an interest in the condo. 
Personal Property: Each party to retain the property in their possession except for any personal Items belonging to one 
party which may be held by the other party. Personal property of the children to "floaf between mom and dad with the 
understanding that property sent with the children would be returned following parent time. My client has prepared an 
inventory that I will fax to Mary Corporon this afternoon. 
Tax Exemptions: My client is open to an arrangement to divide the exemptions provided that Mr. Stone is current In the 
payment of his support obligations. 
Division of Retirement Accounts: Each party to be awarded one half of the amounts accrued during the marriage of the 
parties. I do not know what Mr. Stone has or had with QWEST, My client has retirement with DMBA based on her 
employment with the LDS church. 
l 
Tab 34 
Withdrawals shortly prior to the separation of the parties or since the separation of the parties would need to be 
considered. My client is not adverse to offsetting Mr. Stone's claims against the equities in the real property or her 
judgments for fees and childcare 
Respondent's claim for monies allegedly taken by Petitioner from rental accounts; My client thinks the amounts taken are 
less than $1,000 and are offset by Mr. Stone's failure to pay support in June 2001. Mr. Stone keeps increasing the amount 
of his claims, but they are certainly less than the amount of my client's judgments for fees and childcare (about $7,000), 
Respondent's contempt: My client is willing to waive the issue of contempt as part of a global settlement or at least to 
reserve the issues to see if there is future compliance. 
Respondent's Request for more involvement in the counseling for the children: My client thinks the counselors should 
determine the level of involvement for both parents in the counseling process. 
Respondent's Request that Petitioner be found in contempt for violation of court orders: I think Mr, Stone claims violation 
of parent time. No contempt has ever been certified by the court. We would suggest that any such claims be waived or 
reserved against future compliance. 
Ultimate Responsibility for Costs of Custody Evaulation: 
Mr. Stone was ordered to pay for the evaluation. My client paid part of a tax return toward the cost and has advanced 
some additional funds as ordered by Judge Medley. I think that claims by both parties for reimbursement could be 
considered and handled as part of the property settlement. 
I am not sure that copies of any of the pleadings will be particularly helpful, 
I will remind you that the parties separated in June 2001, and that they were divorced in a bifurcated proceeding in 
September 2004. 
The trial is scheduled for June 28 through July 1st. We have a backup setting for August 3 ,4 and 5th based on a pending 
federal criminal trial that Mary Corporon has which conflicts with the first dates. 
Dr. Davies contact me yesterday with an indication that Mr. Stone has not paid him the amounts ordered by Judge Medley. 
Mr. Stone Is therefore responsible to pay all of your costs for the mediation tomorrow. I will leave it to you as to how you 
approach that issue with Mr. Stone end his counsel. 
If there is other information that would help you prepare for the mediation, please let me know. 
Thanks, 
Brent Chipman 
cc: Mary Corporon (by fax) 
335*57 J .doc 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab 35 
Todd L. Stone 
February 4, 2005 
Page 3 
OFFSETS: You have identified a claim against Joanne for her personal 
use of some rental funds at about the time of the separation. Joanne believes those 
funds could be viewed as support or alimony from the time of the separation until the 
Order of support became effective later in the summer of 2001. In any event, Joanne 
will argue that any amounts found owing by her should be offset against the judgments 
that have been entered against you, or against the interest that has been accruing. 
1 exposed to domestic violence. 
2 Q. By the father? 
3 A, I informed them that the children had been 
4 exposed to domestic violence. I did not go into any 
5 specifics at all. 
6 Q. But you said that youfre the mother and 
7 you're the custodian — 
8 A. Yes-
9 Q. — and they've been exposed to domestic 
10 violence? 
11 A. I did not say that the father had done 
12 anything. 
13 MR. RICHMAN: Off the record just a minute. 
14 (Discussion held off the record.) 
15 Q. (BY MR. RICHMAN) We were given some 
16 documents to show what happened to $635 and $1,000 
17 after we were in court the first time. But I want to 
18 hear — do you agree that you took $635? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And tell me how that came about so this 
21 record is clear on it and ITm clear. 
22 A. We had received a check for $635 for rent on 
23 the condominium. 
24 Q. That's the one on Promenade? 
25 A. No, that is the one on Pintail. 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 106 
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BARNES BANKING COMPANY 
MAIN OFFICE - KAYSV1LLE, UT 
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801-942-5936 r">V 
carp OP 1 ^SfcrniL 
36 59 
Dm 
BANK ONE' ? 
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11 
20 Q. And tell me how that came about so this 
21 record is clear on it and ITm clear. 
22 A. We had received a check for $635 for rent on 
23 the condominium. 
24 Q. That's the one on Promenade? 
25 A. No, that is the one on Pintail. 
1 Q. On Pintail. 
2 Okay. And what did you do with that money? 
3 A . I went to deposit that into the account at 
4 Barnes Bank. We had a rental account there. And when 
5 I presented that to the bank, they asked me if I would 
6 like to cash the check or deposit it. And so at the 
7 time I decided to cash the check. 
8 Q. Okay. So you had use of the funds, right? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Now, what about the thousand dollars. Tell 
11 me about that. 
12 A. Ifm not sure what thousand dollars you're 
13 talking about. 
14 Q. Well, maybe Ifm not either, but it seemed 
15 like there was a thousand-dollar item that Todd 
16 claimed that you had received. Oh, I guess it was 
17 $400 plus that he thought --
18 A. It was $440. 
19 Q. $440 that you took from the bank account 
20 balance; is that right? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. So that would make the thousand dollars, the 
23 $635? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Okay. So you agree that you closed the 
a c c o u n t — 
A, Y e s . 
Q. - - and t o o k $ 4 4 0 ? 
A. Y e s . 
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78-7-45. Private attorney guardian ad litem - Appointment -- Costs and fees — Duties — 
Conflicts of interest -- Pro bono obligation - Indemnification - Minimum qualifications. 
(1) (a) The court may appoint a private attorney as guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of 
the minor in any district court action in which the custody of or visitation with a minor is at issue. The 
attorney guardian ad litem shall be certified by the Director of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem as 
having met the minimum qualifications for appointment, but shall not be employed by or under contract 
with the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem. 
(b) If an attorney guardian ad litem has been appointed for the minor in any prior or concurrent action 
and that attorney guardian ad litem is available, the court shall appoint that attorney guardian ad litem, 
unless good cause is shown why another attorney guardian ad litem should be appointed. 
(c) If, after appointment of the attorney guardian ad litem, an allegation of abuse, neglect, or 
dependency of the minor is made the court shall: 
(i) determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor to continue the appointment; or 
(ii) order the withdrawal of the private attorney guardian ad litem and appoint the Office of the 
Guardian Ad Litem. 
(2) (a) The court shall assess all or part of the attorney guardian ad litem fees, courts costs, and 
paralegal, staff, and volunteer expenses against the parties in a proportion the court determines to be 
just. 
(b) If the court finds a party to be impecunious, under the provisions of Section 78-7-36, the court 
may direct the impecunious party's share of the assessment to be covered by the attorney guardian ad 
litem pro bono obligation established in Subsection (6)(b). 
(3) The attorney guardian ad litem appointed under the provisions of this section shall: 
(a) represent the best interests of the minor from the date of the appointment until released by the 
court; 
(b) conduct or supervise an independent investigation in order to obtain a clear understanding of the 
situation and needs of the minor; 
(c) interview witnesses and review relevant records pertaining to the minor and the minor's family, 
including medical, psychological, and school records; 
(d) if the minor is old enough to communicate and unless it would be detrimental to the minor: 
(i) meet with and interview the minor; 
(ii) determine the minor's goals and concerns regarding custody or visitation; and 
(iii) counsel the minor regarding the nature, purpose, status, and implications of the case, of hearings, 
of recommendations, and proposals by parties and of court orders; 
(e) conduct discovery, file pleadings and other papers, prepare and review orders, and otherwise 
comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as necessary to protect the best interest of the minor; 
(f) unless excused by the court, prepare for and attend all mediation hearings and all court 
conferences and hearings, and present witnesses and exhibits as necessary to protect the best interests of 
the minor; 
(g) identify community resources to protect the best interests of the minor and advocate for those 
resources; and 
(h) participate in all appeals unless excused by the court. 
(4) (a) The attorney guardian ad litem shall represent the best interests of a minor. If the minor's 
wishes differ from the attorney's determination of the minor's best interests, the attorney guardian ad 
litem shall communicate to the court the minor's wishes and the attorney's determination of the minor's 
best interests. A difference between the minor's wishes and the attorney's determination of best interests 
is not sufficient to create a conflict of interest. 
(b) The court may appoint one attorney guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of more than 
one minor child of a marriage. 
(5) An attorney guardian ad litem appointed under this section is immune from any civil liability that 
might result by reason of acts performed within the scope of duties of the attorney guardian ad litem. 
(6) (a) Upon the advice of the Director of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem, the Judicial Council 
shall by rule establish the minimum qualifications and requirements for appointment by the court as an 
attorney guardian ad litem. 
(b) An attorney guardian ad litem may be required to appear pro bono in one case for every five cases 
in which the attorney is appointed with compensation. 
(7) This section shall be effective in the Second, Third, and Fourth Judicial Districts on July 1, 2001, 
and in the remaining judicial districts of the state on July 1, 2002. 
Amended by Chapter 168, 2002 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78_0C041.ZIP 3,942 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 28, 2005 
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7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 I And at one point she started arguing and 
23 saying that because I'm from California and was 
24 unfamiliar with the way heating bills work here in 
25 Utah that I just didn't know what I was talking about 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 15 
1 And I had been in the kitchen cutting some things and 
2 had the knife in my hand, walked into the living room 
3 and was shaking the knife as I was talking to her, 
4 just as you would gesture with your hands. I was not 
5 threatening her in any way at all. That was what 
6 happened. 
7 Q. Did she take it as a threat? 
8 A . I donf t know. 
9 Q. Okay. How did the discussion end? 
10 A. I don!t remember exactly how the discussion 
11 ended. I believe I left the discussion at one point 
12 and went back into the kitchen and let Todd finish the 
13 discussion with her. I think we basically just agreed 
14 to pay it and move on. 
15 Q. I didn!t ask you at the beginning of this 
16 deposition. Are you on any medication? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. None at all? You don!t take any medication? 
19 A. No. Other than aspirin or, you know, 
20 headache medication. 
21 Q. Okay. Are you in good health? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Have you had any health difficulties through 
24 the years? 
25 A. Nothing major. I've had some cysts on my 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 16 
n^,T-.^mav R o n n r f - i n n r P p r v i c e s , Inc. 
Todd Stone 
2783 Melony Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah - Third District Court 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Motion # 1 to produce documents 
V. 
Todd Stone (Respondent) Case #: 014903655 
Commissioner: Casey 
Judge: Medley 
Respondent Motions the Court the following: 
In the October 6, 2005 hearing before the court, the Guardian ad litem stated the minor children (plural) 
are afraid. The Guardian failed to prove that the inference made was against the Respondent, or even 
that the inference was supported with facts. 
The two younger minor children have represented completely different positions both to the court and to 
the Respondent. The two minor children have pleaded with the Respondent to help them, and has also 
represented to their counsel differently than the Guardian represented to the court. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent motions the court to compel Guardian ad litem to produce the 
documents the Guardian inferred or implied existed from the two younger minor children that caused the 
court to be persuaded to rule that the minor children could be taken to California. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent motions the court to read and consider the previously submitted letters 
regarding the children and affidavit of the children's counsel that the Guardian prevented from being 
heard in order to understand the children's desires, concerns, and best interests. 
Dated this day of December, 2005. Signed: 
Todd Stone Pro Se 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) appeared before me on the 
day of , with satisfactory evidence to prove to me his/her identity and signed this document 
in my presence and afiRrmed that he/she had read this document and understood its contents and that the contents were true 
to his/her personal knowledge. 
DATED this day of , . 
Notary Public /Deputy Clerk Signature 
Certificate of Delivery 
I certify that on December , 2005 I caused a copy of this document to be delivered to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 6925 Union Park Center, suite #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Brent Chipman 215 South State Street, suite #1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sharon Kishner 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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1 Q. And when did you do that? 
2 A. We purchased that in 1989. 
3 Q. And then you moved in there, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And has it been refinanced since you moved 
6 out of it? Or let!s say since the initial purchase* 
7 A. I don't believe that --
8 Q. Maybe I've got you confused. 
9 A. Well, no. It's just we've done so many 
10 creative things financially in our marriage that 
11 I've -- it's hard to keep straight exactly what we've 
12 done and what we haven't. I don't believe that has 
13 been refinanced. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. We may have refinanced it. 
16 Q. How much was placed down as a down payment 
17 on that property? 
18 A. I do not know what the down payment was on 
19 that. 
20 Q. Do you have any estimate? 
21 A. I do not know. 
22 Q. Do you know where the money came from? 
23\1 A. I know that part of that money came from my 
24 retirement plan. That's why I was saving money in my 
25 retirement plan to begin with, was for a down payment 
Kaprice Gunn, CSRr RPR 91 
MAY-06-2004 THU 05:14 PM FABIAN & CLENDENIN FAX NO. 801 531 1716 
P. 02 
Delano S. Fmdlay 
May 6, 2004 
Page 2 
I was disappointed to hear that Todd has not obtained a loan against 
either of the other properties to obtain funds for the evaluation and to pay on the 
judgments entered against him In this market of refinancing and home equity loans, I 
cannot believe that Todd is restricted in any way from obtaining a loan that could be 
secured by either of the properties that are now unencumbered except by his mother's 
claims and the judgments awarded to Joanne 
I understand that Brittany has met with the counselor at LDS Family 
Services I am asking my client to have the counselor contact the guardian regarding 
the results of the counseling and her recommendations 
Donna J La Fara To: Scott Knudson/CMD/CF/CCI@Countrywide 3 
cc: %<Cmijr*/ 0 3 / 2 8 / 2 0 0 3 09:19 AM
 S u b j e c t : Underwriting Exception results for Stone LN# 23071918 
Underwriting Exception results for Stone LN# 23071918 
*************************************************************************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
U/W Support Disposition: APPROVED 
CONDITIONS: 
Exception approved, no mortgage lates in the last 12 months. 
Borrower to provide an acceptable letter of explanation on the mortgage lates. 
Comply with all other program guidelines and requirements. 
All the information contained in this request is accurate 
The loan meets all other program guidelines and requirements 
The appraisal supports the value and marketability of the subject. 
If all conditions above are not met this exception is null and void! 
*************************************************************************** 
# # * * * * # # # # # • # # # # 
PRICING ADD-ONS 
Underwriter Comments: 
*************************************************************************** 
**************** 
Exception Description: will not give approval 
Compensating Factors (if any): 
THIS IS AN EXCEPTION DECISION ONLY AND NOT A LOAN APPROVAL. 
IF ALL CONDITIONS ARE NOT MET, THIS EXCEPTION IS NULL AND VOID. 
Fabian 
Clendenin 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
bchipman@fabianlaw.com 
April 4, 2003 
SENT BY TELEFAX AND FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
Martin N. Olsen 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8142 South State Street 
Midvaie, Utah 84047 
Fax No. 255-8067 
Re: Stone v. Stone 
Dear Marty: 
Here is a Motion and Affidavit I am filing on behalf of Joanne Stone. I 
have scheduled the matter in connection with the Status Hearing on the 14th. 
I have also finished a draft of the Answers to Interrogatories, and I have a 
large amount of documents from my client in response to the Requests for Production of 
Documents, I think I can have the Answers and Responses finalized next week so that 
you will have them prior to the hearing.. 
ltr
 Wly client remains interested in settlement. She wants to have her name 
off the mortgage obligations on any real property awarded to your client. I do not know 
if Todd's mother could help him to refinance any necessary obligations into his own 
name. Otherwise, it may make more sense to simply sell one or two of the properties if 
your client is not able to purchase Joanne's equity. We would like to be able to move 
forward in listing the appropriate properties for sale to take advantage of the selling 
season. 
I have also checked with Mrs. Stone and she does not have a copy of any 
Order from April last year as referenced in Todd's letter/motion filed with the court in 
January, I may file a response to his requests next week, but I may simply have to 
make the arguments and observations contained in my letter of March 27th. 
275922^1 
)ATE: 06/30/2003 
JORROWER: TODD STONE 
)ASE #: 
.OAN#: 23071918 
'ROPERTY ADDRESS: 4739 
SALT 
& JOANNE STONE 
SOUTH PINTAIL COURT 
LAKE CITY UT 84117-
BRANCH #0000080 
3981 SOUTH 700 EAST SUITE 5 
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84107-
(801)266-9406 
Br Fax No. : (801)266-1752 
NOTICE OF ACTION TAKEN 
•ESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED CREDIT.- Conf Fixed Fastrack 30 
•ESCRIPTION OF ACTION TAKEN: Approved but not accepted by Applicant 
ART I. In compliance with Regulation "B" (Equal Credit Opportunity Act), you are advised that your recent application for an increase, 
xtension, or renewal of credit has been declined or action was taken as shown below. The decision to deny your application was based on 
le following reasons: 
CREDIT 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No credit file 
Insufficient number credit references provided 
Insufficient credit file 
Unable to verify credit references 
Garnishment, attachment, foreclosure, collection or 
judgement repossession or suit 
Tax or other liens 
Excessive obligations in contrast to income 
Unacceptable payment record on previous mortgage 
Lack of cash reserves 
Delinquent credit obligations (past or present) 
Bankruptcy (past or present) 
OTHER 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
• Unable to verify employment 
• Unacceptable length of employment 
Temporary or irregular employment 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
INCOME 
• Insufficient income to support loan 
Unable to verify qualifying income 
Insufficient liquid assets to close the loan 
Denied by: 
• FHA • VA 
• Fannie Mae • PMI 
• Freddie Mac 
Credit application incomplete 
Inadequate Collateral 
• Property unacceptable 
Inadequate equity 
Insufficient data to support value of 
property 
Unacceptable appraisal 
Unacceptable leasehold 
We do not grant credit to any applicant on the 
terms and conditions you request. 
Credit cannot be granted as originally requested. 
However, pending your approval within 
days we will approve the following: 
• 
• 
RESIDENCY 
• Temporary residence 
• Too short a period of residence 
Unable to verify residence 
L _ l 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Loan Program 
Loan Amt. $_ 
Term years 
Interest Rate 
Other 
• Application Withdrawn 
>ART II. Disclosure of use of information obtained from an outside source. 
| I Our credit decision was based in whole or in part on information obtained in a report from the consumer reporting agency listed 
1
— ' below. You have a right under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to know the information contained in your credit file at the consumer 
reporting agency. The reporting agency played no part in our decision and is unable to supply specific reasons why we have 
denied credit to you. You also have a right to a free copy of your report from the reporting agency, if you request it no later than 
60 days after you receive this notice. In addition, if you find that any information contained in the report you receive is inaccurate 
or incomplete, you have the right to dispute the matter with the reporting agency. 
Name: 
Address: 
Telephone Number: or Toll Free Number: 
• Our credit decision was based in whole or in part on information obtained from an affiliate or from outside source other than a 
consumer reporting agency. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, you have the right to make a written request, no later than 60 
days after you receive this notice, for disclosure of the nature of this information. 
If you have any questions regarding this notice, you should contact: 
Creditor's Name: 
Creditor's Address: 3 9 8 1 SOUTH 700 EAST SUITE 5 
SALT LAKE C I T Y . UT 8 4 1 0 7 -
TODD LUND STONE 07/01 
3747 HILLSIDE LN 277-9955 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84109 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
&ft 
31-5/1240 
DATE 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF . <$0(&>i-/zr hb#lt> -LOprk?. 
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°KM*I6400LS67crs 
<£ ***164.67***** 
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R e e d : 
t c i p a l : 
> r e s t : 
>r ' s Fee • 
•» C h a r g e : 
1310 
4 3 0 . 0 0 D a t e R e c ' d : 
T h i s Payment 
48.35 
379.15 
2 .50 
.00 
.00 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
05/14/92 Int Pd to: 05/01/92 Int Rate: 9.000 
Year-to-Date Previous Balance: 50553.66 
237 .14 
1899 .31 
Adjustments: 
Current Balance: 
Reserve Balance: 
Lte Chg Balance: 
.00 
50505.31 
.00 
145.04 
Ler: ALVIN JAC0BSEN 
rAkiTi V T D ! ICT 
Buyer: LEWIS STONE 
TODD STONE 
n i i il—it I / AIM I [ _ r \ C O I I H I C H U N I Acc t tt 1310 
RECIPIENT'S name & address 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
CONTRACT COLLECTION DEPT. 
1843 N. 400 U. SUITE 101 
LAYTON UT 84041 
Federal identification 
87-0470768 
SELLER'S name 
ALVIN JACOBSEN 
no . 
PAYER'S name & address 
LEWIS STONE 
6931 PROMENADE DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121-
Federal identification no. 
549-30-8517 
1 PAYER'S mortgage interest* 
$ 4592.55 
2 Points paid directly by PAYER 
.00 
s amount shown may not be fully deductible by you on your Federal income tax 
.rn. Limitations based on the cost and value of the secured property may 
y. In addition, you may only deduct an amount of mortgage interest to the 
nt it was incurred by you, actually paid by you, and not reimbursed by 
her person. 
INAL BAL 53,000.00 
INING BAL 50,742.45 
REST RATE 9.000 
DATE TRANSACTION 
RESERVE BAL .00 YTD 
LTE CHG BAL 124.77 YTD 
TRUST BAL .00 INT 
AMOUNT INT PD TO PRINCIPAL 
INT PD 
PRIN PD 
PD TO 
INTEREST 
4,592.55 
524.30 
12/01/91 
END BAL 
1/15/91 
L/15/91 
2/12/91 
2/12/91 
3/18/91 
3/18/91 
3/18/91 
J/18/91 
1/11/91 
-/11/91 
i/13/91 
i/13/91 
./17/91 
/17/91 
/17/91 
/17/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
/I6/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
/16/91 
'16/91 
/11/91 
'11/91 
'15/91 
"15/91 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
LTE PMT.INCLD 
CURR LATE CHG 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
LTE PMT,INCLD 
CURR LATE CHG 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
CURR LATE CHG 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
LTE PMT.INCLD 
CURR LATE CHG 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
CURR LATE CHG 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
PAYMENT 
BUYER FEE PMT 
427.50 
2.50 
427.50 
2.50 
426.45 
1 .05 
21 .32 
2.50 
427.50 
2.50 
427.50 
2.50 
426.45 
1 .05 
21 .32 
2.50 
427.50 
21 .32 
2.50 
426.45 
.05 
.32 
.50 
1 
21 
2 
417.50 
21 .32 
2.50 
427.50 
2.50 
427.50 
2.50 
1/01/91 
1/01/91 
2/01/91 
2/01/91 
3/01/91 
3/01/91 
3/01/91 
3/01/91 
4/01/91 
4/01/91 
5/01/91 
5/01/91 
6/01/91 
6/01/91 
6/01/91 
6/01/91 
7/01/91 
7/01/91 
7/01/91 
8/01/91 
8/01/91 
8/01/91 
8/01/91 
9/01/91 
9/01/91 
9/01/91 
10/01/91 
10/01/91 
11/01/91 
11/01/91 
43.00 
.00 
43.32 
.00 
42.60 
.00 
.00 
.00 
43 .97 
.00 
44 .30 
.00 
43 .58 
.00 
.00 
.00 
44 .96 
.00 
.00 
44 .24 
.00 
.00 
.00 
35.62 
.00 
.00 
45.89 
.00 
46.24 
.00 
384 .50 
.00 
384 .18 
.00 
383 .85 
.00 
.00 
.00 
383.53 
.00 
383 .20 
.00 
382.87 
.00 
.00 
.00 
382.54 
.00 
.00 
382.21 
.00 
.00 
.00 
381.88 
.00 
.00 
381 .61 
.00 
381 .26 
.00 
.75 
.75 
.43 
.43 
.83 
.83 
.83 
.83 
.86 
.86 
.56 
.56 
51223. 
51223. 
51180 
51180. 
51137 
51137. 
51137. 
51137. 
51093, 
51093. 
51049. 
51049. 
51005.98 
51005.98 
51005.98 
51005.98 
50961.02 
50961. 
50961, 
50916, 
50916. 
50916, 
50916, 
50881.16 
50881.16 
50881 
50835 
50835 
50789 
50789 
.02 
.02 
.78 
.78 
.78 
.78 
.16 
.27 
.27 
.03 
.03 
A Q C 
INAL BAL 53,000.00 RESERVE BAL .00 YTD INT PD 4,592.55 
INING BAL 50,742.45 LTE CHG BAL 124.77 YTD PRIN PD 524.30 
REST RATE 9.000 TRUST BAL .00 INT PD TO 12/01/91 
DATE TRANSACTION AMOUNT INT PD TO PRINCIPAL INTEREST END BAL 
2/23/91 PAYMENT 427.50 12/01/91 46.58 380.92 50742.45 
2/23/91 CURR LATE CHG 21.32 12/01/91 .00 .00 50742.45 
2/23/91 BUYER FEE PMT 2.50 12/01/91 .00 .00 50742.45 
MD M« iR/ii;_nqni fMnrfaaaft Tnterest Statement) 
HIDDEN LAKE 
CONDOMINIUM 
10*1 fAST 4 t 0 0 SOUTH-SAITIAKE CITY UTAH $4U7' U 0 1 1 3 6 1 - 4 * 0 * 
STONE, TODD & LEWIS 
OWNER/NONRESIDENT 1 6 5 
2 7 8 3 MELONY DRIVE 
S L C , UT R i i 2 4 
lAiift- 1 O S \ "i. V 
V;,. -n • r 
\9-
i ENTRY # 6217690 KIND OF INSTR QCD BOOK 727H PAGE 105~ 
DATE 11SO1995 TIME OHHO FEE 12-00 REQ BRIGHTON TITLE 
3ID 10.00 INSTR DATE 11151995 NUMBER OF RECORDED PAGES 
IS STONE« LEWIS FRED GTO STONE, TODD JT GTE 
STONE., TODD LUND GTO STONE- TODD GTD 
STONE, JOANNE JT GTE 
rp pARTYS? N S DOCUMENT FINISHED? Y 6 6 
DATE FINISHED: 12/13/1995 
>8-£0E-0£0-0G00 HIDDEN LAKE CONDO * SUB 00005 
TOG/W EASE IN COM AREAS B A 00006 
U A 7 3 9 0 0 0 0 7 
1=RXKP 3=RXPS H^PREV 5=PH0NT SEARCH 6=NEXT 7=RXPT S^RXPN ?=MENU 
=<XAB 11=RXAP 1S=RXLP 13=VTDI 1H=B00K/PAGE 
ESCROW SPECIALISTS 
THE FOLLOWING MORTGAGE INTEREST INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. THE AMOUNT SHOWN IS DEDUCTIBLE BY YOU ON 
YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURN ONLY TO THE EXTENT IT WAS ACTUALLY 
PAID BY YOU AND NOT REIMBURSED BY ANOTHER PERSON. THIS INFORMATION 
TAKES THE PLACE OF IRS FORM 1098 - MORTGAGE INTEREST STATEMENT FOR 1995. 
ACCOUNT #ES7391 INTEREST: $3660.98 
STONE, LEWIS 549-30-8517 
2783 MELONY DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124 
Salt Lafce City. u 
GUARD«A*U»SAFETV BtUE WBL 
OCtarke Atiwrtcar 
ADDENDUM L>^ 
Tab 40 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE : CASE HISTORY 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : Case No: 014903655 DA 
TODD L STONE : Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY 
Respondent. : Date: Nov. 28, 2005 
CALENDAR 
HEARING scheduled on Dec 12, 2005 at 11:00 AM in Fourth Floor 
W48 with Judge MEDLEY. 
1 hr setting Re: proposed final pleadings. 
Page 1 (last) 
Fabian 
Clendenin 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South Stare, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone; (801)531-8900 
PC. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
!icjiipn}an@tfybiqnlaw.wm 
December 9, 2005 
SENT BY FACSIMILE AND 
BY FIRST CLASS MAIL 
Mary C. Corporon 
Corporon, Williams, & Bradford 
405 South Main Street, Suite 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax No. 328-9565 
Re: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone 
Dear Mary: 
The Christmas Concert referenced in my prior letter is at 6:00 p.m. on 
December 14th and the Park Elementary School In Hayward, California 
At a small claims court hearing, Mr, Stone mentioned that he thought the 
hearing with Judge Medley on Monday the 12th was to allow you to withdraw and to 
argue his many pro se motions. I explained my understanding that the one hour 
hearing was on the Objections to the proposed Supplemental Findings and Decree in 
order to resolve those matters and have the final Supplemental pleadings entered by 
the court. 
hipman 
BRC/aec 
cc: Joanne Stone 
Todd Stone 
Sharon Kishner 
J58XS? I 
Paul J. Morken (10483) 
Frank D. Mylar (5116) 
MYLAR LAW, PC 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 858-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 858-0701 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Intervener 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNABELLE STONE, 
Petitioner/Intervener, 
v. 
JOANNE L. STONE 
Respondent/Petitioner, 
AND 
TODD L. STONE 
Respondent/Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANNABELLE STONE 
Case No. 014903655 DA 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Paul J. Morken (10483) 
Frank D. Mylar (5116) 
MYLAR LAW, PC. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 858-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 858-0701 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Intervener 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNABELLE STONE, 
Petitioner/Intervener, 
v. 
JOANNE L. STONE 
Respondent/Petitioner, 
AND 
TODD L. STONE 
Respondent/Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH TO RESPONDENTS, JOANNE STONE AND TODD STONE: 
JOANNE STONE AND TODD STONE are each hereby summoned and required to file 
their respective Answers in writing to the attached Petitioner/Intervener's Verified Petition for 
Grandparent Visitation to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at the following address: 450 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to serve upon or mail to, Frank D. Mylar, Attorney for 
Petitioner/ Intervener, MYLAR LAW, P.C., 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600, Midvale, Utah 
84047, an exact copy of each of your respective Answers, within twenty (20) days after service of 
this Summons upon each of you. 
SUMMONS - 20 Days 
Case No. 014903655 DA 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Paul! Morken( 10483) 
Frank D. Mylar (5116) 
MYLAR LAW, PC. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 858-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 858-0701 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Intervener 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNABELLE STONE, 
Petitioner/Intervener, 
v. 
JOANNE STONE 
Respondent/Petitioner, 
AND 
TODD STONE 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
GRANDPARENT VISITION 
Case No. 014903655 DA 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Respondent/Respondent. 
PETITIONER/INTERVENER, ANNABELLE STONE, through her attorneys, Paul J. 
»lorken and Frank D. Mylar, respectfully petitions the court for an order for grand parent visitation, 
icluding all other necessary orders pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-5-2, as follows: 
L PARTIES, STANDING, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
ADDENDUM 16 
Tab 41 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TODD STONE vs. JOANNE STONE 
: NUMBER 068900144 SC denovo District 
IENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
MARK KOURIS 
TIES 
Plaintiff - TODD STONE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
Defendant - JOANNE STONE 
HAYWARD, CA 9454 5 
Represented by: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
DUNT SUMMARY 
E NOTE 
Old Case #058903938 
CEEDINGS 
11-06 Case filed 
11-06 Judge ROTH assigned. 
11-06 Note: *Mailed copy to defendant and used Plaintiff's own form 
for Appeal as per Phyllis. 
10-06 Filed: Mediation Notice - This case has not been resolved with 
mediation. Sent to Judge for trial setting. 
15-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 068900144 ID 6535559 
TRIAL DE NOVO is scheduled. 
Date: 03/16/2006 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: STEPHEN ROTH 
•15-06 TRIAL DE NOVO scheduled on March 16, 2006 at 10:00 AM in Third 
Floor - W35 with Judge ROTH. 
•16-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Trial De Novo 
Judge: STANTON M TAYLOR 
Clerk: marcyt 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): TODD STONE 
inted: 05/16/06 12:37:28 Page 1 
NUMBER 068900144 SC denovo District 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Video 
Tape Number: 10:15 
TRIAL 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for trial de novo. 
The Court hears argument from Todd Stone and Brent Chipman, counsel 
for Joanne Stone. 
The Court finds the claims made by Mr. Stone are either part of 
the divorce action or part of a case filed by his mother which is 
pending. According, the Court finds no cause. 
16-06 Case Disposition is Dismsd w prejudice 
Disposition Judge is STEPHEN ROTH 
16-06 Judge KOURIS assigned. 
rinted: 05/16/06 12:37:28 Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM if 
Tab 42 
FINDLA W LLC 
6713 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone No. (801 ) 733-7727 
July 6, 2004 
FAMILY, ADOLESCENT, CHILD T R E A T M E N T SERVICES 
Dr. Matthew Davies, Ph.D. 
5353 South 900 East, Suite 230 
Murray, U T 84117 
Facsimile: (801) 263-2845 
Re: Stone v. Stone, Civil No. 014903655 
Dear Dr. Davies: 
Enclosed please find a copy of a proposed Order On Order to Show Cause which has been 
approved as to form by Brent Chipman, attorney for Joanne Stone. I anticipate that it will be approved 
by Robert Steele and will be signed by both Commissioner Casey and Judge Medley in the next couple of 
days. 
I understand that Todd Stone has recently paid you $1,720.50 to be applied to the cost of 
completing the custody evaluation and your report pursuant to Rule 4-903. As you will note the Order 
calls for Joanne Stone to make up any additional amount necessary to get the evaluation completed 
through the Rule 4-903 conference. It will come from Joanne Stone's portion of the federal tax refund 
which the parties recently received. 
The Court has directed counsel for the parties to inquire of you and ascertain how much more it 
will cost to get the custody evaluation completed through this stage. Would you be so kind as to advise 
me of the amount? I understand from your July I, 2004 letter to Todd Stone, that you now have a credit 
balance of $2,499.50 on the account. 
Could you also advise me as to when your schedule will allow you to resume the evaluation and 
how long you estimate that it will take until it is completed through this stage? As you will note from the 
copy of the order, Joanne Stone will have the children on vacation in California from July 22, 2004 until 
August 8, 2004. 
Thank you so much for your assistance in this matter. If you have any other questions please 
advise me and I will do my best to get you a prompt answer to ther 
cc: R. Steele 
T. Stone 
Enclosure: I 
Delano S. Fin&ay, Attorney and Counselor at Law 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE L STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TODD L STONE, 
Respondent 
MINUTES 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No: 014903655 DA 
Commissioner: T PATRICK CASEY 
Date: June 22, 2004 
Clerk: susanp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: BRENT R CHIPMAN 
Petitioner(s): JOANNE L STONE 
Other Parties: ROBERT L STEELE 
Attorney for the Respondent: DELANO S FINDLAY 
Respondent(s): TODD L STONE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 9-04 Tape Count: 10:58-11:37 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for a hearing regarding the 
petitioner's motion for order to show cause. The parties and 
counsel were present as listed above. 
A partial stipulation was reached and read into the record and 
approved by the court; 
1. Petitioner will cooperate to get the no-contact order lifted 
in the criminal action to allow; e-mail one time a week on Saturday, 
from petitioner to respondent of the other way around just to 
schedule for the next week; 
2. Phone calls will be between 8:00 and 9:00 on Sunday. If the 
respondent is unable to get hold of the children, the petitioner 
will have them call the respondent before they go to bed. There is 
no limitation on weekday calling; 
3. Children can be dropped off both on the weekday and weekend by 
petitioner at the grandmother's home* They should be returned on 
Page 1 
Case No: 014903655 
Date: Jun 22, 2004 
the weekday and weekend by 9:30 between now and when school starts 
back up; 
4. Both parties are to have access to the counselor through the 
GAL as read into the record; 
5. The counseling for the minor child Brittney will be dealt with 
as read into the record; 
IN DISPUTE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS (TPC) -
1. With respect to the custody evaluation. Counsel are to 
contact Dr. Davies and determine how much more money he will need 
to get them to a 4-904 conference with the Commissioner, take that 
3flEj$HMIl£.-4E»BHFT(he tax refund to |^ Petitioner 
is to have access to the balance of the refund; 
2. With respect to the extended parent time. The petitioner is 
allowed to take the children to California with her at the time she 
scheduled this summer. Respondent needs to adjust his block of 
time around that schedule; 
3. Both parties request for attorney's fees are reserved; 
Mr. Findlay is to prepare and submit the appropriate order. 
Page 2 (last) 
Tab 43 
ADDENDUM i* 
Welfare assistance provided to Stone Family January t o December 2 0 0 2 
i l f e g ^ ^ 
Date R<ef# type W::FM&^r0er^-H' G66d& \&miisiimg Uiititi&t 
16-Jan^02 
31-Jan-02 
31^Jari-b2' 
31-Jan-02 
31-Jarift)2" 
2-Feb-02 
16-Fet>-02 
22-Feb~02 
24-Feb-02 
24-Feb-02 
24-Feii-b2" 
2-Mar-02 
3-Mar-02 ; 
3-Mar-02 
3-Mar-02 
16-Mar-02 
29-Mar-b£ 
14-Apr-02 
2b-Apr-02; 
15-May-02 
2b-Juh-02 
17-Aug-02 
21-Sep-02T 
9-Nov-02 
3437 
3439 
4856858 
^ S 5 6 8 6 f 
4860670 
; ' : : - ' ^*3 :p7 ' ' 
3448 
''-''*- PW 
4856860 
3451 
Check 
Cr lc lc -
Check 
irBer^! 
Order 
Brdef'':>7 
Order 
ch&iP 
Check 
Order 
Checicl-
Check 
4856859 
3472 
48S0674 
4860672 
4&35P3 
4860671 
%§56§5f 
4856862 
Order 
Check 
Order 
Order 
#r#eifP 
Order 
S L Suburban Sanitation District Utilities - Sewer $ 34.40 
: : ; :U taK-PdW^at#^^ 
Questar Gas Utilities - Natural Gas $ 261.60 
;
-iift3pmo?eM^ 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 100.32 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 38.54 
Questar Gas Utilities - Natural Gas $ 120.32 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 55.18 
S L Suburban Sanitation District Utilities - Sewer $ 16.00 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 87.22 
LDS Family Services Counseling Services $ 60.00 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 130.38 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 103.23 
Bishop's Storehouse Food Order $ 197.57 
$ 34.40 
$ 261.60 
' $ 100.32 
$ 38 54 
$ 120.32 
" $ 55.18 
$ 16.00 
$ 87.22 
'^ _ , ^ ..,,.„,..,...„,..'.,,,..,.,. ,,.,..,„, J t ....6°-00. 
$ 130.38 
$ 103.23 
"$""197.57" ' ' 
f l ^ f y f j g g ^ ^ 
24 $ 2,227.96 $1,258.06 $108.00 $ 240.00 $ 621.90 
JOANNE L STONE SSN: 561-71-2760 FOR THE PERIOO: 07/01/00 - 09/30/0 
balance as of 07/01/00 
:ES AS OF 07/01/00 
ITY 07/01/00 TO 09/30/00 
i butions 
fnployee Be fo re -Tax 
mployee A f t e r - T a x 
mployer Match 
• 11 o v e r / T r a n s f e r s 
tment G a i n / ( L o s s ) 
t r i b u t i o n s 
rawals/Adjustments 
oans Issued 
Payments 
G BALANCE 09/30/00 
anding Loans 
OF ALL FUNDS 09/30/00 
'/OO ALLOCATION ELECTION 
Money Market 
$.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
Fixed Income 
$9,866.27 
.00 
454.58 
227.29 
.00 
286.80 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$10,834.94 
Bond Index 
$.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
Stock Index 
$ 
$ 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Value Stock 
$.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
Growth Stock Small Co Stock 
$.00 $.00 
OH 100% OH OH OH 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
OH 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
OH 
Int'l Stock 
$.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$.00 
0% 
Total 
$.C 
$9,866.2 
454 
227 
286 
$10,834 
$10,834 
100; 
T PLAN 
87 Employee C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
• '86 Employee C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
ngs on Employee C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
•e-Tax Employee C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
ings on Be fo re Tax C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
)ver C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
ings on R o l l o v e r C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
zyer Match ing C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
ings on Employer C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
. ACCOUNT BALANCE 
1 
6 
2 
$10 
$ 
161 
43 
,836 
,793 
,834 
.00 
.22 
.18 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.60 
.94 
.94 
A f t e r - T a x 
Before-Tax 
6% 
OH 
NE L STONE 
MEL0NY DR 
LAKE CITY UT 84124-3051 
INVESTMENT FUND RATES OF RETURN AS OF 09/30/00 
* 
FUND LAST QUARTER YEAR-TO-DATE Note: Past performance does not guarantee 
personalized rate of return 2.8H 5.6% -- (Includes any outstanding loan(s)) 
REMENT SAVINGS PLAN: 
lary: 
I STONE 
Alternates 
10/4/2005 
10:42 AM 
Member Name: JOANNE STONE 
Date Description 
6/1/2005 **FINANCE CHARGE** 
7/1/2005 **FINANCE CHARGE** 
7/20/2005 VISA - 07/17 01 433691 5499 SHOP 
AM/NATURAL CURES 847-7777131 IL 017460 
7/23/2005 VISA - 07/20 01 445501 5542 OLYMPUS VIEW 
SINCLAIR SALT LAKE CIT UT 02059 
8/1/2005 **FINANCE CHARGE** 
8/15/2005 VISA-08/12 01 471705 5511 HINCKLEY 
DODGE 1 SALT LAKE CIT UT 012855 
8/15/2005 OVERLIMIT FEE 
8/22/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
8/22/2005 COURTESY REBATE 
8/30/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
9/1/2005 **FINANCE CHARGE** 
9/9/2005 VISA - 09/05 13 433691 5499 SHOP AMERICA 
847-7777131 IL 
10/1/2005 **FINANCE CHARGE** 
America First Credit Union 
History Inquiry 10/01/2004 to 10/04/2005 
29.00 
Page: 
Account: 392993-2 
Amount 
/Subsidy 
.00 
.00 
39.90 
Div / Int 
/Unapplied 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Principal 
Misc Insur 
.00 
.00 
39.90 
Fee 
/Escrow 
Balance 
/Escw Bal 
.00 
.00 
39.90 
.00 29.00 
.00 
500.00 
17.00 
-29.00 
-17.00 
•539.90 
2.50 
-26.54 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
500.00 
17.00 
-29.00 
-17.00 
-539.90 
2.50 
-26.54 
.00 .00 .00 
68.90 
68.90 
568.90 
585.90 
556.90 
539.90 
.00 
2.50 
-24.04 
-24.04 
HOME EQUITY LINE 9 
10/19/2004 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
11/23/2004 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
12/24/2004 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
2/25/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
2/25/2005 LOAN ADD ON 
3/16/2005 CREDIT UNION CHECK WITHDRAWAL 
3/18/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
4/20/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
5/20/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
6/14/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
6/14/2005 CREDIT UNION CHECK WITHDRAWAL CHECK 
016001436 TO DR. MATTHEW DAVIES 
7/20/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
7/28/2005 CREDIT UNION CHECK WITHDRAWAL CHECK 
016002753 TO DR. MATTHEW DAVIES 
8/22/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
8/30/2005 LOAN ADD ON 
9/20/2005 PAYMENT, THANK YOU 
END 
-377.89 
-374.66 
-372.13 
-369.37 
66.07 
1,750.00 
-369.41 
-387.95 
-385.20 
-382.29 
575.00 
-386.27 
575.00 
-390.96 
539.90 
-395.03 
119.27 
172.44 
151.71 
306.02 
.00 
.00 
102.59 
168.36 
151.97 
125.68 
.00 
187.10 
.00 
175.95 
.00 
160.52 
-258.62 
-202.22 
-220.42 
-63.35 
66.07 
1,750.00 
-266.82 
-219.59 
-233.23 
-256.61 
575.00 
-199.17 
575.00 
-215.01 
539.90 
-234.51 
30,231.07 
29,972.45 
29,770.23 
29,549.81 
29,486.46 
29,552.53 
31,302.53 
31,035.71 
30,816.12 
30,582.89 
30,326.28 
30,901.28 
30,702.11 
31,277.11 
31,062.10 
31,602.00 
31,367.49 
Printed by Employee 4094 
JlM-20-2003 FRI Oi:S3 PN FINANCE Fffl HO, 301240:735 P. 03. 
"Incapacity* for puipo*es of FMLA, b denned to mean inability to work, attend 
school or perform other regular daily activities due to the icrious health condition, 
treatment therefor, cr recovery therefrom. 
b. (f cny of these treatments >wffl be provided by another provide of health services {e.g., 
Physical iScrapis;), please state the nature of the watrnma: _ , 
c. I f a regtmcit of continuing treatment by the patient t* required xwlet youi supervision, 
provide a general description Orfueh rccimen (±g., prescription drag* physical therapy 
mpiriflg specif afanmiart: MAMMY l U ^ n r Y v ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ 
7a, If medical leave i$ required for ihccmployeek absence from work because of the 
employee's own condition (including abseaccs due to pregnancy cr a chnroic condition), is 
the employee 'unable to perform work of any tend? ~ • 
b. If able to perfomi some work, is the employes urtaMc to perform auy one or more of 
the essential functions of the employee'5 job (the employee or the employer should 
supply you with informatj'oa about the csscntid job &acrion*)? - If yea, please 
Visi/ihct essential functions the employee is unable u>perform; 
J±l* - . 
c If neither a, jjprb. apply, is ii necessary for the employee to bo absent from work for 
treatment' 
no t 
m?Al/ft 
Sa. Iflcavc is required to care for s family nember of the employee with a serioua health 
condition, cce$ the patient require assistance for basic medical or personal needs or 
s&frty, or for transportation? W£S 
b. )f no, would the employee's prmcr.ee to provide psychological comfort be beneficial to 
thepaticn: or a«ist in the patient's recovery? 
X7 ± 
go 3 of 3 
S E R V I C E S 
September 29, 2003 
Mr. Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Dear Mr. Stone, 
I am responding to your request of September 24, 2003 to meet with LDS Family Services 
therapist(s) and discuss issues pertaining to assistance provided your children. Your ex-spouse 
has written the agency and denied access to sharing any information. 
We are unable to meet your request at this time. 
Sincerely, 
yu&j± 
Mark H. Glade 
Director 
MHG/je 
cc: David Hardy 
U T A H S A N D Y A G E N C Y 
L U 3 
ays E RV i c E s 
3 February 2004 
Mr. Todd Stone 
6931 Promenade Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Dear Mr. Stone, 
I am responding to your request of February 2, 2004. Your estranged spouse has re-
iterated her request that you not be involved in the children's counseling process. 
We are unable to assist you further at this time. 
Sincerely, 
Mark H. Glade 
Agency Director 
Cc: David Hardy 
U T A H S A N D Y A G E N C Y 
625 EAST 8400 SOUTH - SANDY, UTAH 84070-0525 
MLO^L. /W fa 
Whad on your list today? YouH finditat 
FredMeyer. 
"T 
ikr*is x. u« » /< i> /e. fPn*~ -jo /He 
tski fok i¥oks> £r ^ 
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ADDENDUM kj 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 2 12006 
Todd Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah ~ Court of Appeals 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Appellant's Motion # 1 for certification 
-v- of Constitutionality as afforded the party 
under the United States Constitution, and 
Utah State Constitution for Topic #1 
Todd Stone (Respondent) Court of Appeals Case #: 2006-0353 
Appellant 
The Appellant respectfully comes now in good faith, and mth good cause to present the 
following combined affidavit and motion to the court in order to avoid two separate 
filings. Without a Certification of constitutionality, and a clear cut determination of what 
is right and what is wrong for both the Appellant, and the court, and the Co-Parent Time 
dispute resolution all to follow and be bound by, Justice cannot go forward in this case. 
Todd Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
(801) 277-9955 (Messages) 
State of Utah - Court of Appeals 
Joanne Stone (Petitioner) Appellant's Motion # 4 for Certification 
-v- of Unethical Conduct of Counsel, & 
Certification of Constitutionality as 
afforded the party under the United 
States Constitution, and Utah State 
Constitution for Topics #4 
Todd Stone (Respondent) Court of Appeals Case #: 2006-0353 
Appellant 
There are Two (2) topics basically addressed and requesting Certification of in the 
following affidavit and Motion. In order to avoid two separate filings surrounding around 
the same facts and matters, the two filings have been combined in this lengthy Affidavit 
and Motion. 
Appellant respectfully comes now with this combined sworn affidavit in support of, and 
ukAr 
Motion for Certification of unethical conduct of counsel/ the Utah State Attorney code of 
conduct, and Motion for Certification of Constitutionality under the U.S. Constitution, 
and the State of Utah Constitution from both the Utah Supreme Court, and the United 
States Supreme Court, as to. actions of the Third District Court's denial of the Appellant's 
ADDENDUM 7 # 
Tab 45 
The children and their records are not owned by the 
petitioner. The legislated Advisory Guidelines provide that: 
The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records 
and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event 
of a medical emergency. UCA § 30-3-33 (10) emphasis added 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
& RESEARCH CENTER OAKLAND 
12/19/06 
To Whoni It May Concern: 
I am writing cm behalf of my patient Brittney Stone (DOB 2/3/90) and her 
mother Joanne. Brittney is a 16 year old was diagnosed with metastatic 
Sertoli Leydig, a life threatening ovarian cancer on 12/7/06, She is currently 
hospitalized, as she is receiving her first round of chemotherapy. In the next 
several months, Brittney will require multiple courses of chemotherapy. She 
may also receive a stem cell transplant For the next six to eight months she 
will be hospitalized regularly for one to three weeks at a time. During her 
admission far transplantation, it is likely she will remain in the hospital for 
four to six weeks. There will also be unscheduled admissions for fevers and 
other complications of therapy. 
Throughout her treatment, Brittney will be immunocompromised, leaving her 
very vulnerable to infection* Since she is immunocompromised, Brittney 
cannot qftend school She will need to return to the hospital immediately 
whenever she has a fever. She will also require transfusions of platelets and 
red blood cells. The timing of when these transfusions will be needed cannot 
be predicted, but do need to be given promptly after we recognize the need 
for them. 
Brittney's mother cannot leave the state of California to attend a January 
court date in Utah, She is needed to care for her daughter, bring Brittney to 
the hospital and clinic at a moment's notice, and to meet with Brittney* s 
doctors, 
Brittney's diagnosis is clearly very new and devastating for the entire family. 
Brittney and her mother are just learning new oncology teaching. This 
includes learning Brittney's medication schedule, how to care for her central 
venous catheter (an indwelling access line), the necessary precautions they 
must take to avoid infectious exposures, and signs and symptoms of concern 
for illness to watch for when out of the hospitaL 
I appreciate the court's postponing this hearing until Brittney's condition is 
more stable and predictable. I can be reached at 510-428-3324 if you have 
any questions with regard to this request. Thank you for your prompt 
consideration of this matter. 
Sincere] 
Department ef Hematology/OncoUgy 
Rllion Vichinsky, M.D. 
Ditfcror/Division Chief 
Jamn Feusnerr MD. 
Dirtctor, Oncology 
Mark Walters, MD. 
Dirrctor, BAfi Pro/tram 
Caroline Hastings, M.D. 
Dirraor, Ftttowhip Program 
Barbara Beach, M.D. 
Caria Golden, M.D. 
Carolyn Hoppe, M.D. 
Ashutosh Lai, M.D. 
A&on Matsunaga, M.D. 
Naveen Qureshi, MLD. 
Keith Quirolo, M.D, 
Sylvia Singer, M.D, 
Sarah Scrandjord, M.D. 
Lori Scylcs, M.D. 
Joseph Toridldion, M.D. 
Adult Hematology 
Ward Hagar, M.D. 
Eugene McMillan, M D . 
i Golden, MD. 
Associate Oncologist 
747 Fifty Second Street • Oakland, CA 94WM809 
510-428-3000 
www.childrenshospiisloakland.org 
Fabian 
& 
Clendenin 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801)531-8900 
PO Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial (801)323-2229 
Facsimile (801)531-1716 
bchipman&fabianlaw com 
November 9, 2006 
HAND DELIVERED 
Todd L. Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
RE: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone Civil No. 014903655 
Dear Mr. Stone: 
Brittney has seen a doctor about amenorrhea. She saw a physician for 
the same problem in Salt Lake before the move last fall. They have run some lab tests 
and the doctor has spoken with an endocrinologist at Children's Hospital in Oakland. 
The doctor thinks Brittney may have an overactive adrenal gland. They have run sorr^ e 
more tests and Brittney was scheduled to meet with the endocrinologist last week. 
They are going to take an ultrasound of her ovaries and then meet with the doctor again 
in December. Joanne was told that one possible treatment might be a low dose of a 
birth control medication. 
Fabian 
^lendenin 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Brent R. Chipman 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801)323-2229 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
bchipman(a)fabianluw.com 
December 7, 2006 
HAND DELIVERED 
Todd L. Stone 
3747 Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
RE: Joanne Stone v. Todd Stone Civil No. 014903655 
Dear Mr. Stone: 
As a follow up to my letter of November 9tn, Brittney's medical condition is 
quite serious. Just yesterday Joanne told me that Brittney most likely has a rare form of 
ovarian cancer and that the surgeon at Children's Hospital in Oakland was performing 
surgery today to place a shunt in the area so that chemotherapy could be administered 
through a pick line. She will probably be in the hospital for several days. She is facing 
6 months of chemotherapy. I will forward more information when it becomes available. 
